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Launched in 2015, project FIRES (Financial and Institutional Reforms for 
the Entrepreneurial Society) endeavored to analyze the conditions required 
for smart, inclusive, and sustainable growth in the European Union, in line 
with the Commission’s “Europe 2020” growth strategy. At the heart of the 
project was the dual recognition that the Union suffers from an innovation 
emergency affecting its economic growth and social equality, and that this 
challenge could be overcome if Europe were to become a more entrepreneur-
ial society.
Ample academic research supports the hypothesis that more entrepreneur-
ial regions and countries innovate more and see greater economic growth. 
Moreover, entrepreneurship provides opportunities for a great many people 
and is instrumental in shaping a country’s transition to a more sustainable 
future. Research has also shown that institutions, i.e., the rules of the game in 
a society, go a long way towards explaining the differences in quality and 
quantity of entrepreneurial venturing across countries and regions. Rather 
than adding to this already vast literature, the chief aim of FIRES was to 
translate the insights of some three decades of entrepreneurship research into 
actionable institutional reform proposals. In June 2018, the program officially 
ended after yielding a host of reports, scientific articles, and books that 
addressed the question of how to make the European Union (EU) more entre-
preneurial and innovative from numerous perspectives. FIRES concluded 
with a seven-step procedure, which, if followed, would tailor a reform strategy 
to the needs of a country or region:
• Step 1: Assess the most salient features of the institutions of a country or 
region and trace their historical roots.
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• Step 2: Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the institutions and flag the 
bottlenecks in the entrepreneurial ecosystem using structured data analysis.
• Step 3: Identify using careful primary data collection among entrepreneur-
ial individuals, the most salient features characterizing the start-up process, 
and the barriers that entrepreneurs face.
• Step 4: Map the results of steps 2 and 3 onto a menu of evidence-based 
policy interventions to identify suitable interventions for the region or 
country under investigation.
• Step 5: In light of the historical analysis under step 1, fit the proposed 
reforms to the existing local, regional, and national institutional setup.
• Step 6: Identify the relevant policymakers and procedures, i.e., who should 
change what and in what order for the reform strategy to have the greatest 
chance of success.
• Step 7: Experiment, evaluate, and learn—and return to step 1 for the next 
iteration.
This book centers on the second half of this list. Its purpose is to present a 
menu of evidence-based interventions aimed at creating an entrepreneurial 
society in Europe (Step 4) and to assess who should change what and in what 
order (Step 6) for the reform strategy to have the greatest possible chance of 
success. As such, its purpose is one of synthesizing and finalizing previously 
acquired insights and creating a road map answering the question: Where do 
we go from here?
The present volume is the work of three authors, but we are indebted to 
and draw inspiration from practically all prior FIRES output and the aca-
demic literature beyond. Some previous contributions, however, merit explicit 
mention here.
First, we would like to draw attention to Institutional Reform for Innovation 
and Entrepreneurship: An Agenda for Europe, a book published in the spring of 
2017. Written by Niklas Elert and Magnus Henrekson, also coauthors of this 
volume, as well as Mikael Stenkula, the book was an early attempt to identify 
the institutional preconditions for entrepreneurship across Europe and to 
shortlist the reforms needed to promote a more innovative Union.
Second, we acknowledge the report Identification and Assessment of the Legal 
Implications of an Entrepreneurial Reform Agenda, by Andrei Suse and Nicolas 
Hachez (in collaboration with Axel Marx). They made Elert et al.’s book more 
concrete by offering a comprehensive account of which level of government 
(the European, member state, regional, or local level) had the competencies 
and mandate to implement the suggested reforms.
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Finally, we wish to highlight the contribution of Financial and Institutional 
Reforms for the Entrepreneurial Society, Part I, authored by Mark Sanders, sci-
entific coordinator of the FIRES project and coauthor of this volume. This 
volume was written towards the end of the project and served as a pertinent 
summary of all (or most) of the reform proposals discussed and investigated 
in the project.
In the following, we expand on these and many other sources, creating a 
new and original work in the process.
Stockholm, Sweden Niklas Elert
  Magnus Henrekson
Montpellier, France  Mark Sanders 
April 2019
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In 2005, Harvard professor Benjamin Friedman published the book The 
Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. His message was depressing in its 
simplicity: economic stagnation is a threat to liberal democracy, as it ushers in 
xenophobia and political populism of all colors. Today, amid sluggish growth 
and rising inequality, populism is on the rise. The liberal political and eco-
nomic order of the EU, which Fukuyama (1989) suggested was a more likely 
candidate than the communist utopia for “the end of history,” faces what may 
be its most formidable challenge since the rise of communism.
This book is written to help address this challenge. In line with the view 
expressed by Karl Popper in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), 
we believe that a healthy society is a contestable society. Contestability ensures 
opportunity, freedom, and progress. From that perspective, growth and inno-
vation are as much a manifestation of freedom as they are a precondition for 
a sustainable liberal democratic order. Europe needs an optimistic and com-
pelling new perspective if it is to regain its legitimacy among large parts of its 
population. In a stagnant economy, people no longer see the opportunities for 
improvement and turn to strong leaders who blame outsiders and promise to 
make things right. In a truly entrepreneurial Europe in which all are empow-
ered to participate, their simplistic recipes will lose much of their appeal. 
Reforms enabling smart, inclusive, and sustainable growth across the entire 
EU could, therefore, offer a way out of the present, perilous situation. The 
academic consensus on the importance of an economy that innovates in a 
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sustainable direction and offers opportunities to all lends urgency to 
our agenda.1
Economic stagnation in Europe arguably relates to a lack of innovation, 
which the EU itself acknowledges: when the European Commission launched 
the “Innovation Union,” a flagship initiative of the EU’s 2020 strategy, it 
simultaneously stressed that the EU was “facing a situation of ‘innovation 
emergency’” (European Commission 2015b).2 This stark conclusion followed 
the observation that European member states were gradually slipping out of 
the top positions in global rankings on innovation. In Table 1.1, we present 
recent rankings of the top 20 countries according to the most commonly used 
measures for innovativeness. As can be seen, the USA consistently ranks 
higher than European countries, as do the Asian Tigers Singapore and Hong 
Kong. Nonetheless, half of the top 20 countries in all rankings are European; 
in particular, Nordic and Western European countries continue to do well. By 
contrast, southern and eastern EU member states are virtually absent in the 
rankings, hinting at Europe’s well-known core–periphery pattern.
In view of this evidence, it is troubling that a key term is missing from the 
Commission’s statement warning of the Union’s innovation emergency. 
Despite acknowledging that “[w]e need to do much better at turning our 
research into new and better services and products if we are to remain com-
petitive in the global marketplace and improve the quality of life in Europe,” 
the authors do not mention the word “entrepreneurship” once. One is 
reminded of economist William Baumol’s (1968) lament 50 years ago that 
economics without the entrepreneur is like Hamlet without the Prince of 
Denmark. Since this statement was made, the economics profession has come 
to acknowledge the importance of the entrepreneur; the same does not seem 
to be the case for the EU’s top policymakers.
Our starting point when tackling Europe’s innovation emergency is that 
entrepreneurship—broadly defined as the act of challenging the status quo by 
introducing novelty into the economic realm—must be a central theme of 
such a strategy. While entrepreneurship is a multifaceted concept, we are con-
vinced that particular emphasis must be placed on what has come to be called 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship: the kind of entrepreneurship that intro-
1 As the reasoning suggests, macroeconomics is not a part of this book. Instead, we believe that issues 
related to fiscal and monetary stimulus and the survival of the EU serve to distract from the structural 
transformation the EU must undertake in order to achieve sustainable growth. Åslund and Djankov 
(2017, pp. 5–7) develop this argument in more detail.
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm?pg=why.
 N. Elert et al.
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Table 1.1 Country ranking according to the five most commonly used measures of 


















spending as a 
share of GDP 
2016
1 USA USA Switzerland Switzerland Israel
2 Hong Kong Singapore Netherlands Japan South Korea
3 Singapore Germany Sweden Germany Sweden
4 Netherlands Switzerland UK Sweden Japan
5 Switzerland Japan Singapore Denmark Austria
6 Denmark Netherlands USA South Korea Germany
7 UAE Hong Kong Finland Austria Denmark
8 Norway UK Denmark Netherlands Finland
9 Sweden Sweden Germany Israel USA
10 Canada Denmark Ireland USA Belgium
11 Luxembourg Finland Israel Finland France
12 Ireland Canada South Korea Belgium China
13 China Taiwan Japan France Iceland
14 Qatar Australia Hong Kong Luxembourg Netherlands
15 Germany South Korea Luxembourg UK Norway
16 Finland Norway France Norway Slovenia
17 Taiwan France China Ireland UK
18 Austria New Zealand Canada Canada Czech Rep.
19 Australia Luxembourg Norway Australia Canada
20 UK Israel Australia Italy Italy
Sources: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2018; World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 2018; The Global Innovation Index 2018—Energizing the 
World with Innovation (INSEAD, Cornell University and WIPO); OECD Factbook 2015–
2016: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics; OECD Statistics
aTriadic patent families are a set of patents filed at three of the major patent offices: 
the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO), and the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Patents included in the triadic family are 
typically of higher economic value
duces new products and technologies and serves as a conduit of knowledge to 
generate innovation and growth (Schumpeter 1934 [1911]).3
The evidence is clear that innovation promotes the further diffusion and 
creation of knowledge and ultimately drives economic progress (Romer 1986, 
1990; Aghion and Howitt 1992; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Jones 1995, 
3 In Schumpeterian terms, innovation is the creation of new combinations, generally of (old and new) 
knowledge, resulting in a new product, a new method of production, the opening of a new market, the 
conquest of a new source of supply, or the carrying out of a new organization of industry (Schumpeter 
1934, p. 66; OECD 2010).
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2005). Crucially, Schumpeter saw the entrepreneur, the agent responsible for 
introducing such innovation into the market, as the primus motor of eco-
nomic growth. However, finding suitable empirical proxies for such entrepre-
neurship has proven difficult.4 To this day, a fierce debate in the literature 
continues to confuse Schumpeter’s clearly defined theoretical concept and the 
inherently imprecise proxies for entrepreneurship provided by empirical data. 
In our view, the empirical definition of entrepreneurship is less relevant. What 
matters for our purposes are the qualitative aspects of entrepreneurship; 
empirical evidence taking these aspects into account suggests that an economy 
that fosters high-growth firms and high-impact entrepreneurial firms grows 
faster than an economy with high numbers of small- and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) or a high self-employment rate (Shane 2008; Henrekson and 
Sanandaji 2014, 2019). But for this growth to be inclusive as well as innova-
tive, others have emphasized the importance of a broad base of active “every-
day entrepreneurs” (Welter et al. 2017).
Table 1.2 presents four measures of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
together with the self-employment rate for Western Europe, Eastern Europe, 
the USA, China, and East Asia. While the self-employment rate is consider-
ably lower in the USA than in Western Europe and East Asia, the number of 
US billionaire entrepreneurs per capita—a measure indicative of successful 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship—is three times greater. The other approxi-
mations of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship reveal a similar picture: total 
venture capital (VC) investment as a share of GDP is five times greater in the 
USA than in Western Europe.5 Furthermore, the number of large firms 
founded by entrepreneurs since 1990 is more than three times greater in the 
USA despite Western Europe’s much larger population, and the number of 
unicorns (privately held start-up companies valued at over USD 1 billion as 
determined by private or public investment) per capita is almost seven 
times greater.
Western Europe trumps East Asia only in terms of the number of unicorns 
and is on a par in terms of VC investment as a share of GDP; it scores clearly 
below East Asia based on the number of billionaire entrepreneurs per capita 
and the number of large firms founded by entrepreneurs since 1990. Eastern 
Europe, meanwhile, scores below both East Asia and China on all four mea-
sures and has the highest rate of self-employment (partly reflecting its sizable 
4 As Acs et al. (2014, p. 476) state: “In spite of years of research, entrepreneurship is a fiendishly difficult 
concept to pin down”. Anderson and Starnawska also (2008, p. 224) note: “more than two decades of 
concentrated endeavor have failed to produce a universally acceptable definition of entrepreneurship”.
5 However, this may also be related to the strong path dependency and complementarities in institutions, 
particularly financial institutions, to which we return below.
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agricultural sector) among the five regions compared. In conclusion, all 
regions show a relatively small number of truly transformative entrepreneurs 
and also differ significantly in the width of the base from which such ven-
tures grow.
Overall, the data suggest that contemporary Europe has a comparatively 
less fertile “ecosystem” for Schumpeterian/high-impact entrepreneurship than 
the USA, and in some respects even relative to China and East Asia (O’Connor 
et  al. 2018). In Eastern Europe, much of the self-employment is marginal 
necessity-driven entrepreneurship, whereas in Western Europe the base of 
self-employment may be broad, but opportunities to grow into the global 
competitors of the future, in particular, seem limited. These shortcomings, we 
believe, explain the EU’s innovation emergency and are the most significant 
impediments to the Union transiting to inclusive and sustainable growth; 
developing a broad reform strategy starts from acknowledging that Europe 
has a long way to go in this respect.
We should stress that a more entrepreneurial EU would benefit all strata of 
society and not only the few exceedingly successful Schumpeterian entrepre-
neurs—the latter are, more than anything else, an important measure of ex 
post success. In addition, of course, “the good life” cannot be achieved through 
material consumption alone: as highlighted by Nobel Laureate Edmund 
Phelps in his book Mass Flourishing (2013), individuals find meaning through 
flourishing as producers of offspring, goods, and services, and as actors who 
solve problems, face challenges, and discover, create, and act upon opportuni-
ties. Moreover, as people naturally have a strong sense of justice (Binmore 
2005), these amenities in life should be open to all. Hence, while outcomes 
matter, the processes that lead to these outcomes matter as well.6 Part of what 
it means to be an entrepreneur—facing challenges and discovering, creating, 
and acting upon opportunities—is also part of what it means to aspire to a 
good life. This holistic emphasis is in line with evidence that the self-employed 
typically report greater job satisfaction and happiness than do employees, 
despite working longer hours (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Benz and Frey 
2004).7 And the entrepreneurial process, where success and reward follow tak-
ing risks, working hard and competing on a level playing field, is perceived as 
both open and just. Thus, entrepreneurship not only holds the key to the 
future economic welfare of Europe, but is also a major ingredient in creating 
6 Frey et al. (2004) refer to this as “procedural utility.”
7 Similar findings are reported by Csíkszentmihályi (1990), who even found that most people were, in 
fact, happier at work than at rest.
 N. Elert et al.
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“the good life” for its citizens, which should be the ultimate goal of 
policymaking.
How, then, is the EU to become a more entrepreneurial society? In answer-
ing this question, our starting points are threefold. First, entrepreneurship does 
not occur in a vacuum; instead, it is the result of several crucial skills coming 
together to create value in what we term a collaborative innovation bloc. The 
flesh and blood actors who possess these skills are both incentivized and con-
strained by society’s rules of the game: its institutions (cf. Welter et al. 2019).
Second, institutions are path-dependent and complementary; this means that 
introducing US-style institutions or any other one-size-fits-all reform strategy 
across Europe is destined to fail. A reform strategy is more viable when poli-
cymakers tailor it to the historical preconditions of an individual region or 
country or to a group of similar countries. To design such a strategy, the focus 
must not be on the institutions per se but on the functions these institutions 
perform in a well-functioning entrepreneurial ecosystem.
Third, entrepreneurship contributes to prosperity by challenging the status quo 
in an open market economy. Entrepreneurship thrives when open institutions 
create open societies where vested interests and incumbents can be challenged 
on a level playing field, enabling fair competition, and new ventures fail or 
succeed based on the value they provide to their customers and society at large.
We outline the gist of this argument in the remainder of the present chap-
ter, in the process providing a framework for our vision of how to make the 
EU more entrepreneurial and innovative.
1.1  Entrepreneurship as a Source of Growth 
and Inclusion
It is a rare firm that always behaves as entrepreneurially as Schumpeter envi-
sioned.8 But one should not dismiss less Schumpeterian entrepreneurs out of 
hand: Baumol (2010, p. 18), for example, distinguishes between Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs and replicative entrepreneurs, who start firms that are similar to 
existing businesses. Replicative entrepreneurs play a crucial role during the 
stage of economic development that follows innovation, when a more general 
adoption and diffusion of new knowledge occurs (Braunerhjelm 2011; see 
also Baumol et al. 2007).
8 In fact, Schumpeter himself argued that successful entrepreneurs will at some point turn from challeng-
ers into defenders of the status quo, and they will venture to limit competition and contestability as soon 
as they have conquered a strong position in their market.
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Replicative entrepreneurs also help explain why few entrepreneurs capture 
a large share of the value they create; Nordhaus (2004) estimates that the 
original innovators and entrepreneurs capture, on average, a mere 3% of the 
value they create. This premium is so small because the existence of challeng-
ers, or the mere possibility of being challenged by new entrants, forces incum-
bent firms to invest continuously in innovation. Consequently, the bulk of 
the innovative surplus accrues to consumers in the form of lower prices and 
better products. Contestable, open markets are therefore a precondition for 
the creation of economic prosperity. Moreover, as open and contestable mar-
kets create opportunities for all and reward merit (a combination of talent, 
luck, and equal access to resources), the resulting wealth (re)distribution is 
usually perceived as equitable.
The need for more replicative entrepreneurship and more contestable 
markets is particularly acute in Southern and Eastern European countries 
marred by high levels of non-employment. Figure 1.1 shows the consider-
able EU cross-country variation in the need for job creation, captured by the 
employment rate; it ranges from 58% in Greece to approximately 82% 
in Sweden.
As we shall see, a great deal can be done to improve the contestability of EU 












Fig. 1.1 Employment share in 2017 among people aged 20–64 in EU countries. Note: 
There are no data for the USA for the 20- to 64-year olds. However, in the OECD data, 
which reports employment rates for 15- to 64-year olds, the US employment rate was 
70.7% in 2017, compared to 76.9% in top-ranked Sweden and 53.5% in Greece, which 
has the lowest employment rate among 15- to 64-year olds. Source: Eurostat
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can one achieve this goal by merely ticking off the items on the usual 
 institutional laundry list—stable property rights, the rule of law, and so on. 
Although ensuring that opportunities exist is crucial, it is also not enough; 
ideally, institutions should also ensure access to essential resources on equal 
terms irrespective of social background and personal wealth, thereby empow-
ering entrepreneurs to act on these opportunities.9
European institutions did not evolve spontaneously to ensure such equi-
table resource access, nor have they been designed to achieve that goal. A 
broad range of institutions are therefore in need of reform: much broader, 
we argue, than the range entrepreneurship scholars and policymakers typi-
cally feel comfortable discussing. To better appreciate the scope of this chal-
lenge, we now turn to outline the ecosystem on which entrepreneurs depend 
to be able to innovate successfully. We label this the collaborative inno-
vation bloc.
1.2  The Collaborative Innovation Bloc
Entrepreneurship scholars have long understood that entrepreneurial ventur-
ing does not occur in a vacuum. For example, the Swedish research tradition 
labeled the experimentally organized economy [EOE; see, e.g., Eliasson 
(1996) and Johansson (2009) for a synthesis] recognizes that the entrepre-
neurial process is inherently collaborative: to pursue their innovative projects, 
entrepreneurs need to cooperate with several actors whose complementary 
skills and resources drastically increase the probability that an innovation- 
based venture will be successful. The actors, skills, and resources are drawn 
from several sources, together forming what we call a collaborative innovation 
bloc. This perspective is useful for understanding how innovations come about 
9 This view echoes that of John Tomasi, a philosopher who promotes what he calls market democracy: a 
hybrid view combining insights from progressive liberals such as John Rawls and classical liberals like 
Friedrich von Hayek. The Rawlsian aspect of Tomasi’s (2012) theory is that social justice be used as a 
standard to evaluate a society’s institutions. In other words, inequality is only acceptable if it benefits the 
least well off. The classical liberal aspect is that economic freedom be considered one of citizens’ most 
important rights, since it is necessary for self-authorship, a Rawlsian term that Tomasi describes as (2012, 
p. 40) “the capacity to develop and act upon a life plan (whether that plan be individual, collective, or 
otherwise shared). People are life agents and their agency matters. As responsible self-authors, they have 
the capacity to realistically assess the options before them and, in light of that assessment, to set standards 
for a life of a sort that each deems worth living.” This view is shared by, e.g., Deirdre McCloskey (2010, 
p. 74): “The economic history of innovation … fulfils the so-called difference principle of the philosopher 
John Rawls … that a change is ethically justified when it helps the very poorest. Markets and innovation 
did.”
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in a modern economy and how the institutional framework of that economy 
ought to change to achieve more innovation and prosperity.10
An economy’s institutional framework is commonly conceptualized as “the 
humanly devised rules of the game” that determine people’s incentives to 
acquire, utilize, and share their resources (North 1991, p. 97). An implication 
of the EOE perspective’s actor and resource complementarity is that institu-
tions have a more substantial effect on innovation and growth than an analysis 
focusing on any one actor would suggest (cf. Phelps 2007, p. 553). The mobi-
lization of actors and resources in the collaborative innovation bloc is a daunt-
ing task for the entrepreneur in the best of circumstances.11 Generally, 
institutions must enable the emergence of a minimum critical mass and vari-
ety of skills and resources before innovation-based venturing can have a high 
probability of success. The number, variety, and character of actors determine 
the shape and intensity of the competition between collaborative teams for 
the scarce resources at hand, as well as their incentives to learn, experiment, 
and collaborate.
When employed successfully, the entrepreneurial meta-skill of gathering 
and jointly combining these skills and resources makes it possible to turn an 
innovation into a good or a service that is produced and sold on an industrial 
scale in competition with innovations created by other collaborative teams 
and the older technology offered by incumbents. When economic institutions 
interact with such meta-skills, they shape the exchange and collaboration that 
ultimately determine access to such skills and resources (Spigel and Harrison 
2018). Competition between various collaborative teams will bring about an 
evolution of collaborative innovation blocs in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
Since the resulting innovations drive out, or at least challenge, incumbents, 
this process generates aggregate economic growth in the experimentally orga-
nized market economy (Elert and Henrekson 2019) and drives the process of 
creative destruction as conceptualized by Joseph Schumpeter (Aghion and 
Howitt 1992; Caballero and Jaffe 1993).
10 The EOE perspective shares many features with the more recent literature on entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems (Stam 2015; Autio 2016; O’Connor et  al. 2018) and the national system of entrepreneurship 
approach (Acs et al. 2014), but we can trace its roots back to the works of Swedish economists Johan 
Åkerman and Erik Dahmén; see Erixon (2011) and Dahmén (1970). While these other perspectives offer 
valuable insights, they seldom make a clear distinction between actors and institutions, and “the institu-
tional variables that are used, such as technology absorption, gender equality, R&D spending, and depth 
of capital markets, are not institutional variables; they are outcomes resulting from the evolution of the 
economic system in a given institutional setup” (Braunerhjelm and Henrekson 2016, p. 101).
11 For one thing, knowledge is often tacit (i.e., difficult to transfer to another person by means of written 
documentation or verbalizing it) and non-communicable (Hayek 1945). Moreover, labor contracts are 
necessarily incomplete and access to finance for early-stage ventures is limited.
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Figure 1.2 provides a schematic overview of the structure and resources 
required for a new idea to transform into a growing firm that eventually 
reaches maturity [as described by, e.g., Fenn et al. (1995) and Gompers and 
Lerner (2001)]. The agents and resources in the collaborative innovation bloc 
fall into six categories: entrepreneurs, inventors, key personnel, early-stage 
financiers, later-stage financiers, and customers. Below, we draw on Elert and 
Henrekson (2019) to briefly describe the six categories.
 1. The entrepreneur: Treating the entrepreneur as a collaborator is not a new 
approach; in fact, Schumpeter (1989 [1949], p. 261) argued that the entre-
preneurial function “may be and is often filled cooperatively,” and several 
perspectives on entrepreneurship acknowledge this fact (e.g., McCloskey 
and Klamer 1995; Cosgel and Klamer 1990; Lazear 2004). In the EOE 
perspective, entrepreneurs create new collaborative teams, both searching 
for and attracting the skills and resources they perceive to be necessary to 
realize their projects. In this role, they benefit from existing collaborative 































Fig. 1.2 The collaborative innovation bloc—an overview. Note: Financing by founders 
(using their assets or retained earnings) and by passive individual and institutional 
investors (in either phase) is not included in the diagram. Source: Elert and Henrekson 
(2019)
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the institutional infrastructure supporting entrepreneurship often emerges 
as a product of a critical mass of entrepreneurship in an industry or a set of 
related industries (Stam and Lambooy 2012).
 2. Inventors: Entrepreneurs generally have an excellent overall understanding 
of how to exploit an opportunity but may lack specific knowledge regard-
ing relevant technologies. Conversely, while inventors can be involved in 
founding teams, there is no reason to assume that they have a comparative 
advantage in bringing new ideas to the market as a good or service. In fact, 
Schumpeter (1934 [1911]) distinguished between inventors and entrepre-
neurs, but the nuance was lost when modern growth models (e.g., Romer 
1990; Aghion and Howitt 1992) collapsed invention, innovation, and 
commercialization into one decision (Acs and Sanders 2012, 2013).
 3. Key personnel: While much has been said about the market’s Hayekian 
knowledge problem—the fact that knowledge of the particular circum-
stances of time and place is dispersed (Hayek 1945)—such a problem is 
consistently present within firms and increasing with the size of the orga-
nization (Foss 1997). In times of rapid firm growth and development, key 
personnel such as professional managers, skilled specialists, production 
staff, and front-line personnel may contribute skills that are essential to an 
entrepreneurial venture (Sautet 2000).12 They will only be able to do so if 
they are allowed to act upon the knowledge only they possess to promote 
intra-firm learning and local discoveries (Foss 1997; Pongracic 2009). 
Detailed evidence on the sequence in which ventures typically draw on 
such resources suggests that founder teams and employees grow more 
 rapidly for radical product innovations than for incremental service inno-
vations (Held et al. 2018b).
Determining the relative importance of the different skills that key per-
sonnel contribute is challenging. While much of the mainstream entrepre-
neurship and economics literature sees R&D teams and technical specialists 
as key to innovation (Audretsch et  al. 2006; Chandler 1990), turning 
high-level ideas into commercially viable products seldom involves much 
in the way of high-level R&D. As Bhidé (2008, pp. 150–151) puts it, “the 
commercial success of innovations turns not just on the attributes of the 
product or know-how, but on the effectiveness and efficiency of the inno-
vator’s sales and marketing process.” As an entrepreneurial venture grows, 
so does its need for professional managers with an expertise in taking the 
12 Labor market institutions largely determine whether they do so as employees or as independent consul-
tants. Held et  al. (2018b) show that while employees and founder team members are complements, 
external expertise can substitute for in-house employees.
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business to a mature stage and mitigating the internal knowledge problem 
(Sautet 2000) so that misuse and conflict do not impede the discovery, 
exploitation, and sharing of local knowledge (Ghoshal et al. 1995).
 4. Early-stage financiers: The founder’s equity (possibly complemented by 
(soft) loans from family and friends) often finances a firm’s early phase, but 
external equity financing is usually necessary if a new entrepreneurial firm 
is to grow into a significant industry player. Debt finance plays a minor 
role at this stage of the firm life cycle because of the high risk and typically 
negative cash flow. Nonetheless, start-ups sometimes do obtain business 
loans early on, and founders frequently pledge personal assets and wealth 
as collateral to obtain loans to finance their ventures (Held et al. 2018a). 
Research shows that such business loans positively affect survival and 
growth (Cumming and Groh 2018; Cole and Sokolyk 2018). Similarly, 
Landström and Mason (2016) show that early-stage external equity finance 
matters for nonfinancial reasons. Business angels, and also banks, play an 
instrumental role in providing tight screening and close monitoring of the 
firm’s progress, markedly reducing moral hazard problems. Hence, the 
early involvement of an external, disciplining entity in the firm is as impor-
tant as the financial resources per se. VC investors, who usually come in 
later in the life cycle, would have far fewer potentially successful candidates 
to choose from, were it not for these earlier contributions.
Individuals with extensive experience in the industry in which they 
invest often perform the business angel and VC function (Busenitz et al. 
2014). When circumstances are appropriate, they can combine several 
high-risk opportunities to achieve a more acceptable overall risk level 
through portfolio diversification; they identify entrepreneurs and their 
projects, determine whether and how much to invest, and decide how the 
investment should be valued. Importantly, they also contribute critical 
skills to the entrepreneurial venture, such as management expertise, mar-
ket knowledge, and access to their business networks. If need be, they can 
also enforce change and appoint new management better equipped to lead 
the company. Thus, a varied and competent VC industry can provide a 
crucial component of the early-stage selection machinery of the collabora-
tive innovation bloc. Provided such a sector exists and is sufficiently devel-
oped, diversification across VC funds makes it possible even for actors with 
low risk tolerance, such as institutional investors and banks, to invest in 
start-ups and innovative ventures. That said, the VC business model is 
labor intensive and has proven hard to scale up (Polzin et al. 2018a). This 
may help explain the recent emergence of platform-based alternatives to 
“traditional” business angel and VC markets, such as equity (Estrin et al. 
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2018) and debt crowdfunding (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2018; Signori 
and Vismara 2018). While still marginal in size, these new sources of 
finance currently grow at double or even triple digit rates, and they are 
particularly open to the relatively modest amounts commonly demanded 
in entrepreneurial venturing (Polzin et al. 2017).
 5. Later-stage financiers: Well-functioning exit markets are crucial to (a) 
incentivize VC firms by enabling them to unload their investments when 
their operations have run their course (Eliasson 2000) and (b) provide 
entrepreneurs with the large equity infusions typically required to turn a 
nascent venture into a sizable firm. In the case of sustained inferior perfor-
mance, later-stage financiers also assess whether there are potential profits 
from assuming control and replacing the entrepreneur and the firm’s top 
management.
The most common exit strategy is through a trade sale, in which the 
entrepreneur/founder hands over full control to the buyer (usually another 
firm in the same industry). A trade sale is likely an indication that the firm 
currently lacks some crucial skill or resource (e.g., distribution networks 
and marketing expertise), making an independent scaling up of its opera-
tions unfeasible or too risky (Lerner and Tåg 2013). Another important 
exit market actor is the buyout firm, which operates much like a VC firm, 
albeit dealing with much larger sums. Evidence suggests that buyouts lead 
to a reallocation of firm resources to more productive uses (Tåg 2012; 
Olsson and Tåg 2017), partly by bringing in better knowledge of manage-
ment practices (Bloom et al. 2009) and access to resources, infrastructure, 
and networks that are particularly relevant when scaling up (Duruflé et al. 
2017). Wealthy industrial families and owner activists are also important 
actors in the secondary market; whether any of them will be able to act in 
a forceful manner depends, in no small measure, on the extent to which 
they can expect capital infusions from passive investors (such as pension 
funds and open-ended stock market funds) if the firm develops well. Of 
course, the functioning of exit markets depends on the prevailing institu-
tions that shape incentives and payoffs for venture owners and acquirers alike.
 6. Competent customers: Consumers are the ultimate arbiters of an innova-
tion’s success, yet they hardly appear in the cast in most accounts of inno-
vation. The omission is regrettable; Bhidé (2008) defines “venturesome 
consumption” as the willingness and ability of intermediate producers and 
individual consumers to take a chance on and effectively use new know- 
how and products and argues that it may be as crucial to a country as its 
capacity to undertake high-level research. Even in an entrepreneurial ven-
ture’s early stages, demanding collaborators can function as particularly 
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important sources of information on consumer needs and preferences. 
Sometimes, they even act as strategic partners, taking an active part in the 
development and commercialization of products (Bhidé 2008; von Hippel 
et al. 2011). In the extreme, when qualified venture capitalists are absent, 
large enterprises rich in capital often step in to play this role. However, this 
substitution is unlikely to yield radical innovations because it restricts such 
financing to technologies close and complementary to those of the part-
nering industry (Eliasson 2000).
The outline above should give an idea of the interconnectedness of the 
agents and resources in a collaborative innovation bloc. Certainly, the details 
of the commercialization process vary, and actors typically work alongside 
each other or overlap during different phases. Frequently, however, the pro-
cess begins when an entrepreneur identifies a potential opportunity through 
her interactions with demanding customers, which she then strives to develop 
together with an inventor into a successfully commercialized innovation. 
Generally, the early commercialization phase mainly involves entrepreneurs 
and, to a lesser extent, key personnel (Held et al. 2018b). In this experimental 
stage, uncertainty is high and equity financing is critical, but debt financing 
can also play an important role. A study covering the USA, the UK, Germany, 
and Italy found that up to 10% of start-ups acquired loans in their first or 
second round of funding (Held et al. 2018b), and debt-financed ventures also 
tend to do well in terms of innovation and growth, as long as the debt is not 
the personal debt of the founder (Cole and Sokolyk 2018).
Early-stage financiers usually propel the project into a scale-up phase, dur-
ing which the conjectured entrepreneurial profits can be realized (assuming 
the project reaches this point). At this stage, the entrepreneur requires more 
key personnel, often with highly specialized skills. Later-stage financiers 
assume responsibility for financing, which (depending on the sector) may be 
substantial. In parallel, competitors begin to imitate the innovation if they 
perceive it to be promising, and the market grows through the operational 
scaling-up of activities resulting from differential growth and selection 
(Metcalfe 1998). Eventually, the process stabilizes (Witt 1996), with the mar-
ket taking the form of a monopoly, an oligopoly, or a competitive situation 
involving multiple actors. By this point, organizational behavior, strategy, and 
business models will have become relatively uniform and standardized. While 
entrepreneurial profits are often exhausted at this point (Dopfer and Potts 
2009), the scope for innovation is by no means exhausted: firms can, for 
example, introduce more efficient production and distribution methods or 
change the attributes of a good or a service to enhance its value.
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Part of what it means to be an entrepreneur is having the ability to gather 
actors with different skills and resources in a collaborative innovation bloc 
and productively combine them into a collaborative team. From the above, 
we can broadly distinguish knowledge, finance, and labor as the key resources 
an entrepreneur needs to acquire, with the emphasis shifting between them in 
different stages of the venture process. This suggests that entrepreneurs indeed 
must be “jacks-of-all-trades” (Lazear 2004) and possess a broad and balanced 
skill mix. Even then, the task may be arcane for any individual if the bloc in 
question is not of sufficient breadth and depth. Moreover, the institutional 
context in which teams compete determines the supply of these scarce 
resources and the conditions under which teams compete for them. It is in 
this context that economic policy and the institutional framework underpin-
ning the innovation bloc come into play.
1.3  No One-Size-Fits-All Strategy
Scholars began to examine the link between institutions and entrepreneurship 
in earnest following William Baumol’s (1990) landmark paper establishing 
that the way a society’s institutions structure economic payoffs influences the 
nature of entrepreneurial efforts and activities (Baumol 1990; see also North 
1990; Murphy et al. 1991; Sobel 2008; Acs et al. 2008; Stenholm et al. 2013; 
Calcagno and Sobel 2014; Urbano and Alvarez 2014). The current literature 
suggests that entrepreneurship takes different forms between countries or 
regions because of institutional differences (see, e.g., Case and Harris 2012; 
WEF 2013; Stam 2014), and the (formal) institutions thought to be particu-
larly important in this respect include the protection of private property, the 
rule of law, intellectual property rights, tax codes, social insurance systems, 
employment protection legislation, and competition policy (Hall and Jones 
1999; Henrekson and Johansson 2009; Bjørnskov and Foss 2013).13 Reform 
directed towards more entrepreneurship-friendly institutions in these areas 
should, the reasoning goes, improve the environment for entrepreneurial ven-
turing in Europe.
This reasoning is correct, subject to some caveats. For one thing, as Samuel 
Bowles (2016) has argued in his thoughtful book The Moral Economy, incen-
13 Informal institutions influencing entrepreneurship include social capital, trust, inclusiveness, individu-
alism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance (Hechavarria and Reynolds 2009; Taylor and Wilson 
2012). Policymakers should take them into account when they fit reform proposals to local contexts, but 
as these institutions are much less amenable to reform and policy interventions, they are beyond the scope 
of this book. The interested reader is referred to a longer discussion in Elert et al. (2017, pp. 71–74).
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tives are a double-edged sword: incentivizing policies can erode individuals’ 
intrinsic social motivations unless policymakers combine them with a con-
vincing moral message. In our context, this means that institutional reforms 
directed towards an entrepreneurial society will likely only be effective if 
accompanied by recognition of the importance of entrepreneurship. According 
to McCloskey (2016), such a cultural shift goes a long way towards explaining 
the innovative miracle that created the modern world during the industrial 
revolution. Bowles (2016) also notes that monetary incentives should never 
be divorced from the policy process that introduced or allowed for them; 
reforms risk backfiring if they are imposed without public consultation and 
buy-in. Here, of course, the national and local contexts are crucial.
While the EU has seen top-down and bottom-up convergence over the 
years, even member states with similar levels of per capita income continue to 
differ substantially in their institutional organization. The diversity is not sur-
prising given the documented importance of historical values and norms, 
lock-in effects, and path dependency in institutional evolution (Arthur 1989; 
Reher 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Nunn 2009; Alesina et al. 2015). Indeed, 
these cross-country differences are a starting point in the various incarnations 
of the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature, which is closely associated with 
the seminal work of Hall and Soskice (2001). Research in this tradition sees 
the existence of institutional complementarities as the main driver of the per-
sistence of institutional differences across VoC, with institutions being com-
plementary “if the presence (or efficiency) of one [institution] increases the 
returns from (or efficiency of ) the other” (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 17).14 
Specifically, it makes little sense for European member states to try and emu-
late US-style alumni donations to universities or Chinese-style infrastructure 
investments when the supporting cultural and deeply embedded, historically 
evolved complementary institutions are absent. It is better to look at the best 
of your closest peers and adopt, e.g., German-style apprenticeships or Finnish 
educational policies.
The VoC literature illustrates how a distinct set of institutions governs the 
exchange between companies and their national labor markets, financial mar-
kets, and research and development infrastructure. The particulars of this syn-
14 One salient example is the sizeable cross-country variation in corporate governance models of large 
listed firms: It ranges from the archetypical Anglo-American model based on management control and 
dispersed ownership, to various models of concentrated family control by means of dual-class shares, 
pyramiding, and cross-ownership, common in Europe and Asia (Bebchuk and Roe 2004). The comple-
mentarity of elements in these specific corporate governance models is crucial. Reforms limited to a 
particular element risk giving rise to inconsistencies that make the overall model less efficient (Schmidt 
and Spindler 2002).
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ergy translate into different innovation, technology, and production outcomes 
across economies—varieties of capitalism that are thought to be particularly 
stable because of the complementarities between their underpinning institu-
tions. The perspective helps explain the nonrandom interconnectedness of 
various institutions, the persistence of institutional forms that are (seemingly) 
not conducive to entrepreneurship and growth, and thus the prospects for 
amending these institutions.
To date, however, the VoC literature has largely neglected entrepreneurial 
venturing, evolving instead through studies of incumbent firms and the insti-
tutions channeling their behavior. Dilli et al. (2018) filled this research gap by 
illustrating how distinct institutional constellations relate to specific types of 
entrepreneurship in a study focusing on the USA and 20 European econo-
mies: countries fall into four distinct families or clusters with a similar set of 
institutions governing finance, labor markets, education and training, and 
inter-firm relationships. According to Dilli et al. (2018), these constellations 
facilitate the development of different types of entrepreneurship, ranging 
from risk-loving, growth-aspiring ventures based on radical innovations to 
risk-avoiding, growth-averse ventures based on imitation.
These findings are both discouraging and revealing. If distinct institutional 
constellations govern the emergence of distinct forms of entrepreneurship, 
then merely pushing a regulatory button in isolation is unlikely to yield the 
desired results. Such an action might even make matters worse if it removes or 
weakens an institution whose presence is essential for the working of other 
institutions in the complex web that comprises the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
For example, implementing some isolated fiscal reform to strengthen incen-
tives for VC providers would hardly be effective in facilitating more 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship in Continental, Southern, and Eastern 
Europe. To achieve this goal, policymakers more likely need to deregulate 
both labor and financial markets in a sensible manner so that VC-funded 
ventures can also hire and fire employees more freely, implement strong incen-
tive contracts for founders, and a viable exit market is allowed to emerge. 
Only under those conditions the classical VC model can actually function. 
Reform failure is likely if policymakers do not take these important institu-
tional complementarities into account.
However, the steps necessary in an appropriate and effective reform strategy 
are similar across VoC at a sufficiently high level of abstraction. In all regions 
and countries, one must begin by assessing the most salient features of the 
institutional framework in place and tracing its historical roots. This makes it 
possible to assess strengths and weaknesses and identify bottlenecks in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem using the structured analysis of primary and sec-
ondary data. These insights should then be applied to a menu of evidence- 
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based policy interventions, allowing appropriate interventions to be selected 
and tailored to fit the specific country or region by heeding the relevant local, 
regional, and national institutional complexities. In this book, we present 
such a menu of evidence-based policy interventions for six institutional areas 
that we identify as particularly critical to the creation of flourishing collabora-
tive innovation blocs and, ultimately, an entrepreneurial society.15 Looking 
across the proposals developed in this book, we identified a set of common 
core principles that we believe can inform and guide reform proposals in any 
specific context.
1.4  Principles
The common principles underlying all proposals in this book are: neutrality, 
transparency, moderation, contestability, legality, and justifiability. These words 
can take on different meanings depending on the context in which they 
appear, meaning that we must take care when explaining how we employ 
them when formulating our reform agenda. Below, we briefly discuss each of 
these six principles.
Frequently, neutrality is described as the state of not supporting or helping 
either side in a conflict or disagreement. It may seem odd for a book arguing 
in favor of entrepreneurship to adopt this principle. In actuality, however, we 
rarely argue that policymakers should bestow favors upon entrepreneurs 
because they do not need to be pampered. Instead, we wish to level the play-
ing field between entrepreneurs and those they challenge—a playing field that 
at present is all too often tilted against entrepreneurs. Adhering to the neutral-
ity principle, which implies that a level playing field is restored and main-
tained, will often already go a long way towards supporting entrepreneurs in 
their efforts.
Transparency, as commonly used, means operating in such a way that it is 
easy for others to see what actions are performed and what consequences they 
will entail. As such, transparency implies openness, communication, and 
accountability. This principle guides many proposals because it is essential for 
15 The evidence base is not equally extensive for all proposed interventions; the policymaking world is not 
a laboratory, meaning that data on the impact of the proposed interventions are often absent. If we 
restricted our menu to evidence-based policies only, we could only include policies that policymakers 
have already implemented somewhere. More radical ideas and suggestions would not qualify. In such 
cases, we present the arguments and propose that policymakers implement the reforms with caution. The 
implementation of such policy suggestions will aid in building an evidence base, provided that they are 
carefully designed and evaluated.
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(potential) challengers to know the criteria upon which their venture will be 
evaluated. Ensuring more transparency about the criteria that determine how 
labor, knowledge, and financial resources are made available to new ventures 
would, we believe, reduce this source of uncertainty in entrepreneurial 
venturing.
Moderation is commonly defined as the avoidance of excess or extremes or 
the process of eliminating or lessening extremes. This principle underlies 
many of our proposals in the realms of taxation and subsidization, as excessive 
interventions are particularly damaging in these areas. Furthermore, uncer-
tainty is all around us, including when making policy and implementing 
institutional reforms. The future is unknowable; therefore, policymakers 
should be modest in extracting and allocating resources lest such measures 
become costly to reverse.
Contestability is a key for entrepreneurial venturing and also for policymak-
ing. When followed, this principle entails that all vested positions, opinions, 
and truths should be open to challenge and debate. Such openness lends legit-
imacy to the status quo and ensures that institutions support those ventures 
that represent the best of our knowledge to date. If institutions, policies, and 
markets cease to be contestable, they risk becoming outdated and obsolete in 
an ever-changing environment. Contestability is thus the cure for sclerosis 
and rigidity.
Legality refers to the idea that de jure and de facto institutions need to coin-
cide, such that legality ensures the rule of law is both upheld and aligned with 
the institutional framework. This principle is a fundamental precondition in 
all modern economies and underpins any liberal democratic political order—
to the point that it is occasionally taken for granted in much of the 
EU.  Nevertheless, it is important to realize that formally enacting the 
 appropriate laws does not automatically ensure the legality of institutions that 
support an entrepreneurial society.
Justifiability refers to the appropriate balancing of public and private inter-
ests that is needed to justify policy interventions beyond a simple laissez-faire 
attitude. Moreover, not only active policies and institutions need to be justi-
fied but also passive institutions, such as (intellectual) property rights, if they 
are to be effectively implemented and respected. If institutions are perceived 
to benefit entrepreneurs at the expense of their consumers, employees, inven-
tors, financiers, or society at large, these institutions cannot be justified and 
should be reformed to ensure a long-run stable license to operate for entrepre-
neurs that seek to challenge the status quo.
In our more concrete proposals for institutional reform discussed below, 
most proposals can be related to one or more of these underlying principles. 
We also believe that with these principles in hand, many more potentially 
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effective reforms can be conceptualized for specific contexts. We present them 
here, individually and together, as essential guidelines for drafting an effective 
reform strategy that supports innovative, inclusive, and sustainable growth at 
any level of aggregation and policymaking.
1.5  Book Outline
The principles outlined above safeguard the coherence of our overall reform 
strategy by making it easier to structure the discussion and weigh proposals 
against one another. For the sake of concreteness, we also identify the gover-
nance level that has the power and/or competence to implement the proposed 
reforms. As our book seeks to be useful for policymakers, we have chosen to 
structure our proposals along six broad policy areas. The six reform areas we 
discuss in separate chapters in the remainder of this book are as follows:
 1. The rule of law and protection of property rights: These institutions are fun-
damental to any market economy and crucial to any attempt to build an 
entrepreneurial society. To understand how they can be strengthened in an 
entrepreneurship-friendly manner across the EU, we first emphasize the 
principle of legality, i.e., considering de facto rather than de jure institu-
tions. Moreover, the protection of property rights cannot be absolute; in 
particular, the realm of intellectual property requires a careful balancing of 
public and private interests to ensure justifiability. Given the European 
Commission’s competencies in international negotiations on these issues, 
a clear and actionable reform agenda presents itself.
 2. Taxation: In this chapter, we systematically cover all areas of taxation that 
we deem relevant to an entrepreneurial society. Such an exercise is impor-
tant because taxes shape and bias the incentives for corporations, individu-
als, and organizations. The principles of moderation, neutrality, and 
transparency guide us when we propose reforms in this area. Biases in favor 
of entrepreneurship can sometimes be justified in the case of strong posi-
tive external effects, but more often, we argue for leveling the playing field 
and moderate taxation to restore or maintain market incentives. Since the 
EU typically has limited capabilities in terms of taxation, we primarily 
address such reforms at the level of the member states, carefully discussing 
the direction in which they could reform their tax systems in support of a 
more entrepreneurial society.
 3. Savings, finance, and capital: Here, we cover the institutions that govern 
the intermediation of savings across Europe while adhering to the princi-
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ples of neutrality, transparency, and justifiability. History and evolution 
have created a largely bank-based and highly regulated system of financial 
markets in which wealth and savings are predominantly “locked-up” in 
professionally managed funds and assets. In such a system, investees with-
out collateral, strong balance sheets and long track records are fighting an 
uphill battle to gain access to credit and financial resources, whereas impor-
tant public interests (e.g., in a secure payment system and stable pension 
funds) require careful balancing against the needs of the entrepreneurial 
society. The principles help us offer proposals aimed at leveling the playing 
field and mobilizing more of Europe’s ample financial resources for entre-
preneurial ventures. Given the shared competencies in this area, most pro-
posals in this chapter are addressed towards both the EU level and the 
member states.
 4. Labor markets and social security: To a large extent, these institutions deter-
mine the allocation of human resources, notably skilled labor, to entrepre-
neurial ventures. Again, these culturally deeply embedded systems typically 
favor large, stable incumbent firms, meaning that experimental, innovative 
ventures struggle to obtain human resources. Our proposed reforms do 
not follow the naïve neoliberal logic of all-out liberalization but rather aim 
to improve the situation for entrepreneurs and employees in Europe by 
making rights more portable and social security more universal and uncon-
ditional. The principles of moderation, neutrality, contestability, and justifi-
ability all play important roles in this area. As in the case of taxes, our 
proposals in this chapter are addressed to the member states primarily, as 
they retain most legal competencies in this area.
 5. Contestable markets for entry and exit: This is an area of strong and extensive 
EU competencies by virtue of the single market, but Europe can do more 
to promote contestable markets for entry and exit. Here, we draw on the 
principles of contestability, transparency, and justifiability to better under-
stand how reforms ensuring a vibrant entrepreneurial society can come 
about. Lower entry barriers and functionally specified quality standards are 
key to this reform area, especially for services, where in the (semi-)public 
domain (e.g., health care and education), there is room for productive 
venturing under appropriate constraints. To facilitate entry in many sec-
tors, exit must also be well arranged, leading us to proposals in the area of 
bankruptcy law and the smooth liquidation of outdated and failed ventures.
 6. Mobilizing human capital for entrepreneurship: Since the Treaty of Lisbon, 
innovation policy is part of the European Commission’s competencies, but 
we have yet to see institutional reform actions to promote the building of 
a European knowledge space where useful knowledge flows freely to the 
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benefit of both incumbents and challengers. When formulating proposals 
in this direction, we draw on the principles of justifiability and contestabil-
ity to ensure that the positive externalities of knowledge creation and dif-
fusion through commercialization are balanced with private interests of 
privacy and competitive advantage.
After discussing no less than 50 proposals in these six policy areas, we con-
clude this volume with a chapter that sketches the agenda for future research 
and, more importantly, policy reform. We would also like to alert interested 
readers to the (forthcoming) companion volume The Entrepreneurial Society 
Part II: Implementing the Reform Strategy for Italy, Germany and the UK (Marx 
et al. 2019), which complements this volume by illustrating how the menu of 
reforms presented here can be prioritized and adjusted to specific Varieties of 
Capitalism in member states across Europe.
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Entrepreneurship, the Rule of Law, 
and Protection of Property Rights
2.1  General Principles
Today, almost 250 years after Thomas Paine stated that “in free countries the 
law ought to be king,” the legal principle that a polity should not be governed 
by arbitrary decisions made by autocratic rulers or government officials is 
considered a central building block of a free society and essential for any 
country striving for prosperity (Bingham 2011). Possibly, the only competitor 
to the rule of law for the title of most fundamental economic institution is the 
protection of private property rights—the existence of legal titles to hold 
property and the protection thereof (North and Weingast 1989; Libecap 
1993; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2005; Rodrik et al. 2004; North et al. 2009; 
Besley and Ghatak 2010). In practice, these fundamental rules of the game 
strengthen and complement each other; when of sufficiently high quality, 
they prevent undue uncertainty and ensure that entrepreneurs can engage in 
productive activities. By contrast, weak rule of law and property rights protec-
tion within a country discourage entrepreneurs from making entrepreneurial 
discoveries and from (re)investing (retained) earnings in their ventures 
(Johnson et al. 2002). The division and specialization of labor are also ham-
pered in such instances, to the detriment of collaborative innovation blocs 
and their actors, whether financiers, personnel, or customers.
That said, the rule of law is not enshrined in any particular legal rule; what 
happens in practice matters more than what the law says. Likewise, formal 
property rights that do not offer control rights in practice are useless, while 
the absence of formal property rights need not be prohibitive if control rights 
are sufficiently strong (Rodrik 2007). When assessing the current state of the 
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rule of law and protection of property rights in Europe, therefore, a first guid-
ing principle is legality, i.e., to consider de facto rather than de jure institu-
tions (Feld and Voigt 2003; Acemoglu et  al. 2005; Woodruff 2006). The 
distinction is crucial: while the acquis communautaire (the accumulated legis-
lation, legal acts, and court decisions that constitute the body of EU law) 
ensure that a candidate member state’s formal legal framework is more or less 
aligned before it is allowed to join the EU, differences among members in 
terms of the effective enforcement of the rule of law and property rights pro-
tection remain substantial.
Table 2.1 shows that the countries with the best judicial systems and the 
highest quality of government are the Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, and Benelux 
countries, followed by Germany and France. The Eastern bloc scores espe-
cially low on most survey items, but this is also true for Greece and Italy 
and, to a lesser extent, for Spain and Portugal.1 Table 2.1 also includes mea-
sures of government effectiveness and regulatory quality; as can be seen, 
countries rank similarly along these dimensions. Most importantly, how-
ever, the table highlights the distinction between de facto and de jure insti-
tutions, especially considering that the EU member states all share the same 
formal legal environment. The discrepancies have implications not only for 
the rule of law and the protection of property rights but also for a member 
state’s overall ability to get things done (Hulten 1996; Aschauer 2000; 
WEF 2015).
Economic actors can (and do) compensate to some extent for weaknesses 
in the rule of law and property rights protection by undertaking more activity 
off-the-books; as a result, member countries that perform poorly in these 
respects have larger underground economies (Schneider 2015a; see Appendix 
Fig. A.1). In Bulgaria and Romania, the shadow economy is estimated to be 
approximately 30% of official GDP, while in Northern European countries, 
the proportion is less than half of that. However, shadow economy activity is 
generally a poor substitute for formal sector activity, partly because it creates 
unfair competition for firms that adhere to rules and regulations. More impor-
tantly, firms in the shadow economy do not benefit from the division of labor 
and specialization of collaborative innovation blocs to the same extent as for-
mal firms and are therefore unlikely to grow large.
1 Suse and Hachez (2017, p. 79) point out that the concept of the rule of law represented by indicators 
such as these is thinner than the concept espoused by most international organizations. Specifically, the 
EU defines the rule of law as “a wider view of the legal system” that provides a stable framework protect-
ing citizen’s expectations and captures the populations’ values and aspirations, ushering in a society free 
of violence and oppression.
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Table 2.1 The rule of law and the quality of government: four indicators for the EU 
member countries and the USA







Finland 100.00 9.29 98.08 96.63
Sweden 99.04 8.27 96.15 95.67
Denmark 97.60 8.18 95.67 92.31
Netherlands 97.12 8.68 96.63 98.56
Austria 96.15 8.09 91.83 90.87
Luxembourg 95.19 8.86 93.75 93.75
UK 92.79 8.83 90.87 94.23
USA 91.83 7.86 92.79 92.79
Germany 91.35 7.60 94.23 95.19
France 89.42 7.29 87.98 83.65
Ireland 88.94 8.29 87.02 91.83
Belgium 87.50 7.91 85.10 86.54
Estonia 86.54 7.34 83.65 93.27
Malta 85.10 6.88 80.77 87.98
Portugal 84.13 6.15 87.50 79.33
Czech Rep. 83.65 6.05 81.25 86.06
Slovenia 82.69 5.63 84.62 72.12
Spain 81.25 6.08 81.73 79.81
Lithuania 80.77 5.57 80.29 83.17
Latvia 80.29 5.06 78.85 82.69
Cyprus 79.81 5.87 79.81 81.25
Slovakia 71.63 5.23 75.00 76.44
Hungary 70.19 3.84 70.19 73.08
Poland 68.27 5.11 74.04 78.85
Romania 63.94 5.64 46.15 70.19
Croatia 63.46 4.38 72.60 68.75
Italy 62.50 5.04 69.71 75.00
Greece 56.73 4.81 66.35 62.98
Bulgaria 51.92 4.18 63.94 72.60
Note: Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. Security of property rights captures the extent to which individuals have 
secure rights to property, including the fruits of their labor. Government effectiveness 
captures perceptions of the quality of public and civil services and the degree of their 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private-sector 
development. All scores except for the security of property rights are standardized 
from 0 to 100, where the value 100 is assigned to the leading country. Singapore is the 
leading country for the third and Hong Kong is the leading country for the fourth 
measure
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators 2018 (based on the data for 2017), 
and Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom of the World 2018 Annual Report for security 
of property rights (based on the data for 2016)
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The second guiding principle we identify in this area is justifiability. It has 
been said that civilizations only flourish when attaining a balance between 
protecting expectations and allowing adaptation to new conditions (Kuran 
1988, p. 145): on one hand, we want to protect private property to incentiv-
ize productive investment through the accumulation of private wealth; on the 
other hand, it is necessary to maintain an open and contestable market for 
new entrants to keep unproductive rent seeking (e.g., lobbying for closed and 
complex standards) and destructive entrepreneurship (e.g., ventures that dis-
regard public health, exploit natural resources, or appropriate other non- 
market goods) at bay. This balancing act is particularly important when 
applied to intellectual property rights (IPR), where one must weigh the inter-
ests of inventors against the positive spillover effects of knowledge diffusion. 
The rules of the game need to reward value creation but discourage pure 
rent seeking.
Because of their encompassing characteristics, safeguarding the rule of law 
and the protection of property rights requires (concerted) policy action at the 
local, regional, and national levels. As to the issues we shall discuss that relate 
to IPR, these mainly fall under the domain of national governments and the 
competencies of the EU in negotiating international treaties and regulations 
referring to IPR.
2.2  Proposals
Regarding the rule of law, the protection of property rights, and the effective-
ness of government, laggard countries should do their utmost to converge 
towards the level of the best-performing countries. Such improvements are in 
the long-term best interest of all citizens in these countries, although powerful 
elites and interest groups may well have a short-term interest in blocking the 
process. The reality is that deficiencies in these factors negatively impact all 
agents in collaborative innovation blocs and induce people to conduct activi-
ties and hide their capital in the shadow economy. The poorest EU member 
states are high-medium-income countries, and even in the VoC literature, 
there is no support for the view that they can compensate for deficiencies in 
the most fundamental rules of the game through other institutional measures.
Proposal 1: Strengthen monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to improve 
and safeguard the performance of all member states on rule of law, protection of 
property rights, and government effectiveness.
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This proposal acknowledges the first guiding principle of focusing on legal-
ity. Unfortunately, even though the effective enforcement of the rule of law 
and property rights is the foundation of virtually all economic activity, this is 
not self-evident in all European member states. For example, the time it takes 
to settle civil court cases in Italy is prohibitively long (Sanders et al. 2018a), 
and institutional backsliding among new members once they have been 
admitted has been highlighted as a real concern (Suse and Hachez 2017). 
Imperfections in these institutions hurt all actors in the economy, but espe-
cially cash-constrained small and young ventures. Addressing such fundamen-
tal issues would go a long way towards supporting a more entrepreneurial and 
innovative economy.
These facts notwithstanding, the potential for the EU’s formal admission 
process to promote the rule of law in candidate countries has been called into 
question; backsliding among admitted members such as Hungary and Poland 
is a case in point. One must, therefore, be “wary of expecting too much from 
rule of law promotion and should certainly not hope that full integration into 
a defined ‘rule of law-compliant’ model of legal system is possible” (Suse and 
Hachez 2017, p. 80). Hence, while the EU should urgently strive to find new 
methods to improve the legal frameworks in laggard countries, the fact 
remains that member states themselves control most matters pertaining to the 
de facto rule of law and the legal protection of property rights (Suse and 
Hachez 2017). As such, the efficiency of a country’s government is an issue of 
paramount importance.
That said, the protection of private property rights can never be absolute. 
Such rights are continually renegotiated and need to be justified. For example, 
landowner property rights, which extended from hell below to heaven above 
in Roman times, were curtailed when the development of the airline industry 
required free airspace. Furthermore, many governments around the world 
have nationalized the ownership rights to minerals below a certain depth (the 
USA is a notable exception). Zoning laws, environmental regulations, and 
heritage protection restrict private property rights and prevent entrepreneur-
ship from becoming a destructive force. In regard to preventing unproductive 
rent seeking and even destructive entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990; Desai 
et al. 2013; Sanders and Weitzel 2013), such restrictions are justified, pro-
vided a legitimate authority can set the rules transparently and enforce them 
neutrally: as long as the rules apply equally to all under the law, productive 
entrepreneurs can play by these rules and contribute to well-being.
It is particularly relevant to justify the IPR framework by balancing private 
incentives and public benefits. Knowledge is unique in the sense that it is 
often tedious and expensive to create. However, once discovered, it is nonrival 
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in use and can be shared freely without being diminished. On one hand, if 
IPR protection is too weak or too easily circumvented, creators will need 
alternative ways to recover the costs of knowledge generation and early diffu-
sion (Merrill et al. 2004; Acs and Szerb 2007; Baumol et al. 2007; Kauffman 
Foundation 2007). On the other hand, if protection is overly strong, the 
inventor or his delegate will extract excessive rents from entrepreneurs ex post. 
Such rents come about if the IPR time frame is too long or if it is too easy to 
obtain protection even for bits and pieces of potentially useful knowledge and 
inventions that have yet to be developed into useful innovations. Such fea-
tures of IPR protection inhibit the free flow of knowledge and reduce incen-
tives to commercialize, leaving the economy less competitive and less 
innovative as a consequence (Jaffe and Lerner 2004; Acs and Sanders 2012). 
Strong(er) IPR protection then becomes the problem rather than the solu-
tion, making it necessary to consider more fundamental reforms to the system 
itself to promote the diffusion and use of knowledge. In line with the princi-
ple of justifiability, we therefore propose the following:
Proposal 2: Limit the breadth, width, and span of patent protection to cover 
working prototypes and market-ready innovations only for a short period of 
time, and permit economic actors to infringe upon patents that have not been 
commercialized.
This proposal is quite fundamental and requires careful planning to ensure 
a smooth transition to the new situation. If implemented, it would limit the 
extent of IPR protection to strike a better balance between public and private 
interests following our guiding principle of justifiability. However, this is a big 
“if ”: the EU, after all, is party to international treaties that set minimum 
requirements for IPR, such as the WTO TRIPS Agreement. Of course, the 
EU should not violate or disregard these treaties. Instead, the Union should 
use its influence in the governing bodies to enable reforms in the desired 
direction. The limitations to patent rights would still fall well within the insti-
tutional structure in place but would significantly reduce the risk that entre-
preneurs are being sued for infringements on patents they did not even know 
existed (Jaffe and Lerner 2004).
Moreover, in line with Schumpeter (1934), we believe that a substantial 
European bottleneck to innovation is found in commercial application of 
knowledge. As the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship (Acs et al. 
2009; Braunerhjelm et al. 2010) argues, commercial application is essential 
for knowledge spillover and diffusion. Thus, rebalancing IPR in favor of 
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entrepreneurs to promote the diffusion of knowledge would be a move in the 
right direction.
Proposal 3: Require patent applicants to set the price for the license before the 
commercial application is known instead of allowing them to negotiate the 
terms of a license contract afterwards.
If this proposal became reality, it would clarify the division of labor within 
collaborative innovation blocs by making the entrepreneur the residual claim-
ant to all the rents of commercialization, while the inventor would retain the 
right to claim the costs she incurred in knowledge generation. To the extent 
that commercialization is an innovation bottleneck, such reforms would 
increase the rate of innovation and growth (Acs and Sanders 2012).
Of course, patent protection works differently in different sectors and dif-
ferent stages of the industry life cycle. Some parts of the economy can achieve 
similar protection with trade secrets (e.g., software), whereas mandatory and 
highly uncertain certification procedures make it difficult to conceive of effi-
cient alternatives to patents in other sectors (e.g., pharmaceuticals). It could 
perhaps be that the functions of patenting can be fulfilled more efficiently in 
other ways, and it certainly does not require allowing inventors to monopolize 
and thereby limit the profitable use of the knowledge they have generated. 
Nevertheless, given legal complexities and institutional complementarities, a 
cautious, experimental approach that retains the system’s benefits while 
increasing the free flow of knowledge is advisable. Here, a promising venue is 
the introduction of the so-called “open source” patents, which would retain 
the functions of knowledge repository and verification while improving access 
to knowledge for commercial use (Boettiger and Burk 2004).
Proposal 4: Introduce and support existing experiments with open source pat-
ent registration.
This proposal is justified, as it restores the balance between the public inter-
est in free knowledge disclosure and dissemination and the private interest in 
obtaining fair and just rewards for creating new knowledge. A public register 
and repository can help inventors claim fair (monetary and non-monetary) 
rewards while guaranteeing open and free access to non-rivalrous knowledge 
to ensure dynamic efficiency.
As for the implementation of proposals 2–4, treaties and case law in the EU 
already underline the importance of balancing the public interest and private 
property rights. Suse and Hachez (2017, p.  86) note that “[r]ecently, the 
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[European Court of Justice] was faced with the question of a potential conflict 
between intellectual property rights and other rights relevant to entrepreneur-
ship, such as the right to conduct a business (Article 16 Charter).” The con-
clusion of the case saw the Court insisting on imposing limits on the protection 
of intellectual property in the face of other (public) interests, in perfect align-
ment with the principle of justifiability.
The EU has strong competencies in (re)negotiating the treaties that govern 
IPR at the international level. It is hard, if not impossible, for individual 
member states, let alone the regions or localities within them, to deviate from 
such international arrangements. The Union must therefore first negotiate for 
the space to experiment before member states and lower polities can engage in 
such experimentation. And while Brexit means that the UK will leave the EU, 
Germany is also a major patenting nation whose role in international treaty 
negotiations should not be underestimated (see Sanders et al. 2018b, c for a 
more detailed analysis of these issues).
2.3  Summary
Table 2.2 summarizes the principles presented in this chapter together with 
the proposals derived from them and the level(s) at which political action 
should take place to make them a reality. Because the rule of law and protec-
tion of property are encompassing characteristics of the institutional environ-
ment for entrepreneurs, the first proposal will require (concerted) policy 
action at the local, regional, and national levels. Put differently, effective 
enforcement at the national level is likely to be ineffective if regional and local 
authorities can still introduce uncertainty by discretionary decisions that favor 
vested interests and protect rents. By contrast, proposals 2–4 emphasize IPR 
protection and can only be taken up by national or even supranational bodies 
with the power to (re)negotiate the international treaties that currently bind 
local and regional policymakers.
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Table 2.2 Summary of proposals regarding rule of law and property rights protection, 
specifying the level in the governance hierarchy where the necessary decisions should 
be made
No. Principle(s) Policy area Proposal
Policy 
levela
1 Legality The rule of 
law
Strengthen monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms to improve and safeguard 
the performance of all member states on 
rule of law, protection of property 





2 Justifiability Patents and 
intellectual 
property
Limit the breadth, width, and span of 
patent protection to cover working 
prototypes and market-ready 
innovations only for a short period of 
time, and permit economic actors to 
infringe upon patents that have not 
been commercialized.
EU, MS
3 Justifiability Patents and 
intellectual 
property
Require patent applicants to set the 
price for the license before the 
commercial application is known instead 
of allowing them to negotiate the terms 
of a license contract afterwards.
EU, MS
4 Justifiability Patents and 
intellectual 
property
Introduce and support existing 





aEU federal level, MS member state level, REG regional government level, LOC local/
municipal level
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3.1  General Principles
With a scope seven times that of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s War and Peace, the US 
tax code should leave nothing to chance. However, as shown by Sull and 
Eisenhardt (2015), authors of Simple Rules: How to Thrive in a Complex World, 
when 45 tax professionals took up the task of calculating one fictional family’s 
tax bill, they came up with 45 different estimates, with differences ranging in 
the tens of thousands of dollars. No wonder that “to navigate this (tax) laby-
rinth, U.S. citizens employ 1.2 million [tax professionals], more than all the 
police and firefighters in the country combined” (Sull and Eisenhardt 2015, 
p. 23). The example reveals how complexity can spiral out of control; in our 
context, it highlights William Baumol’s (1990) fundamental insight that soci-
ety’s rules of the game give rise to a “social structure of payoffs” determining 
whether individuals devote their time and energy to productive, unproduc-
tive, or destructive purposes. The European situation regarding corporate and 
personal income taxation appears to be comparable in that respect (PwC 
2019). Complex rules, especially in an area of such immense importance for 
entrepreneurial venturing as taxes, will likely limit the scope of productive 
entrepreneurial activity and the workings of collaborative innovation blocs.
Any analysis of the effects of taxes on entrepreneurship is further compli-
cated by the fact that no specific tax on income from entrepreneurial efforts 
exists in practice in the USA, Europe, or anywhere else. Governments tax 
entrepreneurial value creation in several ways, notably as labor income, busi-
ness income, current capital income (dividends and interest), or capital gains. 
The complex interactions among these taxes shape incentives. To disentangle 
36
these effects, we begin by focusing on the three main theoretical ways in which 
the tax system affects entrepreneurial activity (Henrekson and Sanandaji 2016).
First, an absolute effect influences the supply of potential entrepreneurs and 
the effort they exert in the economy, as an increase in the taxation of entrepre-
neurial incomes lowers their (expected) after-tax reward, adversely affecting 
entry, growth, and liquidity. Second, there is a relative effect influencing the 
relative returns for different activities; for example, a tax system favoring cer-
tain forms of savings and investments over others can have considerable indi-
rect consequences for entrepreneurship. Likewise, a higher relative tax on 
formal employment may encourage income shifting and push more people 
into self-employment; whether it is the “right” people and whether they are 
choosing self-employment for the right reasons are different matters alto-
gether. Lastly, the tax system (and regulation in general) can be so opaque and 
complex that it puts potential productive entrepreneurs at a disadvantage rela-
tive to individuals able and willing to game the system to their advantage. As 
such, the complexity effect benefits rent seekers, lobbyists, and tax arbitrageurs 
to the disadvantage of new entrants and productive ventures.
Bearing these effects in mind, we choose moderation as a first guiding prin-
ciple: tax rates should be low to promote an entrepreneurial society. Perhaps 
more important still is to espouse the second principle of neutrality and aim 
for as small a bias as possible with regard to taxes across different owner cate-
gories, sources of finance, and economic activities (Elert et al. 2017). Finally, 
adherence to the principle of transparency is vital to make the tax system less 
opaque and exception-ridden.
Tax systems tend to grow increasingly complex and opaque over time 
because politicians, often prompted by vocal interest groups in society, con-
tinually tinker with the system at the margins. This corrosion highlights the 
need for an occasional overhaul of the tax code to do away with the exceptions 
and loopholes typically introduced to fix imbalances caused by changes else-
where in the tax code. Because such a tax code reform requires a strong politi-
cal mandate and momentum, the optimal moment of implementation is hard 
to predict; but when an opportunity presents itself, policymakers should 
embrace it.
The EU’s tax competencies are quite limited, meaning that most of the 
proposals presented below are directed to member states individually. That 
said, the EU can play a role by “nudging” national governments in the right 
direction and has several policy instruments at its disposal to do so. Such 
instruments include recommendations, policy statements developed by the 
Council, and nonbinding agreements between member states, which could be 
coupled with regular assessments, peer pressure, and the exchange of best 
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practices between member states. The EU is entitled to take such supporting 
and coordinating actions whenever tax reforms touch upon the proper func-
tioning of the internal market. This is arguably the case for taxes with a bear-
ing on the efficient allocation of capital in the EU, such as corporate income 
taxation, dividend and capital gains taxation, and the fiscal treatment of debt, 
equity, and stock options (Suse and Hachez 2017).
3.2  Proposals
Given the complexities inherent in the relationship between taxes and entre-
preneurship, we present reform proposals for the major tax categories in EU 
member states one at a time: labor, corporate, dividend, and capital gains, 
wealth, and stock options taxation. These proposals should primarily be con-
sidered at the member state level, either in isolation or, preferably, as part of a 
comprehensive tax reform.
3.2.1  Labor Taxation
While some entrepreneurs (such as owner-managers in incorporated busi-
nesses) are employees in their own companies, they seldom pay themselves a 
high salary, especially in early phases when liquidity tends to be constrained. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on key personnel in the collaborative innovation 
bloc underscores the central role of labor taxation for successful entrepreneur-
ial venturing. EU member states differ substantially in this respect.
While the top marginal tax rates on labor income range from 15% in 
Hungary to 60% in Sweden, the total marginal tax wedge is in many ways a 
more informative measure, with more relevant effects on entrepreneurial ven-
turing. Defined as the share of total labor cost at the margin, it consists of the 
sum of mandatory social security contributions paid by the employer and/or 
the employee and the marginal income tax rate. In a country such as Belgium, 
as much as two-thirds of total labor cost consists of income taxes and social 
security contributions, while the share in Poland is only about half as large 
(see Table 3.1). In part, the differences reflect the diversity in political prefer-
ences and cultures across Europe. Generally, labor taxation is high, both on 
average and at the margin, in the old member states and the Nordic welfare 
states. Rates are much lower in the East, where tax codes are more recent, and 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries, with their less extensive welfare states.
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To offset the negative impacts of high marginal and average labor taxation 
on labor supply, policymakers have tied many of the valuable transfers and 
welfare state services that these taxes finance (e.g., child care and pension 
rights) to employment. Moreover, taxation and social security have often been 
individualized to stimulate female labor participation (Lindbeck 1982). Such 
individualized conditionality explains why a country such as Sweden has the 
EU’s highest employment rate despite high marginal and average taxes on 
labor. However, if systems are poorly designed, they push people away from 
small, risky, and innovative ventures into secure, salaried employment in the 
public sector or in incumbent firms. More often than not, these high- taxation–
high-conditionality systems violate our principles of moderation, neutrality, 
and transparency.
Table 3.1 Top marginal tax rate on labor income, and marginal rate of income tax plus 
employee and employer contributions less cash benefits (tax wedge), 2017
Tax wedges
Country
Top marginal tax 









children, 100 and 
67% AW
Austria 48.0 59.7 42.2 59.7
Belgium 46.0 66.4 68.5 65.6
Czech Rep. 20.1 48.6 48.6 48.6
Denmark 55.8 42.0 55.8 42.0
Estonia 19.7 41.2 41.2 41.2
Finland 49.0 55.6 58.3 56.4
France 53.9 58.5 59.9 60.4
Germany 47.5 60.4 44.3 57.9
Greece 55.0 49.1 61.6 49.1
Hungary 15.0 46.2 49.0 46.2
Ireland 48.0 54.0 55.8 35.9
Italy 42.3 54.7 63.3 55.3
Luxembourg 41.4 55.5 55.5 52.1
Netherlands 49.7 51.6 52.7 51.6
Poland 22.1 37.0 37.2 37.0
Portugal 50.0 51.1 60.8 51.1
Slovakia 21.7 46.4 46.5 46.4
Slovenia 39.0 51.0 60.4 43.6
Spain 43.5 48.3 37.0 48.3
Sweden 60.1 48.3 67.3 48.4
UK 45.0 40.2 49.0 40.3
USA 46.3 43.6 43.6 34.3
Note: The marginal tax wedge refers to the principal earner with an income of 100% 
of average wage (AW) and the secondary earner with an income of 67% of AW in the 
rightmost column
Source: OECD, Taxing Wages 2016–2017
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For Sweden, it has been argued that a reform to lower the marginal tax in 
the top bracket would probably more than finance itself (Sørensen 2010; 
Holmlund and Söderström 2011). The situation is different in the new east-
ern member states: despite low labor income tax rates, they exhibit little 
improvement-driven opportunity entrepreneurship and couple low employ-
ment with large underground economies. These circumstances suggest that 
factors other than high labor taxes are binding constraints for this cluster of 
countries and that lowering such taxes more would merely result in a harmful 
loss of tax income and the deterioration of public sector effectiveness. In con-
trast, labor taxation seems to be a clear impediment to venture creation and 
growth in the Mediterranean countries, as well as in Belgium and France. 
There, high taxes and the employment-related obligations of employers penal-
ize both the employment of people and attempts to realize growth. Reforms 
in these countries should aim to combine lower labor taxes with more univer-
sal access to public services and social security, such as childcare and pension 
rights. We return to these issues when discussing the organization of labor 
markets and social security systems in Chap. 5.
Regarding labor taxation, we contend that countries with high marginal 
labor tax rates should refrain from following the Swedish model. Instead, they 
should reduce their marginal labor tax rates where possible because condition-
ality always benefits well-defined, existing forms of employment. Policymakers 
should not try to offset imbalances caused by high taxation by introducing 
additional layers of complexity. Instead we propose:
Proposal 5: Reduce high tax burdens on labor instead of making subsidies, pen-
sion rights, and social benefits more conditional on employment status.
The proposal would ensure tax neutrality between different types of labor 
market engagement, reducing the disproportionately high penalty small 
employers face when hiring workers. Moreover, the proposal serves the prin-
ciple of transparency by reducing the roundabout method of taxing labor 
income to finance transfers and to provide subsidized services to those that 
paid the tax.
3.2.2  Corporate Taxation
Corporate taxation has significant ramifications for the interplay between 
entrepreneurs and financiers in the collaborative innovation bloc; specifically, 
a high tax rate on business profits discourages equity financing and  encourages 
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debt financing if interest payments are tax-deductible (Desai et  al. 2003; 
Huizinga et al. 2008). Because debt financing is less costly and more readily 
available to larger firms, high corporate tax rates coupled with tax-deductible 
interest payments put smaller firms and potential entrepreneurs at a disadvan-
tage (Davis and Henrekson 1999) while also reducing the retained earnings 
that can be used to expand ventures after start-up. Consequently, taxing prof-
its can be expected to affect growth negatively, especially in small firms 
(Michaelas et al. 1999).
In the EU, the statutory corporate tax rate ranges from 35% in Malta to 
9% in Hungary (Fig. 3.1). While healthy institutional competition among 
member states along this margin keeps rates down, the EU has a central role 
to play to prevent a race to the bottom, and it must act as a watchdog against 
opaque sweetheart deals negotiated between national governments and large 
multinational corporations or national champions. Although they reduce 
effective tax rates, such exceptions violate the principles of neutrality and 
transparency; the Union should therefore encourage member states to remove 
discrepancies between statutory and effective corporate income tax rates stem-
ming from these deals.1
1 Discrepancies can be due to accelerated depreciation rules, inventory valuation rules, and ad hoc coun-
try- or industry-specific tax reductions. They are usually the result of effective lobbying by vested interest; 
at best, they do little harm, but typically they distort the behavior of various agents in the business sector, 












Fig. 3.1 The statutory corporate tax rate in EU countries and the USA, 2018. Source: 
OECD and Eurostat
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Proposal 6: Eliminate discrepancies between statutory and effective corporate 
income tax rates.
It is imperative that these discrepancies be addressed, as it becomes more 
difficult to realize the behavioral effects that policymakers envision if eco-
nomic actors can obtain an effective tax rate lower than the statutory one 
(Chetty et al. 2009). Moreover, all firms should be treated equally under cor-
porate income tax law.
There is, however, one (transparent but decidedly non-neutral) exception 
to the equal treatment rule that we would consider appropriate: that start-ups 
be allowed to retain their profits for reinvestment. The fact that new firms 
create useful knowledge about new technologies and business models (even if 
they ultimately fail) justifies this departure from the neutrality principle. This 
does not mean that personal incomes earned from start-ups should be tax 
exempt, as this could trigger unproductive tax arbitrage and promote solo 
self-employment (Liebregts 2016). This reform would make it easier and 
more attractive to make and reinvest profits while simultaneously creating a 
tough selection environment for firms without creating a need to develop 
(transparent, democratic, and accountable) criteria for public support. In 
addition, this supports new ventures without siphoning off resources from 
successful firms and avoids the risk that direct government support is chan-
neled to the wrong firms. The latter risk is far from negligible; it could induce 
entrepreneurs to spend less time and effort on catering to consumer demands, 
and more on developing expertise in getting such public support (Gustafsson 
et al. 2018). In the extreme case, entrepreneurial profits could be made fully 
tax exempt. However, such a policy would only be effective when statutory 
corporate tax rates are also effective corporate tax rates, as proposed above.
Generally, a corporate income tax is not a potent way to tax the income of 
firms, especially incumbents, since they respond to such measures by increas-
ing their prices and/or lowering the returns to their production factors. 
Corporate income taxation may have made sense in times when collecting 
taxes on personal income and consumption was cumbersome and compli-
cated, but digitalization has made these indirect methods of taxation redun-
dant. Ultimately, they only distort incentives and give rise to fiscal arbitrage. 
The principle of transparency justifies making all corporate profits tax exempt 
(not only those of young firms) while taxing primary incomes and consump-
tion directly.
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Proposal 7: Grant full corporate income tax exemption to genuinely new, inno-
vative start-ups through their 3rd year, with the long-term goal of abolishing 
corporate income taxation altogether.
Clearly, the short-term goal of this proposal violates one of the principles 
we hold dear: neutrality. Moreover, it may give rise to undesirable tax-induced 
arrangements and does not distinguish between innovation-based new ven-
tures producing knowledge spillovers and low-tech replicative ventures. 
However, because it is difficult for bureaucrats to distinguish deserving from 
non-deserving ventures, it is probably best to refrain from fine-tuning this 
further. Regardless, start-ups rarely make big profits in their first years, mean-
ing that the proposal will not be costly in terms of foregone tax revenue. 
Fulfilling its long-term goal could, furthermore, make it a vital step towards a 
tax system in line with the desired principles of transparency, neutrality, and 
moderation.
3.2.3  Taxation of Dividends and Capital Gains
The returns to entrepreneurship mainly accrue to investors and entrepreneurs 
in the form of dividends and capital gains on their firm ownership stake. A 
high dividend tax rate encourages entrepreneurs to rely on retained earnings 
to finance expansion but can also trap capital in incumbent firms, thereby 
obstructing the flow of capital to the most promising projects in a collabora-
tive innovation bloc (Chetty and Saez 2005). This imbalance is probably part 
of the reason why owners receive most of their economic return from success-
ful entrepreneurship in the form of increased share values. Consequently, the 
taxation of capital gains on stock holdings typically has a substantial effect on 
the financial incentives of potential high-impact entrepreneurs and their 
(equity) financiers (Cumming 2005; Da Rin et al. 2006).
As shown in Table 3.2, standard tax rates on dividends and capital gains 
differ substantially among EU countries. Moreover, there are many ways in 
which effective rates can and do diverge from standard rates (Grant Thornton 
2016).2 For example, the Swedish dividend and capital gains tax rates vary 
between 20 and 60% for physical persons; in Ireland, meanwhile, the divi-
2 These divergences depend on factors such as the holding period, firm size, whether the firm is private or 
traded on a stock exchange, and whether ownership is passive or active. Other decisive factors are whether 
the firm and/or the investor qualifies for inclusion in a tax-favored scheme (e.g., a scheme geared towards 
encouraging innovative start-up activity), and the tax status of the body (a natural or a juridical person, 
etc.) receiving the capital income.
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dend tax rate is 51%, whereas the capital gains tax rate can be reduced from 
33% to zero under certain conditions. Levels are low, and variation is smaller 
in the Netherlands, Poland, and Estonia.
What most European member states have in common, however, is that 
their tax schemes for dividends and capital gains are complex, thereby feeding 
a thriving but macro-economically unproductive tax advice business. 
Countries should thus aim for dividend and capital gains tax rates with few 
exceptions and few (opaque) concessionary schemes. Here, Eastern European 
countries, such as Poland and Estonia, offer exemplary models: tax rates are at 
reasonable levels, and the effective tax rate is largely independent of any par-
ticular circumstances. Arguably, the simplicity is due to the relatively recent 
transition of these former communist countries to liberal market-based 
democracies. These economies essentially had to start from scratch in the early 
1990s and were exempt from the burden of decades of lobbying and the type 
of political compromises obfuscating the tax system in most Western European 
countries.
Proposal 8: Countries should aim for low dividend and capital gains tax rates 
with few exceptions and few (opaque) concessionary schemes.
Dividend taxation also creates an undesirable differential in the risk- 
adjusted returns on debt and equity that possibly biases the supply of financial 
Table 3.2 The standard dividend and capital gains tax rates (short-term/long-term) in 
EU member countries and the USA, 2018
Country Dividends Capital gains Country Dividends Capital gains
Austria 27.5 27.5 Latvia 0.0 20.0
Belgium 30.0 0.0 Lithuania 15.0 15.0
Bulgaria 5.0 41.0 Luxembourg 21.0 42.0
Croatia 12.0 12.0 Malta 0.0 35.0
Cyprus 17.0 0.0 Netherlands 25.0 n/aa
Czech Republic 15.0 15/0 Poland 19.0 19.0
Denmark 42.0 42.0 Portugal 28.0 28.0
Estonia 0.0 21.0 Romania 5.0 10.0
Finland 28.9 34.0 Slovakia 7.0 25/0
France 30.0 30.0 Slovenia 25.0 25/0
Germany 26.4 26.4/0 Spain 23.0 23.0
Greece 15.0 15.0 Sweden 30.0 30.0
Hungary 15.0 15.0 UK 38.1 28.0
Ireland 51.0 33.0 USA 29.2 39.6/20
Italy 26.0 26.0
Source: OECD Statistics, Table II.4 Overall Statutory Tax Rates on Dividend Income, and 
the websites of the respective national tax agencies
aThe Dutch tax rate on capital gains does not depend on the realized return. It is a flat 
tax of 30% on an assumed nominal rate of return
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capital away from small, uncertain, experimental entrepreneurial venturing. 
We would, therefore, propose dividend taxation be kept low and at a par with 
the fiscal treatment of interest income on debt to avoid such biases. A similar 
argument holds for capital gains taxation to the extent that retained profits 
drive capital gains. To promote a more entrepreneurial society, the tax system 
should not be biased against the most relevant sources of finance for entrepre-
neurial venturing.
3.2.4  Taxation of Private Wealth
“Triple-F” finance plays an important role in the early stages of many ventures 
in a collaborative innovation bloc. When entrepreneurs exhaust their own 
resources, friends, family, and “fools” typically step in (Mitter and Kraus 
2011). The last category includes informal investors, who, perhaps contrary 
to the general perception, contribute resources neither blindly nor foolishly. 
Entrepreneurs distribute ownership rights to informal investors early in the 
start-up process, putting the lie to the idea that triple-F financiers act out of 
charity (Kotha and George 2012; Ford and Nelsen 2014). In fact, the supply 
of such finance typically follows demand closely, and the amounts invested are 
of the same order of magnitude as amounts committed by angel investors in 
later stages of development (Burke et al. 2014). In other words, entrepreneurs 
mobilize significant funds from their personal and informal networks that aid 
in the development of their nascent ventures. It is possible, therefore, that 
more private wealth would increase the supply of informal finance, ultimately 
enabling more entrepreneurial venturing.
Proposal 9: Harmonize and reduce taxes on private wealth, private wealth trans-
fers, and inheritance if productively invested.
Because the incomes used to build up private wealth have typically already 
been taxed, some would argue that any form of private wealth taxation is 
double taxation (Boadway et  al. 2010). A country may choose to tax the 
wealth of its citizens for equity reasons, but the fact that this gives rise to 
unproductive tax arbitrage (Harrington 2016; Zucman 2014, 2015; Montes 
2018) is probably why most European countries have lowered wealth taxa-
tion. However, as shown in Table A.1  in the Appendix, countries such as 
France and Spain still tax wealth at steep rates even if the exempted amounts 
are sizable. The real effective tax rate on wealth income can become extremely 
high in the current low interest regime: For instance, a wealth tax of 2% is a 
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real tax that is levied in addition to any tax on the nominal return of the asset. 
Invariably, this problem forces the government to introduce distortionary 
safety valves (e.g., Du Rietz and Henrekson 2015).
Equity considerations, while relevant, should take a backseat to ensuring 
that accumulated private wealth is mobilized and productively invested 
(Krippner 2005; Hudson and Bezemer 2012; Piketty et al. 2013; Bezemer 
2014; Bezemer and Hudson 2016). The entrepreneurial society loses out 
when its wealthy families become rentier dynasties, i.e., passive portfolio 
investors in large incumbent firms and real estate. Preferably, their accumu-
lated wealth should be used to create opportunities for the next generation of 
entrepreneurs (Acs and Phillips 2002; Acs 2006; Auerswald and Acs 2009). 
Acs and Phillips (2002) argue that in the USA, wealthy entrepreneurs per-
form this function in part through philanthropy. Historically, European 
nations have relied more on the taxation of accumulated wealth, wealth 
income, and inheritance, redistributing the proceeds through publicly funded 
investments in, e.g., education and health.
To ensure that Europe’s wealthy families reinvest their fortunes in promis-
ing ventures on their own accord, a preferential treatment of equity invest-
ments in young SMEs could be considered. Alternatively, leaving private 
wealth invested unproductively could carry a penalty (Shakow and Shuldiner 
1999).3 Whichever route is chosen to mobilize more private wealth for 
 entrepreneurial venturing, a strong case can be made for a harmonization of 
wealth taxation at the Union level. Appropriately implemented, such a 
measure would prevent a legislative race to the bottom and minimize the 
scope for unproductive tax evasion. Such considerations would benefit the 
current debate on European wealth taxation, which appears to be dominated 
by  concerns of tax revenue and equity (Astarita 2014; Krenek and 
Schratzenstaller 2018).
Regarding inheritance taxation, another delicate balance must be struck—
this time between preventing the build-up and entrenchment of passively 
invested dynastic fortunes on one hand and incentivizing the accumulation of 
wealth through productive investment on the other hand. Table A.2 in the 
Appendix reveals that inheritance taxes differ widely across member states, 
being zero or close to zero in 14 of the 28 member states but very high in 
some of the larger states, such as the UK, Germany, France, and Spain, as well 
3 This need not be complicated. For example, the Dutch system for taxation of private wealth assumes a 
4% return on assets (above a threshold of 30.360 euros per person) which is taxed at 30%, implying a tax 
on the value of wealth above the threshold of 1.2%. Since 2017 the percentage increases with the size of 
the wealth. By assuming the return instead of measuring it, the wealth owner has an incentive to invest 
her wealth with higher risk and earn a higher return.
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as in Finland and Belgium. As private wealth is most often invested produc-
tively in ventures when investors are knowledgeable about local conditions, 
fiscally motivated movement of capital to avoid inheritance taxation is unpro-
ductive. The EU should aim for harmonization in this area to prevent such 
wasteful actions.
Proposal 10: Harmonize inheritance taxes across member states and introduce a 
moderate flat tax rate and exempt the majority of inheritances from taxation.
Most Western European countries have reduced their inheritance taxation 
significantly since the 1960s. Interestingly, the tax is least popular among the 
lower income brackets. Following the work of Piketty (2015), however, the 
issue of preventing the accumulation of “dead” wealth has resurfaced in the 
policy debate (e.g., The Economist 2017). While there are strong arguments 
for taxing inheritances, the devil is, as always, in the details. The primary pur-
pose of this tax should not be to raise revenue but to incentivize the produc-
tive investment of wealth. People should be discouraged from rolling over 
large fortunes into risk-free portfolios of government bonds, and the liquida-
tion of productive ventures to avoid inheritance taxation would be especially 
damaging. A moderate and harmonized inheritance tax would broaden the 
tax base while limiting the incentives and opportunities for tax avoidance. 
Furthermore, in member states where family-owned businesses are engines of 
innovation and growth, policymakers should consider additional means to 
strengthen the entrepreneurial society, for example, by introducing exemp-
tions for wealth that remains productively invested in family firms.
Reducing and simplifying the taxation of private wealth are the first steps 
towards freeing up more savings for productive investment in entrepreneurial 
ventures. Those steps are not enough, however, if the interests and skills of 
private wealth owners do not meet the entrepreneurial sector’s needs. Here, a 
well-developed financial sector, to which we return below, has an important 
role as a matchmaker and intermediary.
3.2.5  Tax Neutral Treatment of Equity and Debt
Innovative entrepreneurs have limited access to bank credit and tradable debt 
obligations. They may borrow from friends, family, and fools or through 
crowdlending, but these types of lending are often exposed to the same risks 
as equity and given in anticipation of the same return profiles (with no formal 
governance rights). The reason is that innovative start-ups face large disadvan-
tages in attracting more formal forms of debt finance due to high uncertainty 
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and the lack of a robust track record and readily collateralizable assets. 
Therefore, tax structures that favor debt over equity investments will, often 
unintentionally, bias the flow of financial resources away from innovative 
entrepreneurial venturing and impede the workings of the collaborative inno-
vation bloc. Moreover, the tax-deductibility of interest payments has provided 
large firms with ample room for artificially shifting profits to low or zero-tax 
locations (OECD 2017).
Currently, national tax systems in Europe favor debt finance. Debt becomes 
(too) cheap relative to equity because interest payments are deductible as 
operating costs, while dividends are subject to corporate income taxation 
before they can be paid out to shareholders. Moreover, strong legal creditor 
protection reduces risks for creditors that would otherwise justify a higher risk 
premium on debt finance. Together, these fiscal and institutional arrange-
ments bias the supply of finance towards debt, and entrepreneurs are at a 
disadvantage when competing for debt relative to homeowners, large multi-
nationals, and other actors. As such, debt finance channels society’s available 
savings into the reproduction and growth of the existing capital stock, and a 
case can be made that only equity type investments finance innovation and 
progress beyond the status quo (Polzin et al. 2018a).
Neutrality between debt and equity can be achieved in two principal ways: 
by reducing the tax advantages of debt finance or by giving similar advantages 
to equity (e.g., De Mooij and Devereux 2016). The EU’s efforts in this regard 
have mainly been to reduce interest deductibility. In 2016, the European 
Council (2016) adopted the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD), which 
lays down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the func-
tioning of the internal market. Article 4 in the Directive stipulates a limit to 
interest deductions: net interest payments cannot exceed a certain percentage 
of company earnings, typically defined as 30% of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), allowing for a minimum 
deductible amount independent of earnings. Table A.3 in the Appendix shows 
that almost all member states have instituted such rules, with most of them 
settling for a minimum deductible amount of EUR 3 million.
Unfortunately, the Council has prioritized its concern regarding tax base 
erosion over the need to even out the imbalance between debt and equity as 
sources of finance. It is unclear to what extent the EBITDA rules will be bind-
ing for incumbent firms, and if the rules are not binding, they will do nothing 
to reduce the difference in effective taxation of debt and equity.
A better route to follow to achieve neutrality would be to introduce a so- 
called comprehensive business income tax. This measure would eliminate the 
fiscal favoring of debt-financed investment by disallowing any deduction for 
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interest payments while compensating the business sector with a commensu-
rate lowering of the corporate tax rate. If implemented, this proposal would 
promote an entrepreneurial society by lowering the taxation of high profits, 
thereby incentivizing the pursuit of ventures with high risk and high expected 
returns. Moreover, although firms are allowed to deduct interest payments 
from corporate taxes, the creditors appropriate most of that benefit, as com-
petition in debt markets is much higher on the demand side than on the sup-
ply side. Nevertheless, resistance against such a reform will likely be extensive; 
it is in the best interest of creditors (notably banks) to lobby against it, and 
many firms also (believe that they) benefit from the favorable tax treatment of 
debt finance. In practice, therefore, policymakers may need to opt for an 
allowance for corporate equity scheme instead. Such a scheme would replace 
the deductibility of actual interest payments by allowing the deduction of an 
amount corresponding to the normal return applied to the book value of the 
firm’s total assets. While this scheme eliminates the bias towards debt finance, 
such a reform would, in fact, tax profits at a higher rate than before. It would 
thus reduce the bias, and also reduce firms’ ability to retain funds. In the short 
run, however, it may be the best we can hope for.
Proposal 11: Initiate a balanced program aiming to achieve tax neutrality 
between debt and equity finance.
In an entrepreneurial society, it is (primarily) equity investments that enable 
innovative entrepreneurial venturing and thereby generate useful knowledge 
about the products, services, and business models that work or fail. This 
knowledge constitutes a positive externality, which may even justify the pref-
erential tax treatment of equity investments over debt.4 At the very least, the 
long-term ambition should be to eliminate any fiscal advantages held by debt 
finance over equity.
3.2.6  Taxation of Stock Options
The fiscal treatment of stock options deserves special mention, harking back 
to the role played by key personnel in the collaborative innovation bloc. As a 
4 The same logic suggests that banks and other investors should be encouraged to disclose information on 
loan applications they accept or turn down. Of course, the traditional banking business model relies in 
part on exclusive access to financial information on clients, but as European banks have largely aban-
doned the traditional relationship-based banking model, it is difficult to justify exclusive access. Presently, 
alternative platform finance is exploring practical ways to collect and disseminate such information. We 
return to this issue in Chap. 4.
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promise of a future ownership stake, employee stock options are used to 
encourage and reward individuals who supply key competencies to a young 
firm that is typically short on cash. However, their value—and effectiveness as 
an incentive mechanism—greatly depends on the option tax code, notably on 
whether employees can defer the tax liability until they sell the stocks (and 
whether they are taxed at a low capital gains tax rate at this point) (Gilson and 
Schizer 2003).
The effective tax treatment of option contracts is a major determinant of 
the size of the VC-funded entrepreneurial sector (Henrekson and Sanandaji 
2018a). In a cross-country perspective, the tax rates on stock options vary 
considerably. For instance, the tax rate is as low as 7% in Ireland, while it typi-
cally exceeds 70% in Italy, and the tax rules tend to be highly complex (see 
Table A.4 in the Appendix). The VC sector remains small in most countries 
where the tax rate on stock options is high, while low-tax countries such as 
Hong Kong and the USA have large and highly dynamic VC sectors (Armour 
and Cumming 2006).
Proposal 12: Taxes on capital gains on stock options and the underlying stock in 
start-ups should be low and only be taxed when exercised and/or sold, i.e., when 
gains are realized.
In many EU countries, the lower taxation of gains on employee stock 
options in the start-up sector is necessary, both as a means to lure talented 
people away from traditional careers in incumbent firms and to channel insti-
tutional capital into the entrepreneurial sector, which should be mediated by 
a professional VC sector. A tax break that targets human capital in this seg-
ment would promote innovative entrepreneurship without the high fiscal cost 
of broad capital gains tax cuts (Henrekson and Sanandaji 2018c).
3.3  Summary
Taxation is essential to any government’s ability to finance essential public 
infrastructure and collective goods. Therefore, where we argue in favor of 
moderation, healthy government finances are assumed. Inevitably, this implies 
that countries in the Union will end up with different tax levels and rates. 
However, given the aggregate level of tax income required to ensure a long- 
term stable government budget, we maintain that moderate, neutral, and 
transparent taxation are key to boosting entrepreneurial venturing across 
Europe. Adhering to these three principles requires an ongoing effort to keep 
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the tax system simple, clear, and effective in the face of interest groups lobby-
ing for exemptions and exceptions. The alternative is less transparency, 
impaired neutrality, and increased complexity, which will distort behavior.
Table 3.3 provides a summary of our proposals regarding taxation and the 
level(s) of the governance hierarchy at which political action should take place 
to make them a reality. In contrast to the previous chapter, the proposals in 
Table 3.3 Summary of proposals regarding taxation, specifying the level in the gover-
nance hierarchy where the necessary decisions should be made
No. Principle(s) Policy area Proposal
Policy 
levela




Reduce high tax burdens on labor 
instead of making subsidies, pension 
rights, and social benefits more 
conditional on employment status.
MS
6 Transparency Corporate 
income 
taxation
Eliminate discrepancies between 
statutory and effective corporate 
income tax rates.
EU, MS





Grant full corporate income tax 
exemption to genuinely new, 
innovative start-ups through their 
third year, with the long-term goal 
of abolishing corporate income 
taxation altogether.
EU, MS





Countries should aim for low 
dividend and capital gains tax rates 
with few exceptions and few 
(opaque) concessionary schemes.
EU, MS




Harmonize and reduce taxes on 
private wealth, private wealth 
transfers, and inheritance if 
productively invested.
MS




Harmonize inheritance taxes across 
member states and introduce a 
moderate flat tax rate and exempt 
the majority of inheritances from 
taxation.
EU, MS
11 Neutrality Debt and 
equity 
taxation
Initiate a balanced program aiming 
to achieve tax neutrality between 
debt and equity finance.
EU, MS
12 Moderation Stock options 
taxation
Taxes on capital gains on stock 
options and the underlying stock in 
start-ups should be low and only be 
taxed when exercised and/or sold, 
i.e., when gains are realized.
EU, MS
aEU federal level, MS member state level
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this chapter require little policy coordination across policymaking levels: the 
legislative powers in tax policy are almost exclusively reserved for the member 
states. However, as Suse and Hachez (2017) note, the EU can and should use 
a number of nonbinding instruments and approaches to influence the tax 
policies of its member states.
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4
Savings, Finance, and Capital 
for Entrepreneurial Ventures
4.1  General Principles
The nature and estimated cost of innovations foregone as a result of institu-
tional obstacles will always be shrouded in uncertainty because we can only 
speculate about what is “not seen,” in the words of Frédéric Bastiat (1850). In 
a given institutional setting, we see only those market transactions and those 
entrepreneurial activities that the institutional setting allows and supports; 
innovations that do not conform to the existing economic order will not 
attract the required skills and resources and therefore not materialize. Thinking 
in terms of what is seen and unseen is valuable when pondering how existing 
rules governing savings, finance, and capital in Europe affect entrepreneurial 
activity and how they should change.
Europe certainly has no shortage of savings (OECD 2019a). However, as 
we have already mentioned, the nature of entrepreneurial venturing makes 
some forms of finance more suitable than others. In other words, the problem 
is not quantitative but qualitative: the allocation, rather than the volume, of 
European savings is what matters for entrepreneurial activity. Though plenti-
ful, financial resources in the EU are mainly intermediated through universal 
banks and institutional investors who prefer large, low-risk, debt-based assets 
and blue-chip stock over small, risky equity-based investments (Westerhuis 
2016). This systemic problem has considerable ramifications for collaborative 
innovation blocs; one can only speculate as to the number of fundamentally 
sound entrepreneurial projects that never got off the ground because the 
financial playing field was tilted against them.
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In this chapter, we present reform proposals intended to increase the flow 
of financial resources to small and new firms with high potential for entrepre-
neurial venturing. Our proposals aim to ensure that more of the existing 
resources become available to new ventures at the right time and in the appro-
priate form and quantities. For these goals to materialize, policymakers should 
reform existing institutions governing the allocation of capital in Europe. 
While proven recipes from outside Europe can be adopted, digital platform 
technology allows entirely new ones to be tried. As such, the reform proposals 
will enable vested institutions, promote proven alternatives, and experiment 
with new technologies to allocate more of the available capital to innovative 
entrepreneurs.
Again, a few basic principles underlie our proposals. First, because the 
framework surrounding savings and finance often puts entrepreneurs at a dis-
advantage, we adhere to the principle of neutrality by creating a level playing 
field for entrepreneurial ventures in the competition for financial resources. 
When followed, the principle guarantees that entrepreneurs are given a fair 
shot without being pampered. Second, we aim for increased transparency to 
reduce asymmetric information problems for investors. Adhering to this prin-
ciple ensures that entrepreneurs know the criteria upon which the success of 
their venture will be evaluated, reducing a substantial source of uncertainty in 
entrepreneurial venturing. Finally, the principle of justifiability enters the dis-
cussion when we consider enabling reforms in the banking sector and pension 
funds. Given the seemingly conflicting aims of providing financial stability 
and financing productive venturing, the justifiability principle helps balance 
important functions, thus increasing the probability that reforms are effec-
tively implemented and respected.
As stated, financial resources are not in short supply in Europe; the prob-
lem is the way in which they are intermediated. Therefore, we first discuss 
reforms that prevent some savings from ending up with institutionalized 
intermediaries, as this would free up resources for start-ups in the form of 
private and informal investments. Then, we consider whether and how Europe 
might emulate the successful American model of business angels and VC 
before addressing reforms that would enable Europe’s historically dominant 
banking sector and more recently built up pension funds to invest parts of 
their vast portfolios in growing entrepreneurial firms. Because some of the 
proposals touch upon the so-called FinTech innovations, we conclude the 
chapter with a discussion of business models for alternative finance on digital 
platforms.
Proposals referring to private wealth accumulation and pension funds are 
primarily addressed to the member state level, as the European treaties do not 
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give strong and effective competencies to European policymakers in these 
areas (Suse and Hachez 2017, pp. 40–41).1 However, it does seem that the 
European policy level has ample competencies and instruments to implement 
reforms for the banking sector and FinTech innovation, while lower levels of 
policymaking are better suited to promote small-scale, arm’s length financing 
for early-stage start-ups and the development of vibrant local and regional 
VC sectors.
4.2  Proposals
4.2.1  Financing Early-Stage Venturing
A large share of savings in European economies currently goes into banks and 
pension funds (OECD 2018a). This share can be expected to grow in the 
future, as funded systems increasingly substitute for pay-as-you-go systems 
and an increasing number of European workers opt for voluntary or collec-
tively agreed upon supplementary pension plans (PensionsEurope 2017). 
These institutions primarily invest the funds of their clients and beneficiaries 
in liquid debt-based assets or tradable equities. This preference is unsurprising 
given the inability of such investors to take an active role in firm manage-
ment.2 The large economies of scale in managing loan portfolios (e.g., Philpot 
et al. 1998; Hughes and Mester 1998; Piketty 2014; Fagereng et al. 2016) also 
cause a bias towards “big ticket” investments and tradable securities. As a 
result, the resources managed by banks and pension funds can typically not be 
used for the type of smaller, long-run, equity-based investments that are so 
central to small and young ventures in collaborative innovation blocs (Kramer- 
Eis et al. 2017).
The lack of equity capital in smaller ticket sizes constrains (potential) high- 
growth firms more than others because such firms require regular infusions of 
1 Still, the EU has some coordination tools available, and the Commission has substantial powers when-
ever proposals relate to the internal market for financial services. For example, in 2013, the Commission 
adopted a proposal establishing uniform rules to enable venture capital funds to “market their funds and 
raise capital on a pan-European basis across the Single Market.” Moreover, since the financial crisis, 
European coordinating, supervisory, and legislative powers have been expanded through the establish-
ment of the Banking Union in 2012 and the Capital Markets Union. The aim of the latter is “to deepen 
and further integrate the capital markets of the 28 EU member states” and its gradual buildup is projected 
to be completed in 2019 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/capital-markets-union/).
2 The 23 associations in 21 European countries that are members of PensionsEurope (2017, p. 12) hold 
some 30% of assets in equity, but these holdings are typically passive. When pension funds actively 
engage with the firms in which they invest, it is usually to promote corporate social responsibility (e.g., 
O’Rourke 2003).
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external equity to sustain growth (Baumol et al. 2007, p. 205). This reliance 
increases (relative to debt) with the degree of risk and opacity, both of which 
are greater among younger and more innovative firms. Therefore, entrepre-
neurial start-ups usually struggle to raise funds in general and funds  from 
large financial institutions in particular (Tilburg 2009). Part of the problem is 
that wealth-constrained would-be entrepreneurs do not have a track record, 
cannot put up collateral or make sizable equity infusions of their own to cred-
ibly signal their project’s worth to outside investors. Higher levels of private 
wealth accumulation could remedy this problem of asymmetric information 
(Nykvist 2008; Parker 2018) or even enable the entrepreneur to make equity 
infusions that are large enough to capitalize the firm at inception. Such capi-
talization is essential for later venture success and performance (Henrekson 
and Sanandaji 2016).
Moreover, greater private or family-based savings could increase the pool of 
potential business angels and other informal investors who can help entrepreneurs 
overcome liquidity constraints in the early stages of venture creation (Ho and 
Wong 2007). The entrepreneur’s family can be crucial in this respect, especially in 
regions where family ties are strong (Dilli and Westerhuis 2018). Conversely, a 
lack of private wealth impedes entrepreneurial venturing; any arrangement chan-
neling savings and asset control away from large institutional investors and back 
to private individuals is, therefore, likely to increase the supply of equity capital 
and “soft” loans in smaller ticket sizes with early- stage entrepreneurs, even if much 
of it will end up in lower mortgages and savings deposits at banks.
A first best option for institutional reform is to reduce the share of institu-
tionalized savings: the flow of finance into entrepreneurial venturing would 
potentially increase if less European wealth were tied up in compartmental-
ized institutional investment funds. The best way to ensure entrepreneurial 
financing is the pursuit of policies that encourage private wealth accumula-
tion and the free flow of that wealth into entrepreneurial ventures 
(Pelikan 1988).
Proposal 13: Allow more wealth to accumulate and remain in private hands and 
make it possible, easy, and attractive to invest such wealth in entrepreneur-
ial ventures.
This proposal complements Proposal 9, which argues for the moderate tax-
ation of private wealth holdings and transfers. While fiscal incentives matter, 
soft measures can be instrumental in developing a vibrant investment climate, 
especially when they take the form of information campaigns,  matchmaking 
events, and the development of an effective support and information 
 N. Elert et al.
57
 infrastructure for informal investors. To the extent that private investors allo-
cate their capital towards small equity ticket deals, this corrects for the bias in 
Europe’s financial system, returning it to neutrality by increasing transparency.
Unfortunately, financial markets show a growing tendency towards institu-
tionalization with funds managed on behalf of individual investors (e.g., 
Pilbeam 2018). And even if policymakers adopted Proposal 13, it would take 
time for private wealth to accumulate in significant amounts. Therefore, we 
should consider other initiatives to make more savings available to early-stage 
start-ups. Indeed, with increasing shares of savings going into pension funds 
and in light of demographic trends, most member states of the EU are con-
templating reforms.3 A crucial ingredient of such reforms should be to give 
participants more discretion over their pension savings, enabling them to buy 
unlisted stock, and invest part of their pension savings in start-ups if 
they want to.4
Proposal 14: Allow people to individually choose how and where to invest part 
of their pension savings.
Not everyone has the inclination and skill to manage a portfolio of early- 
stage equity investments. Moreover, financial literacy remains low, and people 
are generally susceptible to behavioral biases and have a hard time selecting 
the products and services that best fit their preferences and risk attitudes 
(Rooij et al. 2011; Madrian et al. 2017). This justifies significant regulation 
on how different options should be presented and those who prefer that their 
pension savings be invested in low-risk assets should, consequently, always 
have a secure alternative. But while policymakers must strike a balance 
between public and private interests to justify the reforms, allowing people to 
invest some of their pension savings in entrepreneurial ventures can democra-
tize capitalism, especially when combined with, e.g., crowd investing plat-
forms (Shiller 2013; Mollick and Robb 2016; Stevenson et al. 2019). This 
facilitation could help jumpstart Europe’s embryonic professional angel and 
VC sector, to which we turn next.
3 See Ebbinghaus (2011, 2015), Hinrichs (2016), Carone et  al. (2016), and PensionsEurope (2017) 
regarding the trend away from pay-as-you-go and towards the privatization of pension systems in Europe 
and reforms proposed to introduce risk-sharing by participants through defined contribution schemes.
4 This goes against the grain of, for example, the Pan-European Pension Product initiative of the European 
Council that aims to develop a European market for pension products, which will increase the level of 
savings tied up in professionally managed funds. See, for example, European Commission (2017a) and 
European Council (2018).
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4.2.2  Financing Scale Ups
Beyond the early stage, business angels and VC can play a crucial role for 
high-performing entrepreneurial firms with growth ambitions (Cumming 
2012). Their funding is considered superior to bank finance because it comes 
with expertise and access to crucial networks (Keuschnigg and Nielsen 
2004a; Ho and Wong 2007). As Table  4.1 shows, substantial differences 
exist in the size of VC investments across Europe, with Eastern European 
and Mediterranean countries at the bottom, while the UK, Sweden, Finland, 
and France are clearly in the lead. Nevertheless, these differences pale in 
comparison to the huge gap with the USA—arguably a major reason why 
US firms grow faster than their European counterparts (Bottazzi and Da Rin 
2002; Scarpetta et  al. 2002; Da Rin et  al. 2006; Henrekson and 
Sanandaji 2018b).
Table 4.1 Venture capital investments as a share of GDP, and the ease of getting credit 
















USA 0.400 95 Belgium 0.033 65
Denmark 0.032 70 Spain 0.043 60
Luxembourg 0.030 15 Austria 0.026 55
Finland 0.055 65 Poland 0.011 75
Ireland 0.040 70 Bulgaria 0.010 65
Portugal 0.010 45 Czech Rep. 0.002 70
France 0.055 50 Italy 0.005 45
Sweden 0.060 55 Romania 0.003 80
Netherlands 0.044 45 Greece 0.000 50
UK 0.076 75 Croatia n/a 55
Germany 0.035 70 Cyprus n/a 60
Estonia 0.006a 70 Malta n/a 35
Latvia 0.006a 85 Slovakia n/a 70
Lithuania 0.006a 70 Slovenia n/a 45
Hungary 0.021 75
Note: The ranking of economies on the ease of getting credit is determined by their 
distance to the leading country for getting credit. These scores are the distance to 
frontier score for the sum of the strength of legal rights index (range 0–10); and the 
depth of credit information index (range 0–8). New Zealand is the leading country
Sources: Invest Europe (2018, p. 47) for venture capital and World Bank, Doing Business 
2018 for ease of getting credit. Data for venture capital for the USA is from OECD, 
Entrepreneurship at a Glance: Highlights 2018
aFor VC-investments, values for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are a Baltic average
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More private wealth is but a first step towards developing a VC industry. 
Here, policymakers ought to learn from the US experience of the 1970s and 
1980s and adopt a broad-based policy approach: an encouraging legal frame-
work allowing pension funds to invest in high-risk securities issued by small 
and new firms as well as VC funds (Gompers and Lerner 1999; cf. Keuschnigg 
and Nielsen 2004a, b). Because the current trend of a progressively larger 
share of savings going into pension funds is unlikely to reverse anytime soon 
(OECD 2018a), a wise policy measure would allow at least part of these assets 
to be invested in entrepreneurial firms and not just in real estate, public stocks, 
and high-rated bonds. Moreover, since large financial institutions do not have 
the competence to invest directly in small and new firms, such a measure 
would create a demand for a professional VC sector.
Proposal 15: Pension funds and other institutional investors should, on an 
experimental basis, be allowed to invest more in equity in general and in venture 
capital specifically.
In implementing a reform of this kind, policymakers should judiciously 
consider the balance between public and private interests. Crucially, such a 
scheme should be combined with cuts in capital gains taxes and the effective 
tax treatment of stock options in young entrepreneurial firms, as discussed in 
Chap. 3. Only a broad-based policy effort would enable VC firms and other 
actors in the entrepreneurial ecosystem to supply their services profitably and 
design the appropriate incentive contracts needed to build innovative firms 
(Henrekson and Rosenberg 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg 2003; Lerner and 
Tåg 2013; Udell 2015). A sizable and efficient VC sector cannot evolve with-
out significant demand and a favorable fiscal climate.
By contrast, promoting VC in Europe by directing more public funds to 
VC investors will likely not result in more productive entrepreneurial ventur-
ing. Granted, European VC firms are at best moderately successful in picking 
the winners among high-risk projects (Gompers and Lerner 2004; Birch 
2006; Svensson 2008; Gompers et al. 2009), but there is little to suggest that 
subsidized organizations are better placed in this respect (Baumol et al. 2007, 
p. 220). Such organizations may—directly or indirectly, openly or furtively, 
partly or completely—base their decisions on political rather than commer-
cial considerations and therefore underperform. It may be possible to channel 
some additional funding into VC by matching private investment, but it is of 
key importance that decision makers in the VC industry retain a substantial 
personal stake in their decisions (Grilli and Murtinu 2014a, b; Cumming 
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et al. 2017). Instead of throwing public money at the sector, we believe these 
resources are best spent developing the skills and competencies to allocate 
venture capital. The business model of carefully selecting and coaching ven-
tures resists efficient scaling. For the VC sector to grow, therefore, we need 
more people who can do the job. The absence of VC expertise currently biases 
the flow of capital against high-growth firms; promoting its formation in 
Europe would return financial markets to neutrality. We therefore propose:
Proposal 16: Develop competencies for private equity and venture capital 
investment in the field and avoid promoting VC capital with funding directly.
At the same time, this proposal calls into question the approach suggested 
under, e.g., the Investment Plan for Europe, the so-called Juncker Plan 
(European Commission 2015a), which provides sizable additional public 
funding. The plan’s target now stands at 500 billion euros by 2020, some 32% 
of which was allocated to small firms up to 2019 (European Commission 
2019b). Unfortunately, the requisite competence to channel these funds to 
young, high-growth firms is lacking (Schneider 2015b). The problem with 
VC is not a lack of money or skills per se. Rather, a substantial degree of “skin 
in the game” needs to be retained to avoid moral hazard as returns and the risk 
of failure are likely to depend on entrepreneurial effort and investors’ commit-
ment to the venture. Too much “easy” public funding may actually reduce the 
chances of success. Even professional fund managers will make expensive mis-
takes and invest in projects with high risks and low returns if allowed to play 
with “other people’s money” (Kay 2015). Therefore, reforms should aim at 
strengthening the demand and supply of private VC funds and ensure that 
incentives to invest are strong while the potential to offload losses onto tax-
payers is kept to a minimum.5
After all, a VC fund is involved in a venture’s lifespan for a relatively short 
but crucial period, after which it strives to find a quick and profitable exit 
opportunity. Strengthening such opportunities would be a valuable comple-
ment to the aforementioned tax reforms.
5 Germany, for example, does not seem to suffer from a direct lack of VC funds and its geographical dis-
tribution nicely matches the entrepreneurial ecosystem (Klagge et al. 2017). However, the German mar-
ket remains small, arguably because of low demand. Direct subsidies under these circumstances will only 
cause too much cheap money to chase too few projects. Moreover, as public funds necessarily come with 
rules and regulations to ensure accountability, they would introduce a bias against the radically innovative 
start-ups that need this type of investment.
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Proposal 17: Reduce barriers to the sale, acquisition, and IPO of VC-funded 
start-ups to facilitate profitable exits.
It may seem, with mostly large incumbent firms currently buying up small 
ventures for strategic reasons, that this proposal would strengthen their posi-
tion. However, what we intend here is that improved access to exit markets 
will intensify competition among potential buyers, which will then increase 
the value of innovative entrepreneurial ventures. If policymakers help build 
the skills, enhance the incentives, and create the demand for VC, the European 
VC sector is likely to flourish to the benefit of all venture creation. This sector 
is urgently needed to restore a level playing field in the competition for avail-
able financial resources, but we warn against propping up VC with (more) 
public funds.
4.2.3  The Role of Banks
Although Europe’s financial system remains predominantly bank-based, sig-
nificant deleveraging in all euro countries since 2008 caused the average share 
of banks in total financial market assets to drop from 57% to approximately 
45% in 2016 (ECB 2017, p. 7). As can be seen in Fig. 4.1, the Eurozone aver-
age hides considerable variety across national jurisdictions. The banks’ total 
assets as share of GDP ranges from 2500% in 2008 for Luxemburg down to 
approximately 75% for Lithuania in 2016. Overall, the banking sector has 
deleveraged and contracted between 2008 and 2016  in all euro countries. 
Nevertheless, banking in Europe (especially Germany and France) continues 
to dominate in finance and is large relative to GDP. The share of bank assets 
in the top countries is high by international standards, and recent research 
(Hassan et  al. 2011; Arcand et  al. 2012) has shown that shares well above 
100% of GDP tend to become a drag on growth. More important than the 
size of the banking sector relative to GDP, however, is its share in the total 
intermediation of national savings. Financial development typically increases 
with GDP, whereas banking’s share in the financial mix first rises (capturing 
market share from informal finance) and then declines (losing market share to 
bond and stock markets) as financial markets develop (Levine 1997; Dufey 
1998). The share of banking in total financial market assets also varies sub-
stantially across euro countries, with approximately 10% in Luxemburg and 
over 90% in Greece (ECB 2017, p. 9), but it lies well above 50% in most 
Eurozone countries. Moreover, when controlling for the size of the corporate 
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loan book, most European countries still rely heavily on banking as a channel 
for intermediation (Kraemer-Eis et al. 2017, e.g., Fig. 40).
As a result, more than 50% of European SMEs report bank loans and over-
drafts as relevant sources of finance (Lee et al. 2015; Udell 2015; Kraemer-Eis 
et al. 2017). While the absolute size of the banking system is not problematic 
from the perspective of an entrepreneurial society, how banks allocate their 
credit is (Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano 2010). Here, Europe’s 
banking system exhibits some worrying trends with respect to regulation, 
consolidation, leveraging, and lending practices. While the roots of these 
developments can be traced back decades (Westerhuis 2016), they are far 
from irreversible; the EU has already used its significant competencies to 
implement reforms in the banking sector. For example, under the Banking 
Union and Capital Markets Union programs, European banks can offer their 
services across the Union when they obtain a “passport.”6 The recent financial 
crisis can be used as a cautionary tale to motivate the implementation of more 
initiatives.
It is well established that Europe’s universal bank-based system mixes inher-
ently public with private functions (Liikanen et al. 2012; Vickers Commission 
2013; Bordo and Levin 2017). The system combines the public function of 
providing access to a payment system based on secure assets free of default risk 
with the for-profit allocation of capital to viable projects. The combination 
implies that regulations to secure the first objective may limit banks’ ability to 
achieve the second. While (implicit or explicit) public guarantees to (large) 
banks serve a public function, they also mean that banks can finance their 
assets at a significant discount in the market (Davis and Tracey 2014; Schich 
and Aydin 2014; Toader 2015). In a competitive market, this would be good 
news for customers because competition would force banks to pass on their 
lowered funding costs by providing cheaper credit to all. Public guarantees 
without such competitive pressures give banks a strong incentive to take on 
high risks and play a “heads I win, tails you lose” strategy (Gropp et al. 2013).
Unfortunately, the European banking sector is far from competitive 
(Apergis et al. 2016). Due to economies of scale and scope, aggregate market 
shares of 80% or more for the five largest banks in a country are not uncom-
mon (ECB 2017, p. 32). The result is not cheap credit but monopoly rents for 
bank employees and shareholders (Molyneux et al. 1994; Carbó et al. 2009). 
6 The Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD IV and CRR IV respectively) regulate these 
bank passports. Their investment banking is generally covered under the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID II), which was updated and came into effect in January 2018. Non-banks can obtain 
similar passport rights under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) and 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS).
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Moreover, because public guarantees mean that taxpayers are ultimately liable 
for any losses beyond a small equity buffer, regulators must strictly supervise 
the lending practices of banks, especially those deemed “systemically impor-
tant.” Following the financial crisis of 2008, European regulators tightened 
their supervision and now enforce a harmonized set of stricter European rules 
(e.g., European Banking Authority 2019). The regulation aims to reduce the 
risk of a single bank collapsing by imposing risk-weighted reserve require-
ments and subjecting banks to stress tests (Focarelli and Pozzolo 2016).7 
However, the unintended consequences of such tightened regulation are fur-
ther bank concentration and even less credit flowing to ventures that cannot 
offer high-quality collateral, strong  and long track records, or reliable cash 
flow predictions.
As previously mentioned, Europe’s fiscal and social security systems are also 
strongly biased towards large portfolios of professionally managed assets and 
debt-based finance (Kay 2015). The imbalance makes financial markets in 
Europe highly concentrated, largely debt- and bank-based, and biased against 
small- and medium-sized firms in general and young, innovative ventures in 
particular (Liikanen et al. 2012; Pohl and Tortella 2017; Miklaszewska 2017). 
Ironically, regulation to limit the micro risk for individual banks, funds, and 
portfolios thus creates systemic and macro risks by eliminating diversity and 
shifting investment away from small-scale experimental ventures. To maintain 
a competitive return on equity, the system as a whole is highly leveraged, and 
citizens end up investing their savings in liquid, marketable assets. These assets 
have a low real return because they do not finance innovative and productive 
ventures (Bezemer and Hudson 2016) but instead go to large incumbent 
firms with strong balance sheets, further entrenching the status quo.
Policymakers can take many steps to address this bias and make some of 
Europe’s abundant savings available to entrepreneurs, also through bank 
credit. One option would be to set up a system of loan guarantees for entre-
preneurs and SMEs; such schemes are already in place in several member 
states and work reasonably well in channeling financial resources into small- 
and medium-sized firms.8 Second, the Union has already established a legal 
7 Under the auspices of the Banking Union (BU), for example, the Commission has prioritized safety. The 
key pillars of the BU are stronger prudential regulation, improved depositor protection, and the single 
resolution mechanism aimed at preventing the need for taxpayer bailouts. No doubt unintentionally, 
these measures make bank finance even less accessible for entrepreneurial ventures.
8 The evidence on SME loan guarantee schemes is mixed (Udell 2015). While schemes seem to have been 
successful in channeling additional resources to SMEs in Italy (Zecchini and Ventura 2009) and Korea 
(Oh et al. 2009), a similar scheme in Japan seems to have caused firm performance to deteriorate (Uesugi 
et al. 2010). Also, UK evidence shows that the impacts may differ substantially across regions (Craig et al. 
2007).
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right to feedback from credit institutions on their credit decision under Article 
431 in the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union 2013). This initiative is laudable because it 
helps entrepreneurs and individuals understand their financial position and 
improve their chances of obtaining financing in the future (European 
Commission 2018a; cf. European Banking Federation 2017). This informa-
tion is valuable to third parties as well, but it is presently not common practice 
to demand such disclosure: Irish banks, for example, currently do not disclose 
information about any publicly guaranteed credit they grant or turn down 
under the credit guarantee scheme (see, e.g., Strategic Banking Corporation 
of Ireland 2019). In line with the principle of transparency, we propose the 
following:
Proposal 18: Maintain the systems of bank loan guarantees for start-ups and 
ensure that (appropriately anonymized) credit decision information becomes 
publicly available.
Strictly speaking, this proposal violates the neutrality principle, but given 
the existing biases against start-ups in banking, the risk is small that it would 
tilt the playing field far in their favor. The proposal would gain further trac-
tion if policymakers linked it to provisions enhancing transparency for other 
types of investors.
Nevertheless, it would be preferable to address the issue at a more funda-
mental level, notably by increasing banks’ mandatory equity ratios, i.e., the 
minimum proportion of a bank’s lending and other investments that has to be 
financed by its own equity (equity/total assets). Under the new Basel IV agree-
ment, ratios stand at 3% of unweighted assets. These levels of equity are 
thought to be sufficient to absorb the risks on current bank balance sheets, 
but they severely limit the risk banks can responsibly assume in their lending.9 
Therefore, these balance sheets are currently dominated by mortgages, gov-
ernment bonds, and corporate loans with low credit risk. If European banks 
are to take on more micro risk by increasing their lending to innovation-based 
entrepreneurial firms, they will (first) need larger buffers to avoid putting 
their clients’ deposits at risk.
9 The Basel IV agreement also details risk weights and sets reserve requirements for risk-weighted assets. 
As weights cannot be objectively determined or immediately translated into profits and returns, they are 
subject to intense lobbying. Banks frequently underestimate risks and have even been known to manipu-
late weights (Mariathasan and Merrouche 2014). This matter is beyond the scope of this book, but as risk 
weights tend to disadvantage SME lending, we would prefer a simple unweighted equity ratio in line with 
the principles of transparency and neutrality.
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Proposal 19: Increase the mandatory equity ratio in banking gradually to 
10–15% to allow them to responsibly take on more risk in their lending 
portfolios.
We do not expect this measure to cause banks to start lending massively to 
early-stage, high-risk ventures. That is the province of venture capitalists. 
However, this proposed change will make it easier for entrepreneurial ven-
tures to acquire additional funding and grow in the later, less risky stages of 
their life cycle. With more “skin in the game,” banks will be able to enter 
earlier in a firm’s life cycle, responsibly assuming slightly more risk (Admati 
et al. 2010). Mandatory higher equity ratios also give them the incentive to 
do so. Lower leverage implies lower returns on equity, which should lead 
banks’ shareholders to push for higher returns on the bank’s portfolio and 
shift credit towards riskier, but more rewarding ventures that can on average 
afford higher interest rates and risk premia.10 Of course, the rates for mort-
gages, large corporations, and governments would also rise—but credit to 
these sectors of the economy is currently too cheap, arguably fueling unpro-
ductive speculative bubbles rather than productive investment (Bezemer and 
Hudson 2016). The gradual phasing-in of the proposal would enable banks to 
use retained profits to increase equity, and portfolio impacts should be closely 
monitored during the transition. As such, the proposal is justifiable as it serves 
both private and public interests, while its simplicity satisfies the principles of 
transparency and neutrality.
Nevertheless, a higher equity ratio across the board is a second-best solu-
tion, as it is unable to yield the more diverse banking system we need to cater 
to the diverse demand for financing in the entrepreneurial society. Traces of 
diversity in banking are still found in Europe: in Germany, for example, a few 
very large and highly leveraged banks (e.g., Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank) 
coexist with many small, often locally operating banks (Sparkassen) that oper-
ate in different niches. A multitude of small, locally embedded banks survive 
in Italy as well.11
In such situations, there is a risk that minimum equity ratios cause a reduc-
tion in diversity that makes the entire system more vulnerable (Haldane and 
10 Of course, it is also true that banks’ shareholders would like the bank to take on very high risks when 
leverage is high, especially once the little equity remaining is wiped out but the bank remains liquid (Fox 
2010). However, this type of speculation at the expense of depositors is not the kind of productive risk 
taking we refer to here.
11 Verdier (2002) gives an excellent historical account of the development of diversity in banking systems 
across Europe. These historical processes explain how diversity in banking has emerged and hold impor-
tant lessons on how it can be retained or fostered.
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May 2011). A first best approach would, therefore, allow some banks to oper-
ate in a low-risk low-return niche with high leverage, while others could opt 
for a smaller, riskier, and high-yielding portfolio with more equity on their 
balance sheet. The market, rather than the regulator, would then determine 
each bank’s required equity ratio. This end state is desirable but would require 
that banks cease the essential public good functions that currently justify and 
motivate their strong regulation and supervision. Only when the public inter-
est is firmly secured can banks be set free to intermediate the savings they 
attract as they see fit based on their customers’ and financiers’ risk-return 
preferences, with contestability and competition leading to the best business 
models in a variety of niche markets.
The more diverse and entrepreneurial banking sector envisioned above sits 
uncomfortably with banks’ legally sanctioned ability to attract deposits in cur-
rent accounts. Due to public guarantees and technological development, these 
deposits have largely replaced the publicly issued alternative—cash—as the 
preferred medium of exchange and store of value. Thus, commercial banks 
finance a substantial part of their balance sheet with the type of monetized 
debt that has come to circulate in the economy as money.12 In the wake of the 
financial crisis, many have questioned banks’ prerogative to create money by 
giving credit, and monetary reform has been proposed for a variety of reasons 
(e.g., Benes and Kumhof 2012; Vickers Commission 2013; Wolf 2014; 
Dyson et al. 2016). Our point here is that freeing up the balance sheets of 
Europe’s banking industry just a little would help channel a small share of 
total savings to young and innovative ventures—a change that could have a 
huge impact on promoting an entrepreneurial society.
When considering ways to secure public functions while freeing up 
resources in the banking sector, we believe the introduction of central bank 
digital currency (CBDC) is the most suitable candidate for exploration.13 
CBDC is a digital form of fiat money that is a currency established as money 
by government regulation or law; its introduction would provide consumers 
and firms with a risk-free alternative to bank deposits for transactions and as 
a store of value (Barrdear and Kumhof 2016; Kumhof and Noone 2018; 
12 The share of cash in circulation has been falling in the monetary aggregates of all European countries 
for decades and has now reached less than 15% of M1 in the Eurozone in 2017 (ECB 2019). The share 
of cash in transactions, especially among young people, has also fallen below 20% in countries like the 
Netherlands and Sweden (DNB 2018).
13 This subject is a matter of debate among central bankers. For example, the IMF’s Christine Lagarde 
(2018) has argued that experiments with CBDC be explored globally. European central banks (e.g., the 
Bank of England and the Dutch Central Bank) are looking into the issue, and the Swedish Central Bank 
(Riksbanken 2018) is working towards a field experiment with a digital Krona.
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Bordo and Levin 2019). Gradually abandoning the deposit insurance scheme 
would cause money held for transaction and store-of-value purposes to flow 
from commercial banks’ balance sheets to central banks’ balance sheets and 
force commercial banks to return to a pure intermediation role: borrowing to 
lend and paying and charging appropriate risk premia. Once the security of 
citizens’ wealth is no longer tied to the survival of their bank, regulators can 
reduce the strict supervision and regulation of banks’ asset side, ushering in 
increased differentiation and diversity. When available, CDBC provides 
everybody with a secure alternative for storing wealth and settling transac-
tions, and the need to justify public guarantees for commercial bank deposits 
disappears. In the absence of such guarantees, commercial banks can revert to 
investing for their own risk and return. They can therefore be deregulated so 
that they can take on the important role Schumpeter (1934 [1911]) foresaw 
for them in the entrepreneurial society: that of selecting viable ventures for 
investment.
Proposal 20: Introduce central bank digital currency to replace deposits at com-
mercial banks as the dominant risk-free store of value and medium of exchange.
The implementation of such a fundamental reform close to the heart of the 
European economy should not be rushed. The operation can be compared in 
scope and complexity with the introduction of the euro two decades ago and 
will require a comparable amount of planning and a broad public discussion 
before it can be implemented. Some technical issues will need to be addressed 
to realize this proposal, but bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies show that the 
technology is there for central banks to use. The advantage of CDBC over 
private cryptocurrencies should be obvious, as central banks are the only party 
that can guarantee and stabilize the value of a digital currency, eliminating the 
kind of volatile and speculative trading plaguing private cryptocurrencies. 
That being said, an implementation of the proposal would be nothing short 
of a monetary paradigm shift, and such shifts are not to be implemented 
lightly. However, once completed the reform would also make monetary pol-
icy more effective, by (re)establishing a more direct link between the money 
supply (M1) and the monetary base (M0) (Bordo and Levin 2017). It is there-
fore encouraging that central banks inside and outside the EU are currently 
discussing and researching this issue, with several experiments being planned 
or under way. Such developments will help achieve a more diverse banking 
sector that can cater to the diverse financial needs of small and large, young, 
and old firms in Europe to the benefit of entrepreneurial society.14
14 With its Capital Markets Union (CMU), the Commission shows a keen awareness of the unintended 
consequences for entrepreneurial finance stemming from tight regulation (see, e.g., European Commission 
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Overall, the focus of the discussion in this section has been on creating a 
situation in which banks and institutional investors can responsibly interme-
diate funds, directing more of Europe’s savings to deserving new ventures 
without jeopardizing the stability of the system. If banks are to play a role in 
the financing of tomorrow’s firms, they should perhaps (be forced to) with-
draw from also providing our medium of exchange, as the two activities seem 
incompatible. Modern technology offers the opportunity to rebalance public 
and private interests in the banking sector and correct this apparent flaw in 
our current financial system. But new technology also allows for alternatives 
to banking altogether. We now turn to a discussion of such “alterna-
tive finance.”
4.2.4  Experimenting with New Technology to Finance 
Venturing in All Stages
Alternative modes of financing are on the rise as sources of entrepreneurial 
funding (Bruton et al. 2015; Vulkan et al. 2016; Block et al. 2018). Notably, 
today’s small firms can access large pools of financial resources through crowd-
funding and peer-to-business platforms, which are characterized by many 
small investments adding up to a large and growing total. Modern platform 
technology can even decentralize informal finance and help entrepreneurs, 
especially in business-to-consumer markets, to combine finance, marketing, 
and sales. Evidence from London’s equity crowdfunding scene suggests that 
(regulated and well-managed) alternative finance helps to address the entre-
preneurial equity gap and bridge the infamous “valley of death” in venture 
finance (Estrin et al. 2018; cf. Frank et al. 1996; Auerswald and Branscomb 
2003), especially in new sectors (Polzin 2017). For these benefits to material-
ize, it is essential that regulators and supervisors resist their instinct to protect 
small-scale investors. One cannot regulate equity crowdfunding with the goal 
of eliminating all risks involved. Taking on risk is an essential part of such 
activities.
Proposal 21: Implement a light-touch regulatory regime for equity crowdfund-
ing and peer-to-business lending.
Vigilance on this matter is well founded: German regulation (the 
Kleinanlegergesetz) recently threatened to limit crowdfunding for real estate 
2017b). The CMU pushes for a European venture capital market and considers passporting for FinTech 
firms, which could help yield a level playing field between entrants and incumbents.
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investments and was averted only at the last moment (Crowdfunding Insider 
2017). While its proponents typically cite stability, investor protection, and 
other seemingly compelling reasons, restrictive regulation risks preventing 
valuable services from emerging in the first place. In our view, a regime of 
tight supervision but loose regulation, akin to the one implemented in the 
UK, would better encourage experimentation with this new form of finance. 
Peer-to-business lending warrants a similar approach, especially considering 
that it proved to be an important buffer against the impact of the financial 
crisis in countries where it existed (Mills and McCarthy 2014).
Moreover, these systems of alternative finance benefit entrepreneurial start- 
ups more than they do large, incumbent firms and corporate groups. 
Crowdfunding platforms are better than traditional finance channels at han-
dling smaller ticket investments (Polzin et al. 2017). They also reduce opacity 
and information asymmetry because their open character generates access to 
valuable information in addition to handling financial resources (Polzin et al. 
2018b; Toxopeus 2019).
The principle of neutrality warns against using public funding for entrepre-
neurial finance: administrative procedures to allocate funding risk being 
gamed or biased against exactly the type of players that such programs intend 
to support. That said, the decentralized decision characteristics of crowd 
financing can be a useful tool for improving access to public funding for 
small, innovative ventures (Hervé and Schwienbacher 2018). Such financing 
could, for example, be beneficial for the Juncker Fund, a high-profile public 
funding scheme that has been criticized for emphasizing “shovel-ready” proj-
ects over smaller, more risky, innovative ventures (Schneider 2015b).
Proposal 22: As part of its efforts to allocate the Juncker Fund, the European 
Investment Bank could experiment with a euro-denominated European crowd-
funding platform and match successful campaigns with public funds.
Member states and local authorities running similar national and local sup-
port schemes could adopt this proposal’s logic as well. It fits well under the 
neutrality principle, given that projects in the platforms compete on a level play-
ing field that is not biased against small, risky, and radically innovative projects.
4.3  Summary
The financial system plays a central role in any modern economy; its primary 
functions include the efficient allocation of available savings and the provision 
of a secure payment system. In Europe, this system is bank-dominated and 
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heavily institutionalized, with tight regulation and economies of scale 
 conspiring to bias access to financial resources against small, young, and rap-
idly growing businesses. Since adequate capitalization in the early stages of 
Table 4.2 Summary of proposals regarding savings, capital, and finance, specifying the 










Allow for more wealth to accumulate and 
remain in private hands and make it 
possible, easy, and attractive to invest 








Allow people to choose how and where to 
invest part of their pension savings 
individually.
EU, MS




Pension funds and other institutional 
investors should, on an experimental 
basis, be allowed to invest more in equity 
in general and in venture capital 
specifically.
EU, MS
16 Neutrality and 
justifiability
VC Develop competencies for private equity 
and venture capital investment in the field 





17 Neutrality VC Reduce barriers to the sale, acquisition, 
and IPO of VC-funded start-ups to 
facilitate profitable exits.
EU, MS
18 Neutrality and 
transparency
Banks Ensure that (appropriately anonymized) 
credit decision information becomes 
publicly available in the system of bank 
loan guarantees for start-ups.
MS, 
REG
19 Neutrality and 
justifiability
Banks Increase the mandatory equity ratio in 
banking gradually to 10–15% to allow 
them to take on more risk responsibly in 
their lending portfolios.
EU
20 Neutrality and 
justifiability
Banks Introduce central bank digital currency to 
replace deposits at commercial banks as 
the dominant medium of exchange.
EU, MS
21 Neutrality FinTech Implement a light-touch regulatory 
regime for equity crowdfunding and 
peer-to-business lending.
EU, MS
22 Neutrality and 
transparency
FinTech As part of its efforts to allocate the 
Juncker Fund, the European Investment 
Bank could experiment with a euro- 
denominated European crowdfunding 
platform and match successful campaigns 
with public funds.
EU
aEU federal level, MS member state level, REG regional government level, LOC local/
municipal level
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development is a major driver of venture survival and success, the proposals in 
this section attempt to rebalance the financial sector. They do so, on one 
hand, by preventing resources from being “institutionalized” in the first place 
and freeing them up once they are; on the other hand, the proposals develop 
and facilitate the evolution of alternative channels that have proven effective 
in the USA and hold promise for Europe as well. Table 4.2 provides a sum-
mary of our proposals and the level(s) of the governance hierarchy at which 
political action should take place to make them a reality.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium 
or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were 
made.
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5
Labor Markets and Social Security 
in the Entrepreneurial Society
5.1  General Principles
A necessary condition for the long-term success of a new venture is that the 
entrepreneur can recruit key personnel at the opportune time to scale up the 
business to a full-grown firm (Eliasson 1996; Elert and Henrekson 2019). 
While new ventures are free to offer jobs and recruit workers as they see fit, 
they do not compete for the talent they need on a level playing field. Unlike 
other inputs in the production process, employing labor typically comes with 
responsibilities that go beyond paying a competitive wage—responsibilities 
that may be particularly hard for new ventures to shoulder. Such issues make 
access to key personnel more constrained than it need be, to the detriment of 
the workings of collaborative innovation blocs.
Because labor is a critical input in all economic activities, we propose neu-
trality as a first principle to guide reforms in this area. In this context, the 
neutrality principle refers to equal access, i.e., that employers can compete for 
workers and employees can compete for jobs based on the relevant character-
istics of the job and the potential recruits. Moreover, employees should be free 
to move from one job to the next, just as employers should be free to adjust 
the labor force to the needs of their venture (subject to rules guaranteeing that 
any dismissal of redundant or allegedly underperforming workers follows a 
fair and transparent procedure). Only when both sides have this flexibility can 
the matching in labor markets promote an entrepreneurial society.
As labor constitutes the primary source of income in a market-based econ-
omy, it is not surprising that employees greatly value security, stability, and 
equitable distribution. While these values are valid, they also imply that an 
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efficient labor market matching of the kind just envisioned is far from the 
most important criterion used by Europeans to assess labor markets and social 
security institutions. When proposing reforms to labor and social security 
arrangements, we must carefully weigh and balance these values so that our 
proposals conform to the principle of justifiability.
Carefully separating individual and collective responsibilities is the best 
way to achieve this balance. Basic social security is a collective responsibility 
best organized through moderate universal arrangements that do not unduly 
reduce flexibility for employers or mobility for employees. Individual employ-
ers will then reward merit, and employees will invest in talent, ensuring a 
reasonably efficient wage structure that is also fair.1 If enacted, the proposed 
reforms would increase the mobility of workers and flexibility for employers 
by removing onerous labor market regulations while providing the social 
security system with much needed risk pooling for the risks all individuals 
face but cannot manage individually.
The incentives that encourage activation, mobility, and risk-taking are best 
served by universal insurance systems that disregard labor market status, his-
tory, or attachment. These institutions should, therefore, ensure portability of 
tenure rights and pension plans as well as a full decoupling of health insurance 
from current employers. Such measures would avoid punishing individuals 
who leave secure, tenured employment positions and pursue entrepreneurial 
projects, whether as entrepreneurs or as employees in entrepreneurial start- 
ups. Finally, the extent to which these risks are collectively insured should be 
moderate, and systems should be kept simple to achieve the salience necessary 
for people to act rationally and avoid costs from spiraling out of control.
The EU has limited competencies for implementing reforms pertaining to 
labor markets and social security systems, which is logical given that the same 
reforms can be expected to work out quite differently in different contexts.2 
Thus, we primarily address the following proposals to the member states (cf. 
Suse and Hachez 2017, p. 49).
1 To be sure, what is considered fair is highly context dependent and remains an open question (e.g., 
Binmore 2005). We propose here that a fair income distribution enables everyone to have a universal 
social minimum living standard while rewarding people for effort and merit. Ultimately, these outcomes 
result from ongoing political and bargaining processes, which, in turn, depend on productivity differ-
ences emerging across the labor market. In this chapter, we focus on ways to make portable those claims, 
benefits, and services that are best provided universally, such that these considerations do not drive and 
bias the allocation of labor.
2 Here, the only legislative competencies in the treaties are those intended to ensure mobility of worker 
rights across member states (e.g., Article 153(2)(b) TFEU). In practice, this may give the Union some 
legislative power because rights that are not portable across employers are often also not portable across 
national borders.
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5.2  Proposals
We begin this section by presenting our analysis and proposals relating to 
employment protection regulations. This is followed by our analysis and pro-
posals with respect to social security.
5.2.1  Employment Protection Legislation
Figure 5.1 shows the stringency of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
in the EU countries and the USA for temporary and permanent contracts. 
While the Anglo-Saxon countries have the least stringent employment protec-
tion by far within the EU, most other countries have liberalized their legisla-
tion for temporary employment considerably in recent decades (Skedinger 
2010; Martin and Scarpetta 2012). Sweden and Germany stand out for their 
substantial liberalization of temporary contracts over the past 20 years; nota-
bly, these are two of the top-performing EU countries in terms of employ-







































Fig. 5.1 Stringency of employment protection legislation for workers on permanent 
and temporary contracts in EU countries and the USA, 2013. Note: The scale of the 
index is 0–6, where 6 represents the most stringent regulation. 2013 is the latest avail-
able year. The index for permanent employment is the index for individual and collec-
tive dismissals. Source: OECD/IAB Employment Protection Database, 2013
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(OECD 2016a). In 2017, employment through temporary contracts consti-
tuted 22.2 and 13.8% of total employment in Germany and Sweden, respec-
tively (OECD 2019b).3
Figure 5.1 also reveals considerable gaps between temporary and perma-
nent employment; for example, the Netherlands ranks 2nd for permanent 
and 26th for temporary contract protection out of 33 OECD countries 
(OECD 2013). Such discrepancies may have some logic to them: policymak-
ers may see tight labor protection for permanent employees as necessary to 
maintain high levels of firm-specific human capital (Adnett et al. 2004) yet 
prefer temporary work over unemployment when it serves as a stepping stone 
to permanent contracts (Scherer 2004; Gash 2008). Nonetheless, the widen-
ing gap has caused concern about the emergence of dual labor markets (Gebel 
2010; Hirsch 2016a; Dolado 2016). While it is true that this constellation 
allows employers to retain a fixed core of competencies while adjusting the 
size of their labor force to demand fluctuations at low costs, the productivity 
of the jobs created remains low (Kleinknecht et al. 2006). Moreover, the dis-
parity implies that government-enforced regulation tilts the playing field 
against entrepreneurial ventures: the greater the disparity between temporary 
and permanent contracts, the greater the opportunity cost for an employee on 
a permanent contract of accepting a job in a high-risk firm.
Interestingly, all Eastern European countries have increased the stringency 
of their legislation related to temporary contracts. Without implying direct 
and strong causality here, we take note of their generally weak employment 
performance, especially among the more populous Eastern European member 
states Poland and Romania (see Fig. 1.1). Overall, legislation concerning both 
types of contracts remains strict in most Mediterranean and Continental 
European countries.
To mitigate the adverse effects of overly stringent EPL, policymakers in 
many European countries have instituted firm-size thresholds below which 
regulations are more relaxed. In practice, however, the threshold is the equiva-
lent of a tax on firm growth and has been shown to incentivize firms to remain 
small in, e.g., Germany (Autio et al. 2007), France (Garicano et al. 2016), 
Portugal (Braguinsky et  al. 2011), and Italy (Schivardi and Torrini 2008). 
Discouraged by such thresholds, many entrepreneurs never discover whether 
they could have become high-impact entrepreneurs. More generally, there is a 
3 In the absence of controlled experiments it is hard to firmly establish causality from such correlations 
and some have suggested alternative explanations for the data (e.g., Kahn 2009). Germany also allowed 
for wider wage dispersion and Sweden implemented several other reforms as well. These changes may 
have contributed to employment growth in these countries.
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negative relationship between the overall strictness of EPL and the rate of 
high-growth expectation early-stage entrepreneurship (the percentage of indi-
viduals engaged in entrepreneurial activity who expect their firms to grow to 
employ at least five employees within 5 years), as seen in Fig. 5.2.
If the EU is to become more inclusive, innovative, and entrepreneurial, its 
most regulated countries should reduce the stringency of their EPL for per-
manent contracts. Competently implemented liberalization would reduce job 
security but increase employment security for workers because it would 
increase labor demand and result in the creation of more labor market 
opportunities.
Proposal 23: Relax the stringency of employment protection legislation for per-
manent contracts.
That said, the impact and strictness of EPL depend on a complex combina-
tion of components, such as grounds for individual dismissal, redundancy 
procedures, mandated periods of advanced notice, severance payments,  special 
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Fig. 5.2 The strictness of employment protection, 2013, and high-growth expectation 
early-stage entrepreneurial activity, 2015–2018. Note: High-growth expectation early- 
stage entrepreneurial activity is averaged over the 4 years 2015–2018. Permanent EPL 
is given a weight of 2/3 and temporary EPL a weight of 1/3. Sources: Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor and OECD/IAB Employment Protection Database, 2013 
update
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requirements for collective dismissals, and rules favoring disadvantaged 
groups. For liberalization to produce the desired results, countries must con-
sider and possibly emulate the paths already explored in similar countries. As 
we shall argue below, such a strategy also presupposes the implementation of 
complementary social insurance institutions.
A relatively simple way for policymakers to make the labor supply more 
flexible and responsive to the needs of entrepreneurs would be to give workers 
and employers more freedom to contract on working hours. Such freedom 
should apply to weekly and daily hours, holiday, overtime, and irregular 
hours, for which the EU and its member states have implemented detailed 
and stringent minimum standards (e.g., European Union 2018b; Messenger 
et al. 2007).
Proposal 24: Allow for more flexibility in working hours by reconsidering overly 
stringent minimum requirements for daily and weekly working hours, holidays, 
irregular hours, and overtime.
Policymakers should also strive to promote worker mobility across jobs, 
industries, and regions. Notably, confidentiality agreements and non-compete 
clauses often prevent knowledge from flowing freely between firms and sec-
tors. The fact that non-compete clauses are not allowed in California (as 
opposed to, say, Texas) is seen as an important element in the development of 
the golden state’s highly successful entrepreneurial ecosystem (Gilson 1999).4
Proposal 25: Lift the legal enforceability of confidentiality agreements between 
employers and their employees.
Finally, it would be beneficial to reduce job tenure-related wage scales and 
severance pay; these insider benefits tend to lock people into their current job 
and shift bargaining power in the labor market to large, incumbent employers 
(Lindbeck and Snower 2001; Eichhorst et al. 2017). However, before employ-
ment protection and job security can be reformed, it is wise to put in place a 
social security system that empowers (all) workers vis-à-vis their employers by 
creating a robust fallback option.
4 Marx et  al. (2009) further highlight the importance of non-compete clauses: Examining Michigan’s 
1985 reversal of its non-compete enforcement policy, they find that this weakened worker mobility, 
especially for inventors with firm-specific skills and specialists in narrow technical fields.
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5.2.2  Social Insurance Systems
In principle, providing insurance for the usual social risks (loss of income due 
to unemployment, illness, disability or old age, and high medical, child care, 
or educational expenses) enables individuals to consider and pursue entrepre-
neurial endeavors by mitigating the burden of uncertainty. Social security sys-
tems still vary a great deal across Europe,5 but the design features of these 
systems are more relevant than their overall levels and generosity. As Sinn 
(1996) argues, when insurance is closely linked to tenure in a specific job, it 
does not promote an entrepreneurial spirit. What matters for the individual is 
the opportunity cost, i.e., how much an employee who transfers to self- 
employment or a risky job in an entrepreneurial firm has to sacrifice in terms 
of income and security. If there are no public or collective insurance schemes, 
these costs can be prohibitive. Company-specific health insurance plans, as 
are common in the USA, are an obvious example; another is accumulated 
pension assets that are difficult to transfer when switching employers, indus-
tries, or countries of residence. If policymakers decoupled these and other 
benefits from the current employer–employee relationship, they would 
increase labor mobility and eliminate the competitive advantage held by large 
mature companies in attracting and retaining talent.
Proposal 26: Guarantee equal access to welfare state arrangements for all, regard-
less of tenure in a specific job or labor market status.
An important role model in this respect can be Denmark’s flexicurity sys-
tem, which combines generous welfare protection and opportunities for 
retraining with weak job security mandates (Andersen 2005). Danish employ-
ees lose little when they switch employers or labor market status, making 
Danish talent available on equal terms for entrepreneurial firms (Bredgaard 
2013). By contrast, a Swedish employee who voluntarily gives up a tenured 
position for self-employment typically has no more security than what is pro-
vided by (means-tested) social welfare. Thus, the opportunity cost of giving 
up a tenured position in Denmark is substantially lower than in Sweden.
EU member states should embrace the general principles of flexicurity, 
which can be summarized as flexible and reliable contractual arrangements, 
comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effective active labor market 
5 As shown in Fig. A.2 in the Appendix, replacement rates for unemployment insurance, for example, vary 
a great deal among European countries. It should also be noted that irrespective of duration and family 
constellations the USA is invariably found at or close to the bottom of the ranking.
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 policies, and modern social security systems providing adequate income sup-
port during transitions (European Commission 2007). However, while the 
general principles of flexicurity are almost invariably met with approval by 
policymakers at the EU level, the devil is in the details: member states should 
carefully consider the impact of flexicurity reforms on young SMEs. We stress 
this last point as it is politically convenient and often tempting for policy-
makers to shift the burden of administration and risks in lifelong learning 
strategies onto employers, whether through sectoral training funds or by giv-
ing employers the responsibility to invest in the employability of their work-
ers (Vermeylen 2008; Verdier 2009). Unions will push for such measures on 
behalf of their members, while large firms will typically not resist them. 
However, such responsibilities are more burdensome for small employers and 
it is better to leave such responsibilities with the employee when this is pos-
sible and collectivize them at the sectoral or national level where necessary. As 
small and especially not-yet-existing employers have a harder time lobbying 
for their joint interests, politicians must resist the tendency to make individ-
ual employers responsible for the employability of their workers. Flexicurity 
reforms should decouple the protection of employees from their employer so 
as not to tilt the playing field more against entrepreneurial ventures.
Proposal 27: Carefully consider the impact of flexicurity reforms on young firms 
and do not force them to take on excessive risks and burdens.
Behavioral biases are known to cause adverse selection and the underinsur-
ance of risks. Basic risks in the labor market are therefore best covered by collec-
tive and mandatory  insurance, ensuring that employees do not compete on 
social insurance coverage in a race to the bottom. That said, employers should be 
allowed to offer complementary pension plans as long as the accumulated assets 
are fully portable when employees switch employers or become self-employed.
Proposal 28: Introduce mandatory universal insurance to cover healthcare costs, 
old age, and disability.
Making such insurance mandatory prevents adverse selection problems; 
making them universal prevents unproductive compartmentalization in the 
labor market and ensures full portability of entitlements. The Dutch system 
for health care costs may be a role model here: though mandatory, it allows 
insurance companies to compete for patients (Maarse et al. 2016). Crucially, 
the design of such systems should ensure that competition focuses on price 
and avoids causing a race to the bottom in quality or coverage. In the Dutch 
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case, detailed product specifications are set by law, and insurers must accept 
all patients. However, they can and do compete on brand loyalty; although 
4–7% of consumers indicate that they intend to switch providers every year, 
fewer turn this intention into reality (Schut et al. 2013). As a result, insurers 
can extract significant rents from the human tendency to prefer the status 
quo. Employers collectively bargaining on behalf of their employees have even 
created a closer link between current employment and health benefits than 
existed previously.6 Possibly, allowing insurance companies to bid for collec-
tive blocks of insurance policies would lessen the need to advertise, whereas 
adequately designed closed-bid auctions may keep prices and costs at a rea-
sonably low level.
A core aim in this reform area should be to make the individual’s social 
benefits independent of tenure at an employer—regardless of whether the 
insurance is public, paid by the individual herself, or paid by the employer 
based on individual or collective agreement. Tenure often plays a role in 
unemployment benefit entitlements and disability insurance. Unemployment 
benefits insure against the involuntary loss of income, but when someone 
switches into or out of self-employment or between jobs, the counter is often 
reset, reducing both the duration and the benefit level in the case of a new 
unemployment spell. With disability, benefits are often made dependent on 
the level of income and tenure in the job held at the time the disability occurs; 
the risk of losing these entitlements prevents beneficiaries from moving into 
other occupations or sectors.
One example of how to achieve full portability is the Austrian reform of 
2003, which converted uncertain firing costs for employers into a system of 
individual savings accounts funded by a payroll tax (Hofer 2007). The system 
guarantees the employer who hires someone certainty about the cost of any 
future dismissal, while workers do not lose their entitlement to severance pay 
should they decide to quit and take a new job. Similar measures could also 
make unemployment benefit entitlements and disability insurance portable.
Proposal 29: Ensure full portability of social security entitlements by making 
them independent of tenure at a specific employer.
This proposal is highly relevant for a country such as Germany, where labor 
market mobility is low, geographically (Niebuhr et al. 2012; Bentivogli and 
Pagano 1999), occupationally (Korpi and Mertens 2003; König and Müller 
6 These collective policies on average are between 3 and 10% cheaper and there are some 56,000 of which 
60% are by employers, also SMEs. See, e.g., Commissie Evaluatie Risicoverevening ZVW (2012).
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1986), within firms (Fitzenberger et al. 2015), and across industries (Gangl 
2003; Bachmann and Burda 2010). In part, the low mobility may be a result 
of Germany’s “orderly” educational system, which sets people on a highly 
predictable career path. Linking social security entitlements to job tenure is 
then perhaps a consequence of, as much as a cause for, immobility. Under 
such circumstances, any portability reform would have to be accompanied by 
reforms in the educational system to be effective.
Furthermore, it should be evident that complexity and opacity in social 
security systems make both beneficiaries and employees risk averse, reducing 
the attractiveness of any nonstandard labor market offerings. Such corrosion 
is perhaps inevitable over time, but as with the tax system, an occasional rede-
sign of the social security system from the ground up could enhance transpar-
ency and neutrality. One form that such a reboot could take in European 
welfare states would be the introduction of a universal negative income tax 
system. Such a reform provides the system with an unconditional floor on 
which policymakers can build more detailed and complicated structures.
Proposal 30: Investigate the possibility of establishing a modest but uncondi-
tional floor in the social security system through a negative income tax system.
The main benefit of a negative income tax scheme would be to reduce the 
need to reform current welfare state arrangements to create access for self- 
employed and freelance workers who, though hard to classify, will make up a 
growing share of the labor force in an entrepreneurial society (Noorderhaven 
et al. 2004; Hatfield 2015). Once more, this reform would constitute a fun-
damental paradigm shift in providing social security benefits and will involve 
careful long-term planning, small scale experimentation, and step-by-step 
implementation to ensure success. But once a basic level for a decent living is 
provided collectively, other features of the system—unemployment benefits, 
disability and sickness insurance, child care, educational allowances, and pen-
sion schemes—go from being peoples’ only source of income and support to 
being add-ons that can arguably be left (more) to private or collective initia-
tives and self-insurance. With the universal basic level to fall back on, entre-
preneurs and self-employed individuals will not need expensive insurance for 
temporary involuntary unemployment or illness. As such, the guarantee 
enables them to compete on quality and not on their ability to self-insure such 
risks. This may be helpful both for R&D workers wishing to start innovative 
high-tech ventures and for the growing army of everyday entrepreneurs that 
are important in an entrepreneurial society (Welter et al. 2017).
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That said, the results from the Finnish basic income experiment have been 
mixed. While the experiment seems to have made participants happier and 
less stressed, it did not achieve the intended effect of giving people more 
incentives to find work than the traditional system (Meyer 2019). More gen-
erally, there is a risk that a negative income tax may encourage activity in the 
informal economy, which, as mentioned, is already a major concern in 
Southern and Eastern Europe. Maintaining a low floor will also become 
increasingly difficult as time goes by and politicians are tempted to try to buy 
votes. Overall, such a system is probably only viable in countries with low 
corruption and high tax compliance; only then will the institutional environ-
ment be robust against the corrosive effects and the inevitable incentives to 
game the system.
Investing in the ability of people to rejoin the labor market soon after los-
ing a job is better than income insurance in case of joblessness. To prepare 
people for the new labor market, an efficient flexicurity model must encour-
age the retraining of redundant workers, preferably in the dual sense that 
training should be a right and a mandatory responsibility.
Proposal 31: Establish or strengthen retraining programs to prepare workers for 
new occupations.
The proposal falls under the broader heading of active labor market policies 
commonly advocated for and implemented throughout the EU (European 
Commission 2018b). Job creation and destruction are relatively high in a 
country such as the UK, and small firms are disproportionately responsible 
for this. The implication is that employees in a more entrepreneurial society 
need to be equipped with the skills necessary to switch jobs and employers 
(Hijzen et al. 2010). As neither government agencies nor private providers 
have proven effective in retraining workers, local and regional governments 
should think carefully about how to organize these programs. Because train-
ing works best when people are motivated (Fouarge et al. 2013), the impact 
of such programs is probably the greatest if trainers can motivate, convince, 
and help people to help themselves.
5.3  Summary
The labor market allocates scarce labor resources in the economy while pro-
viding most people with their main source of income. Because the adminis-
trative burden and the insurance of social risks by employers fall 
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disproportionately on small and young firms, reforms should aim for moder-
ate universal social insurance and transparent and straightforward systems. 
The full portability of entitlements and flexible employment contracts would 
create a more level playing field in the competition for labor, given that young, 
innovative firms can seldom offer long and secure tenure. Flexibility measures 
would also be justifiable when they balance the collective interests of social 
security and fair income distribution with the private interest of fair compen-
sation for merit and the efficient matching of people to jobs.
Table 5.1 provides a summary of our proposals regarding labor markets and 
social security, specifying the level in the governance hierarchy that should 
make the necessary decisions. The institutions in this area are typically highly 
country-specific, path-dependent, and complementary, meaning that policy-
makers must carefully fit them to local contexts when implementing reforms. 
The competencies for doing so are limited at the EU level, but this is probably 
not to be lamented; the diverse varieties of capitalism in Europe mean that the 
same reforms can be expected to work out quite differently in different con-
texts, and reforms are more urgent in some member states than in others.
Although the articles in the various treaties are not intended to give the 
Union a say over the level, shape, or form of member states’ labor market 
institutions, the EU has many soft instruments available to coordinate and 
inform. As the institutional arrangements in the labor market and social secu-
rity operate at the national level, there is also little scope for regional and local 
policymaking in this area, even if some member states have at times decentral-
ized the execution of the programs. For these reasons, we address most of the 
proposals primarily at the member state level, where reforms following our 
general principles need careful fitting to the specific national context to 
achieve their aims.
Proposals on social security and labor market regulation all aim to mobilize 
Europe’s most knowledgeable and valuable employees. The portability of 
social security entitlements across jobs, sectors, and labor market statuses will 
eliminate the lock-in of skilled labor in gilded jobs and reduce the barriers for 
employers. As such, they would create a level playing field for start-ups on the 
demand side and for marginalized groups in the labor market on the supply 
side. Creating a level playing field will also entail forcing the self-employed to 
join collective social insurance, e.g., for pension and health costs. This will 
make growth in Europe more inclusive, equitable, and innovation driven.
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Table 5.1 Summary of proposals regarding labor markets and social security, specify-
ing the level in the governance hierarchy where the necessary decisions should be 
made
No. Principle(s) Policy area Proposal
Policy 
levela




Relax the stringency of employment 
protection legislation for permanent 
contracts.
MS
24 Neutrality Employment 
protection
Allow for more flexibility in working 
hours by reconsidering overly 
stringent minimum requirements for 
daily and weekly working hours, 
holidays, irregular hours, and 
overtime.
EU




Lift the legal enforceability of 
confidentiality agreements between 
employers and their employees.
EU, MS
26 Neutrality Social security Guarantee equal access to welfare 
state arrangements for all, 
regardless of tenure in a specific job 
or labor market status.
EU, MS
27 Neutrality and 
transparency
Social security Carefully consider the impact of 
flexicurity reforms on young firms 
and do not force them to take on 




Social security Introduce mandatory universal 
insurance to cover healthcare costs, 
old age, and disability.
MS
29 Neutrality Social security Ensure full portability of social 
security entitlements by making 
them independent of tenure at a 
specific employer.
EU, MS
30 Neutrality and 
moderation
Social security Investigate the possibility of 
establishing a modest but 
unconditional floor in the social 
security system through a negative 
income tax system.
EU, MS
31 Neutrality Active labor 
market policy
Establish or strengthen training 





aEU federal level, MS member state level, REG regional government level, LOC local/
municipal level
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Contestable Markets for Entry and Exit
6.1  General Principles
In his 2011 book, Adapt: Why Success Always Starts with Failure, economist 
Tim Harford highlights three core tenets central to individuals or societies 
striving to “learn from failure.” The first is the importance of variability. In 
the market, this occurs when firms are heterogeneous and dispersed through-
out the economy and differ with respect to size, age, technology, and so forth. 
As no one can know a priori which business models will be successful, there is 
a need for a large number of different experiments (Audretsch and Fritsch 
2002; Metcalfe 2010). Second, as numerous experiments will inevitably fail, 
they should be conducted on a sufficiently small scale so that the system as a 
whole will survive such failure. This survival emerges in the market because all 
entrepreneurs select the strategy, technology, behavior, and organizational 
structure they believe could help them outcompete their rivals (Eliasson 1996; 
Dosi and Nelson 2010; Vivarelli 2013). Finally, Harford (2011) stresses the 
importance of selection, i.e., that successful experiments be pursued and cop-
ied, while unsuccessful ones are identified and quickly terminated. The profit 
and loss signals conveyed through prices and driven by market competition 
combine to form an imperfect but crucial selection mechanism. Prices encour-
age agents to devote resources to their most highly valued use (Hayek 1945), 
enabling successful firms to survive and grow, while unsuccessful firms exit 
(Dosi and Nelson 2010). Progress in an entrepreneurial society is not the aim 
but the result of this evolutionary process, which can only be expected to 
work if the institutions underpinning the market indeed ensure variability, 
survival, and selection.
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In this chapter, we address the related policy areas of market regulation, 
competition policy, and bankruptcy policy. The principles guiding reforms 
are threefold: contestability, transparency, and justifiability. Contestability 
here refers to openness to innovation and challengers, which is crucial to mar-
kets but also relevant to the soundness of individual firms, bureaucratic orga-
nizations, and a host of other contexts; put simply, the system will progress 
only if it allows better ideas to drive out inferior ones. Furthermore, contest-
ability is most effective when the rules of the game are well defined and guided 
by transparency: only under this principle can we ensure that potential chal-
lengers know what to expect—and what not to expect—when entering a 
competitive situation.
To safeguard contestability, policymakers must keep incumbent lobbyists 
at arm’s length and refuse their attempts to coauthor the standards, rules, and 
regulations of their industry. That said, policymakers also have a responsibility 
to ensure that the challengers’ interests are balanced against those of their 
financiers, employees, customers, and other stakeholders, ensuring that a 
competitive edge is justifiable and does not come at the cost of the public 
interest. When they govern markets, these principles help limit the resources 
that are wasted on losing and flawed projects (Type 1 error) while also avoid-
ing the imposition of undue constraints on winners and successful projects 
(Type 2 error).
The EU enjoys far-reaching competencies for market regulation, competi-
tion policy, and bankruptcy policy.1 In addition to opening up markets by 
enforcing Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods and services and 
the freedom of establishment, the Commission may order member states to 
remove legislative and regulatory restrictions on the movement of goods and 
services and the right of establishment. That said, member states do retain 
significant regulatory power (Suse and Hachez 2017, p. 63).2 Both coopera-
tion in civil matters and the regulation of the internal market are shared com-
petencies, meaning that the EU and its member states jointly shape national 
bankruptcy and insolvency laws. Furthermore, member states have some 
room to maneuver where aspects of EU law are subject to minimum standards 
1 While the power to regulate the internal market is a shared competence (Article 4(2)(a) TFEU), compe-
tition policy is an exclusive Union competence (Article 3(1)(b) TFEU)—to the extent that the anti- 
competitive conduct has cross-border effects (Articles 101, 102, and 107 TFEU).
2 First, there is room for deviating from the Treaty rules for purposes of advancing overriding public policy 
objectives. Second, the power to regulate the internal market is a shared competence: member states 
retain the power to regulate particular aspects of their markets to the extent that EU law does not already 
apply. Third, national competition laws apply whenever anti-competitive conduct lacks cross-border 
effects.
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established by a directive (Suse and Hachez 2017, p. 66).3 For these reasons, 
we address all proposals in this chapter to the EU and its member states.
6.2  Proposals
6.2.1  Regulations of Goods and Service Markets
While environmental, health, safety, and quality regulations are often well 
motivated and well intended, they can be abused by incumbents to limit entry 
and competition. It is therefore vital that such regulation is clear, transparent, 
and neutrally formulated to ensure that new, alternative ways of doing old 
and new things are permitted. Excessive reliance on rules and procedures dis-
courages potential entrepreneurs and hampers the process of creative destruc-
tion, but uncertainty and the absence of clear regulation can be 
equally damaging.
As a principle, contestability entails preventing market-leading incumbents 
from building and exploiting a dominant market position by unduly restrict-
ing market entry. To this end, low entry barriers are crucial, as is the opening 
of industries and markets that have thus far barred outside challengers. Within 
a system characterized by goal-oriented rules, regulations, and public financ-
ing, there should be ample room for commercial and cooperative initiatives 
that challenge the status quo. As a first precondition for contestability, it 
should be easy and cheap to formally start a venture.4
Proposal 32: Excessive barriers to new business formation and new entry should 
be lifted where possible.
This proposal may have different implications in different countries: in 
Italy, for example, “excessive” is the operative word, as Italian firm founders 
report a wide variety of bureaucratic and administrative barriers to starting up 
a venture. Italy ranks 51st in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking, 
scoring particularly poorly in terms of ease of paying taxes, obtaining credit, 
3 The EU has no explicit legal basis in the Treaties to adopt bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. 
However, the provisions of Article 81 of the TFEU, on judicial cooperation in civil matters, and the 
harmonization clauses in Articles 114 and 115, may serve as legal bases for enacting EU law in this area.
4 Figure A.3 in the Appendix shows how the EU countries compare with respect to the ease of starting a 
business relative to the USA and New Zealand, which are the leading countries. Countries such as 
Germany, Austria, and Malta show considerable room for improvement, while the western EU countries 
have high overall scores on this measure. Apart from Poland and the Czech Republic, this is also the case 
for the Eastern European countries.
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and enforcing contracts (World Bank 2018). There is also room for improve-
ment in Germany, which ranks on par with Georgia in the ease of starting a 
business, with founders perceiving bureaucracy and regulation as barriers to 
business formation (Sanders et al. 2018b). Austria, Poland, and the Czech and 
Slovak Republics find themselves in similarly dire positions (World 
Bank 2018).
An entry barrier warranting special attention is occupational licensing, 
which was originally intended to ensure the quality of services that consum-
ers are unable to determine themselves. In theory, the license indicates that 
the provider is capable and abides by the rules, ensuring a minimum quality 
level of the service. In practice, however, occupational licensing often results 
in unjustified profit opportunities for license holders and abuse of market 
power, rather than consumer protection. Today, Europe’s regulated profes-
sions involve more than 50 million people or 22% of total employment 
(European Commission 2015a; Koumenta and Pagliero 2017). Evidence 
from the USA and the EU shows that such regulation has a significant impact 
on prices and labor mobility, while little to no evidence supports the claim 
that quality is higher (Kleiner 2000; Kleiner and Krueger 2010, 2013; 
Johnson and Kleiner 2017; Koumenta and Pagliero 2017; Bowblis and Smith 
2018; Barrios 2018). It seems that such protection no longer serves its origi-
nal purpose: according to the European Commission (2015a, p. 7), “many of 
these regulations are now disproportionate and create unnecessary regulatory 
obstacles to the mobility of professionals, lowering productivity” (cf. Erixon 
and Weigel 2016).
The Services Directive and the Professional Qualifications Directive5 give 
the Commission extensive competencies concerning occupational licensing, 
and a rigorous process of evaluation of regulated professions has been put in 
place as part of the European Semester. Member states have implemented 
reforms and opened up such professions, ushering in more jobs and lower 
prices while maintaining service quality (Koumenta and Humphris 2015; 
Pagliero 2015; Athanassiou et  al. 2015). Thus far, the Commission has 
devoted its liberalization attempts to occupations such as civil engineers, 
architects, accountants, lawyers, real estate agents, tourist guides, and patent 
agents (European Commission 2015a), but a list of some 6468 regulated 
occupations is under systematic review (European Commission 2019a).
5 Directive 2005/36/EC, recently amended by Directive 2013/55/EC.
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Occupational licenses imply that contestability is curtailed.6 They keep 
challengers out and lock incumbents in, thereby reducing allocative efficiency 
and innovation. These consequences directly affect the flow of labor into and 
out of new ventures. Recognizing that occupational licensing is already on the 
EU policy agenda, we propose, in line with all three principles above:
Proposal 33: Create transparent and open systems of occupational certification, 
such that people can easily move across occupations and in and out of 
new ventures.
Product market reform is the second ingredient in the European integra-
tion effort; European policymakers consider similar product market regula-
tions in all EU countries to be necessary to transform the EU into a single 
market. Despite several rounds of deregulation, however, member states still 
exhibit substantial differences in the extent of their product market regula-
tions. Differences in service sector regulations are still larger. As Fig. 6.1 shows, 
the two measures are strongly correlated; countries with highly regulated 
product markets tend to have strictly regulated service markets as well. 
Arguably, reducing this complexity and opacity is easier said than done 
because policymakers typically allow lobbyists and incumbents to influence 
the process. Granted, one should not ignore the genuine interests of incum-
bents offhand; they often provide valuable technical know-how and facilitate 
the adoption of new standards and regulation. Nonetheless, a more detailed 
and complex system should be avoided because it works in incumbents’ favor 
vis-à-vis potential challengers, running counter to the principles of contest-
ability and justifiability.
Proposal 34: Continue to harmonize and liberalize product and service markets 
in the Union by setting functional and transparent minimum requirements and 
limiting the influence of lobbyists.
We should note that there is little correspondence between the indices of 
product and service market regulations and the World Bank’s (2018) ease of 
starting a business index. For example, Austria and Germany score poorly in 
terms of the ease of starting a business despite their lenient product and ser-
vice market regulations. The discrepancy is probably observed because a great 
6 For example, Koumenta and Pagliero (2017) find that foreign-born practitioners are underrepresented 
by about one-third in licensed occupations, but no similar discrepancy in unregulated or certified occupa-
tions. Moreover, certified workers invest more in training than licensed workers, but the latter earn a wage 
premium of about 4% on average.
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deal more is involved in setting up a firm than just product market regula-
tions; excessive taxes, red tape, and poor conditions for financing matter a 
great deal as well. Removing such obstacles is part and parcel of the EU policy 
agenda already, and we encourage these efforts, with the caveat that 
 well- justified barriers to entry can be useful to keep unproductive and destruc-
tive ventures out (Stenholm et al. 2013; Darnihamedani et al. 2018). While 
it should be easy for challengers to enter (and exit) markets, these challengers 
should be serious and professional. Regulation that sets reasonable and func-
tional restrictions on new ventures helps prescreen challengers on quality.
This seems particularly relevant in the regulation of publicly provided ser-
vices. With “publicly provided services,” we here refer to collectively financed 
services provided by a government to people within its jurisdiction, whether 
directly (through the public sector) or by financing service provision. These 
services are relevant for the future of Europe’s entrepreneurial ecosystem for 
multiple reasons. First, demand in these sectors is growing: the share of health 
and education in total GDP is rising in all advanced countries due to demo-
graphic and technological trends. Arguably, another driver is Baumol’s cost 


















































Fig. 6.1 Strictness of product and service market regulations in EU countries and the 
USA, 2013. Note: The scale of the index is 0–6, where a larger number means a more 
stringent regulation. 2013 is the latest available year. The product market regulation 
index is OECD’s aggregate indicator; the service sector index is the arithmetic average 
of the OECD indices for professional services, retail trade, and the network sectors 
(transportation, energy, telecom, and mail). The indices are based on responses of 
national governments to the OECD Regulatory Indicator Questionnaires. Source: OECD, 
Product Market Regulation Database
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in labor productivity in response to rising salaries in other jobs that have expe-
rienced higher labor productivity growth.7 In the long run, the rising demand 
for public services is unlikely to be satisfied, barring significant efficiency 
improvements and entrepreneurship-driven innovation. If onerous regulation 
limits access for challengers in these domains, the long-run consequences can 
be detrimental for the economy as a whole. However, reforms to open up 
these areas for private initiatives should not take the form of naïve wholesale 
privatization and laissez-faire. Evidence from the USA suggests that privatized 
healthcare and education are not necessarily cheaper or better; again, much 
depends on the institutional framework that makes these special markets 
work (Reinhardt et al. 2004; Squires 2012).
That said, although there are ways to introduce contestability in public sec-
tor organizations, it is easier to do so in a market context. The challenge for 
policymakers is to ensure quality and access to health care and other social 
services without resorting to full bureaucratic regulation and public produc-
tion. Doing so likely involves the clever combining of partially open markets 
with strict legal and institutional frameworks while drawing a clear line 
between the market domain and the bureaucratic domain. A case in point 
could be the Dutch system of universal private health insurance: introduced 
in 2006, it requires private suppliers to offer a standardized policy at a (com-
petitive) price while obliging all citizens to buy such a policy (Schäfer et al. 
2010). Competition on coverage is prohibited, and private insurance provid-
ers must accept all applicants, leaving price and quality as the sole dimensions 
on which to compete.
The deregulation of some health and public services promises to open 
entirely new arenas for private innovation and entrepreneurial venturing, even 
if direct public financing is likely to remain the default option in most EU 
countries. Of course, confounding factors, such as strong asymmetries in 
information and market power or economies of scale and scope, can effec-
tively preclude market systems as a viable option. When this happens, the 
public sector can still organize contestability in bureaucratic organizations by 
giving users a “right to challenge” public sector provision8 and by holding 
7 Liu and Chollet (2006) find income and price elasticities of demand of about 0.1–0.2 for healthcare 
services in the short run. The evidence suggests that in the short run people have no choice but to demand 
the services regardless of income and price, whereas, in the long run, the demand for these services rises 
faster than GDP. The long-run income elasticity for health care and education, however, is probably 
closer to 1.6 (Fogel 1999). In relation to Baumol’s (2012) cost disease, this fact implies that a rapidly 
rising share of income and employment in the total economy will be absorbed in these sectors.
8 In the UK, for example, the right to challenge is instituted as a right for local communities to challenge 
public sector provision of rescue and firefighting services. There are also examples of community-based 
challengers in care and social service provision. See, e.g., My Community (2019).
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competitions on relevant dimensions among smaller organizational units. In 
line with the principle of contestability, we therefore propose the following:
Proposal 35: Undertake the responsible deregulation of publicly provided ser-
vices to introduce contestability into these growing areas of the economy.
One challenge to the implementation of the proposals is the fact that con-
sumers can rarely assess the quality of the service provided or discipline pro-
ducers directly. If countries are to tap the potential and handle the challenge of 
this combination of semi-public financing and semi-private production, they 
must create novel institutional arrangements and dare to experiment. When 
the state acts as an intermediary for an absent third party (the taxpayers) and 
removes market discipline on producers, no level of competition or freedom of 
choice will eliminate the scope for manipulation and rent seeking.9 Moreover, 
producers typically have limited options to offer and charge for extra quality 
beyond what a bureaucratically organized and tax-financed system prescribes. 
When equal access is considered more important than maximum efficiency, 
such as in basic health care, such constraints can be justifiable; in other 
instances, policymakers could achieve welfare improvements by allowing for 
more private for-profit and nonprofit initiatives in the social domain.
Proposal 36: Allow experiments with private actors providing public services in 
carefully designed markets and learn from these experiments.
The regulatory framework discussed here governs activities characterized by 
a mixture of private production and public financing. Unless they experiment 
with this framework, countries cannot reap the full benefits of innovation and 
entrepreneurial initiatives. Allowing private initiatives in these areas would 
also create investment opportunities for Europe’s institutionalized savings 
through VC firms, thereby spurring innovation in the social domain.
Hovering over the issue of market contestability is the current trend in the 
EU towards digitalization—a development that, like most developments, 
presents both opportunities and challenges. The digital revolution is begin-
ning to change the way we organize society across the board, touching on the 
very institutions that allocate capital, labor, and knowledge in society (deGryse 
2016; Ferrari 2016; Mackenzie 2015; Lin et al. 2009). Currently, the Nordic 
countries, the Netherlands, and the UK rank high in terms of networked 
9 Welfare services are supplied and consumed in the so-called quasi-markets that are characterized by a 
series of problems that must be addressed, see Le Grand and Bartlett (1993).
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readiness (WEF 2016). Laggard countries such as Germany can improve their 
ranking, providing fertile ground for new firm formation and promoting a 
more dynamic and innovative entrepreneurial ecosystem without jeopardiz-
ing their existing routine-based, incremental innovation paradigms (Sanders 
et al. 2018b). If policymakers proactively embraced the digitalization trend, 
they would allow entrepreneurs to act on the new opportunities that technol-
ogy offers while protecting European citizens from the risks.
Digitalization also brings with it strong positive network externalities, 
which offer a compelling argument for collective action: A no-regret policy 
would be to provide an excellent, publicly financed, Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) infrastructure in Europe that allows 
entrepreneurs to scale up their innovative ideas to the EU level and beyond in 
a rapid fashion. Such an effort would integrate more European citizens in the 
common market for digital services and facilitate information exchange, 
essentially enabling them to act as venturesome consumers (Bhidé 2008). In 
essence, building an open platform for European entrepreneurs would pro-
mote contestability by increasing transparency.
Proposal 37: Invest in excellent, open access digital infrastructure for European 
citizens and businesses.
In addition to providing European entrepreneurs and consumers with a 
springboard to the global marketplace, a high-quality ICT infrastructure is 
also essential in the urgently needed transition to a circular economy; that is, 
an economic system aimed at minimizing waste and making the most out of 
resources (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2013; European Commission 2012). 
Currently, our economic model is geared towards a linear model of produc-
tion from virgin resources to waste (Haas et al. 2015), where prices are believed 
to convey the most relevant information regarding production and opportu-
nity costs throughout the value chain. However, price alone no longer conveys 
the most relevant information, and information flows are increasingly becom-
ing both multidimensional (concerning quality, origin, ecological impact, 
etc.) and multidirectional (running, for example, from users to intermediate 
producers and back). Circular business models are better placed to address 
these complexities but also require much more intense cooperation and com-
munication throughout the value chain (Subramanian and Gunasekaran 
2015). The same holds for the more intense use of peer-to-peer lending and 
equity crowdfunding, proposed in Chap. 4: Lin et al. (2013) show that even 
the social media contacts of borrowers convey valuable information to lend-
ers. A reliable and secure ICT infrastructure managing more complicated 
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information flows could be a prerequisite for the transition to a more 
 sustainable economy. This justifies public investment and interventions to 
create a transparent and open digital infrastructure.
Proposal 38: Develop open but responsible standards and open regulation for 
the many digital platforms that emerge to facilitate peer-to-peer and business- 
to- business trade, services and finance.
That said, carefully considering the position of workers and customers on 
these platforms is essential. Frenken et al. (2017), for example, voice concern 
about the quality of work and the possibility that digital platforms may under-
mine social security. Additionally, privacy issues, digital rights, and consumer 
protection remain important areas of EU policy. Technological developments 
necessitate the careful modernization of labor market protection and social 
security systems (in line with proposals in Chap. 5) and adequate investment 
in human capital (in line with proposals in Chap. 7) to ensure that digitaliza-
tion contributes to inclusive growth.
The EU could be instrumental in establishing standards that would boost 
European entrepreneurship on digital platforms.10 Given its leading position 
in terms of platform-based financial innovation, the UK was in an excellent 
position to set such standards before Brexit (Sanders et al. 2018c). Now, the 
torch will have to pass to the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, as they 
also have a high degree of network readiness (WEF 2016).
6.2.2  Bankruptcy Law and Insolvency Regulation
The entrepreneurial ecosystem is experimental at its core, which makes fre-
quent failure inevitable and, to some extent, desirable. Failed projects should 
not be considered a waste of resources, and bankruptcies are neither unpro-
ductive nor destructive; instead, firm failure provides valuable information to 
economic agents about whether a business model is viable. Failed ventures 
must end so that their resources can be turned to more productive uses, but 
“fear of failure” should not prevent new entrants from challenging the status 
quo. Learning by failure is of paramount importance for both the entrepre-
neur and society. Moreover, a restructured venture with new management or 
10 The proposals in this subsection are well aligned with the Commission’s Digital Single Market initia-
tive, it’s Circular Economy Package (European Commission 2017c), and the Digital Agenda (European 
Commission 2014). The European Commission has substantial legal competencies and supportive mea-
sures available to act in this domain.
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a different firm can often recycle and improve upon the knowledge and ideas 
from failed projects, making past failure the foundation for future success. Of 
course, failure also implies that people suffer, psychologically and financially, 
and such damage should be minimized. Thus, it is reasonable to institute rela-
tively generous bankruptcy laws and insolvency regulations, with provision 
for discharge clauses, the postponement of debt service and repayment, and 
the possibility of restructuring.
Efficient handling of ailing firms calls for bankruptcy and insolvency regu-
lation that minimizes the time and costs to society in phasing out unprofitable 
and inefficient firms while limiting the damages for creditors, customers, sup-
pliers, employees, and the government. Importantly, a distinction must be 
made between insolvent firms, which should be closed down, and illiquid 
ones, which should be allowed to remain operative. A firm is insolvent when 
the value of its assets is less than its debt and its equity is negative. However, 
a firm could be unable to honor its obligations simply because it is experienc-
ing temporary financial difficulties. If so, the best solution for both the firm 
and its creditors is debt restructuring and possibly reduction (a “haircut”) 
through negotiations with the firm’s creditors to avoid a “fire sale” of valuable 
firm assets.
As Fig. 6.2 shows, Finland and Germany have the best regulatory frame-











Fig. 6.2 Ease of resolving insolvency in EU member countries and the USA, 2018. Note: 
The ranking of economies on the ease of resolving insolvency is determined based on 
their distance to frontier scores for resolving insolvency. These scores are the simple 
average of the distance to frontier scores for the recovery rate and the strength of 
insolvency framework index. Finland is also the most highly ranked country in the 
world. Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2018
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than the USA (World Bank 2018)—and the rest of Western Europe also 
scores high (with the notable exception of Luxembourg). Meanwhile, the 
Eastern European and Mediterranean countries rank low, with Portugal, 
Slovenia, and Cyprus being interesting exceptions (World Bank 2018). 
Overall, the picture suggests substantial room for improvement.
Reform efforts should strive for insolvency regulation that protects inher-
ently healthy and promising ventures while smoothly putting bad ventures to 
rest once the verdict is clear. If they are too hastily shut down, with their 
remaining assets shifted out to creditors, the result could be excessive value 
destruction. Not all insolvent operations should be considered a failure: it is 
often sufficient that the current owners lose their equity, that the debt is 
restructured, and that the consortium of debtors finds a new controlling 
owner after restructuring (Becker and Josephson 2016). Reforms taking these 
concerns into account would be in line with the principle of justifiability, as 
they balance the interests of the entrepreneur and other stakeholders in 
the venture.
Proposal 39: Insolvency regulation should protect ventures that are inherently 
healthy and promising and allow for a quick and ex ante transparent liquidation 
of those that are not.
The European Commission adopted a recast of the Insolvency Regulation 
Directive in 2015. Moreover, under its Capital Markets Union program, the 
Commission has proposed a business restructuring directive. If implemented, 
it would provide the tools to rescue viable businesses and give honest, albeit, 
bankrupt entrepreneurs a second chance (European Commission 2016; 
Stamegna 2018). Given the persistent variation in insolvency regulation 
across Europe, the Commission’s reform agenda in this area is laudable.
Unfortunately, “fear of failure” cannot be eliminated by efficient and effec-
tive insolvency regulation alone. Such attitudes depend, in no small measure, 
on a cultural dimension that differs markedly across the EU. To the extent 
that reforms of formal institutions affect citizens’ attitudes about entrepre-
neurial venturing, such effects will only materialize in the long run. 
Nevertheless, if policymakers signal to society that business failure is accept-
able, cultural attitudes can gradually become more supportive (Sanders 
et al. 2018b).
Furthermore, while laggard countries must improve their insolvency regu-
lation to become more innovative and entrepreneurial, this cannot be done in 
isolation. Policymakers must combine reforms in this direction with a 
strengthening of the rule of law, government effectiveness, and the security of 
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property rights (Chap. 2); otherwise, reforms will prove ineffective or even 
facilitate abuse and fraudulence. An insolvency regulation such as Finland’s—
which strikes a sound balance between protecting and restructuring inher-
ently healthy firms, discouraging rent seeking, and encouraging entrepreneurial 
risk-taking—may fail miserably in Romania or Greece. As such, forgiving 
insolvency regulation is only feasible when countries also rank highly on the 
most fundamental rules of the game. Portugal and Slovenia provide what may 
be a second-best solution in this respect: given their apparent success, it is 
probably a wise, low-risk strategy for countries with similar institutional con-
figurations to undertake reforms akin to theirs, so as not to base their reform 
strategy on non-existing high-quality legal institutions.
Finally, we believe it would be a waste of resources not to draw lessons from 
failed ventures: much of this knowledge is tacit and hard to record and trans-
mit, but that which can be saved should not go to waste. However, the trans-
ferrable knowledge generated by failed ventures is lost if entrepreneurs do not 
record or share it. Because private incentives to do so are absent, it makes 
sense to publicly fund the collection, curation, and diffusion of such knowl-
edge. The creation of entrepreneurial knowledge observatories would help to 
diffuse such knowledge to potential investors, would-be entrepreneurs and 
academic researchers alike, especially when combined with open access data 
on, for example, crowdfunding campaigns. Therefore, and in line with our 
principle of transparency, we propose the following:
Proposal 40: Set up publicly funded “entrepreneurial knowledge observatories” 
where knowledge accumulated in the entrepreneurial process is collected, 
curated, and freely diffused.
Because the generated knowledge is typically highly context dependent and 
firm specific, it makes sense to create the observatories in the ecosystems or 
collaborative innovation blocs where entrepreneurial entry and exit rates are 
high. For example, it would be valuable to locate an observatory in London, 
since the UK’s entrepreneurial venturing is highly concentrated there, to fur-
ther strengthen the ecosystem. In countries such as Italy or Germany, where 
start-up activity is much less geographically concentrated, the strategic forma-
tion of a few observatories could help create clusters that can grow into 
national hotbeds for new firm formation.
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6.3  Summary
Contestability ensures progress in an entrepreneurial society: Only when new 
entrants can challenge the status quo and selection takes place on merit will 
the market’s evolutionary process yield the kind of creative destruction that 
drives innovation and growth (Schumpeter 1934 [1911]). To achieve contest-
ability, entry and exit barriers must be low, transparent, and functional. 
Moreover, vital infrastructure must be accessible to challengers and incum-
bents alike. Finally, the knowledge generated in the entrepreneurial process 
must, to the extent that it is possible, be shared and used, even when—or 
perhaps especially when—a venture fails. Table 6.1 provides a summary of 
our proposals regarding contestable markets for entry and exit, specifying the 
level in the governance hierarchy that should make the necessary decisions.
The EU has extensive competencies in regard to the regulation of product 
markets and ensuring the mobility of capital, labor, goods, and services in the 
single market. These instruments should be used to ensure that challengers 
can compete on a level playing field with incumbents. EU competencies are 
also strong in regard to competition regulation and supervision as well as state 
aid and public procurement, but here, in view of the political backlash of the 
financial crisis, it is probably wise to allow the member states themselves to 
experiment with new governance models and allow for more contestability in 
public service provision. Once experimentation has provided an evidence base 
that can be used to formulate specific reforms, the EU should become involved 
opening up public sector services for more competition.
In regard to the resolution of insolvency and the management of highly 
region-specific knowledge, the Union does not seem to be the most appropri-
ate level for policymaking; regional and local policymakers are probably better 
placed to combine the proposed knowledge observatories with their current 
policies on regional and local business development.
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Table 6.1 Summary of proposals regarding contestable markets for entry and exit, 







32 Contestability Entry 
barriers
Excessive barriers to new business 









Create transparent and open 
systems of occupational 
certification, such that people can 
easily move across occupations and 
in and out of new ventures.
EU, MS




Continue to harmonize and 
liberalize product and service 
markets in the Union by setting 
functional and transparent 
minimum requirements and limiting 
the influence of lobbyists.
EU
35 Contestability Entry 
barriers
Undertake the responsible 
deregulation of publicly provided 
services to introduce contestability 
into these growing areas of the 
economy.
EU, MS




Allow experiments with private 
actors providing public services in 
carefully designed markets and 
learn from these experiments.
MS
37 Contestability and 
transparency
ICT Invest in excellent, open access 




38 Transparency ICT Develop open but responsible 
standards and open regulation for 
the many digital platforms that 
emerge to facilitate peer-to-peer 
and business-to-business trade, 
services, and finance.
EU
39 Justifiability Insolvency Insolvency regulation should 
protect ventures that are inherently 
healthy and promising and allow 
for a quick and ex ante transparent 
liquidation of those that are not.
EU, MS
40 Transparency Insolvency Set up publicly funded 
“entrepreneurial knowledge 
observatories” where knowledge 
accumulated in the entrepreneurial 
process is collected, curated, and 
freely diffused.
REG, LOC
aEU federal level, MS member state level, REG regional government level, LOC local/
municipal level
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Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium 
or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were 
made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chap-
ter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and 
your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted 
use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
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7
Mobilizing Human Capital 
for Entrepreneurship
7.1  General Principles
The creative potential of the human brain has led researchers to label it the 
ultimate resource (Simon and Kahn 1981; Simon 1996; Naam 2013). Indeed, 
the mainstream growth literature finds strong support for the notion that 
human capital—knowledge, skills, and social and personal attributes—matter 
fundamentally for economic growth (Lucas 1988; Mankiw et al. 1992; Barro 
2001). Because an entrepreneurial society requires a broad variety of skills and 
knowledge, a key challenge lies in accumulating sufficient human capital and 
matching it to a sophisticated demand. This accumulation starts in school but 
continues throughout the working life, whether on production floors or in 
dedicated R&D labs.
The specific public good nature of knowledge (Arrow 1962) and the posi-
tive network externalities involved in basic human capital accumulation 
(reading, writing, arithmetic, shared culture and history, socialization, etc.) 
mean that private incentives and social returns rarely coincide. Therefore, 
public policy intervention is called for to create incentives to acquire, main-
tain, and diffuse skills and knowledge. In this chapter, we discuss proposals for 
institutional reform that will ensure that a sufficient level and quality of 
human capital is available to entrepreneurs and their ventures.
The roles of formal education and on-the-job training have shifted over 
time. In the early industrialization phase in the West, leading innovators sel-
dom had much formal education; their innovations emanated from practical 
experience in workshops and production plants. This gradually changed when 
specialized engineering schools were established in late nineteenth century 
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Europe and the USA, followed by the formation of R&D departments in 
large engineering firms in the early twentieth century (Rosenberg and Birdzell 
1986; Mowery and Rosenberg 1998). Today, exceptional cases notwithstand-
ing, most innovation emanates from team efforts that bring together skills 
and knowledge from different sources. The EOE perspective illustrates this 
through its emphasis on the need for several actors and competencies to real-
ize the benefits of innovation. A new idea is only the first step in a knowledge- 
intensive innovation and commercialization process, and if new knowledge is 
to translate into economic growth, entrepreneurs must exploit it by introduc-
ing new methods of production or new products in the marketplace 
(Schumpeter 1934 [1911]; Michelacci 2003; Bhidé 2008).
In Chap. 2, we discussed reforms in the system of IPR that would increase 
the access to and availability of new ideas. Here, we once more embrace the 
principle of justifiability, since it is necessary to carefully balance private and 
public interests when discussing reforms to address the positive externalities 
involved in the accumulation of human capital and the availability of a broad 
and diversified pool of high-quality knowledge in collaborative innovation 
blocs. The principle of neutrality helps us safeguard the European value of 
universal access to high-quality education, whereas the principle of contest-
ability ensures that challengers can compete for knowledge, skills, and skilled 
employees on a level playing field.
We should note that proposals referring to educational systems will usually 
be directed at EU member states, since the Union’s competencies regarding 
education are limited (Suse and Hachez 2017, pp. 73–74). In contrast, poli-
cies supporting R&D and on-the-job human capital accumulation already 
make up a substantial share of the EU annual budget and have been well situ-
ated within the competencies of the EU since the Lisbon Treaty. As to innova-
tion, the European Commission is looking into how existing regulatory 
frameworks in a host of relevant areas affect innovation, striving “to collect 
further suggestions on the relationship between innovation and regulation, 
indications of regulatory barriers to innovation and suggestions for simpler, 
clearer and more efficient regulation supporting growth and jobs” (Suse and 
Hachez 2017, p. 76).1 The role and competencies of local and regional poli-
cymakers in this area are typically found at the base of the educational insti-
tutional framework in European member states.
1 The EU may also influence member states’ educational policies through coordination processes, such as 
the open method of coordination (OMC), recommendations, and incentive measures.
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7.2  Proposals
In all likelihood, an excellent educational system from kindergarten through 
and including the university level would provide entrepreneurial ventures 
with a rich and diverse pool of human capital. Casual observation suffices to 
conclude that there is significant variation across the EU in how educational 
systems are set up, financed, and managed—as well as in how they perform. 
Given this diversity, one-size-fits-all reforms, such as allocating more public 
funds to the educational system, are not the answer.
Consider the evidence provided in internationally comparable tests of 
pupils’ abilities and skills, the most important of which are the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA; OECD 2016b) and the Trends in 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS; Mullis et al. 2016). Human capital, 
as measured in these tests, is of crucial importance for economic growth 
(Hanushek and Woessman 2015), but the link between educational expendi-
tures and test scores is far from homogenous. While high educational spend-
ing accompanies good results in Finland (especially at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century), it is associated with weak results in Sweden.2 Whereas 
pupils in Poland and Estonia achieve excellent results despite relatively low 
educational spending, Romania and Bulgaria spend little and do poorly (see 
Table A.5  in the Appendix for details). An immediate implication is that 
naïvely implemented increases in educational budgets are unlikely to promote 
a more entrepreneurial society.
Undoubtedly, teacher quality is critical for pupil achievement on these tests 
(Goe and Stickler 2008), but still more critical factors are a detailed, coherent, 
and carefully sequenced curriculum organized around subject disciplines 
(Hirsch 2016b; Christodoulou 2014) and external exit exams ensuring that 
schools are held accountable for their performance (Woessman 2016). The 
exam content governs the content of teaching, provides adequate guidance to 
developers and publishers of textbooks and other teaching materials, and 
makes it possible to benchmark schools. That said, centralized exams and cur-
ricula limit diversity and possibly creativity almost by definition. As such, 
they may tempt teachers and pupils to “teach to the test,” possibly forgetting 
about the cultivation of other useful skills and the preservation of a critical 
2 Granted, measuring inputs and outputs and comparing the quality of education across and even within 
educational systems is notoriously difficult. We focus on measures that ensure international comparabil-
ity. PISA is done every 3 years and measures 15-year-old pupils’ knowledge in mathematics, science, and 
reading. TIMSS is done every 4 years and measures the knowledge of fourth- and eighth-graders in 
mathematics and science. In 2015, 72 countries participated in the PISA tests and 57 countries in the 
TIMSS test.
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attitude. Moreover, personality traits and family background matter for the 
performance of individual pupils (Johnson et  al. 1983; Downey 1995; 
Magnusson et al. 2006), blurring the relationship between educational inputs 
and outputs and eventual success in the labor market (Winding et al. 2013). 
Consequently, the link from national performance in international tests to 
economic growth may be positive, but strong causality is hard to establish. 
The link to successful entrepreneurial venturing is even less evident.
The USA is a case in point. Though commonly believed to be the most 
innovative and entrepreneurial of all countries, government spending on edu-
cation is intermediate, while private spending is substantial (2% of GDP 
compared to an EU average of 0.5% of GDP; see OECD 2018b, p. 207). 
Despite this high total spending, US pupils perform poorly in all three PISA 
knowledge areas, particularly in mathematics, yet they do exceptionally well 
in entrepreneurial venturing. The USA may be the exception that confirms 
the rule—or an indication that supporting an entrepreneurial mindset in edu-
cation is not a matter of spending more resources or inserting business model 
canvassing into the national curriculum. A strong knowledge base is essential, 
but evidence also suggests that entrepreneurship is best taught in an experien-
tial, learning-by-doing manner (Elert et al. 2015).
The essence of entrepreneurship is trial and error and learning from failure, 
hinting at the importance of fostering a positive attitude towards learning 
among pupils. To achieve this goal, it is important that the early stages of an 
educational career are characterized by positive learning experiences (Illeris 
2006; Sanders et al. 2015) and that they instill a tolerance for failure and an 
appreciation of trial and error (Clifford 1984; Clifford et al. 1988; Metcalfe 
2017). Therefore, we propose the following:
Proposal 41: Reforms in primary and secondary education should provide 
pupils with a solid and coherent knowledge base and promote initiative, creativ-
ity, and willingness to experiment.
We do not propose, as some have (Griffin and Care 2014; Lazonder and 
Harmsen 2016), that the actual acquisition of knowledge be neglected in 
favor of skills training or purely curiosity-driven learning. Entrepreneurship is 
so broad, diverse, and uncertain that it is impossible to predict the specific 
knowledge that entrepreneurial ventures need. The educational focus should, 
therefore, be on broad and generic bodies of knowledge, rather than on highly 
specialized topics and fields.
Moreover, pupils and students should be challenged, not pleased: human 
capital of a mathematical and natural science orientation, for example, has 
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been shown to be important for science-based entrepreneurship (Shavinina 
2013; Dilli and Westerhuis 2018). Indeed, this type of entrepreneurship typi-
cally delivers the most scalable and growth-enhancing innovations, and the 
most successful entrepreneurs in the world tend to have advanced technical 
degrees from international universities (Henrekson and Sanandaji 2014). It 
would seem, therefore, that an educational system that makes it easy for stu-
dents to avoid challenging topics such as science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics (STEM) would do the entrepreneurial society no favors. As 
Dilli and Westerhuis (2018) argue, early efforts to promote STEM (not least 
among young girls) would be a way to promote more ambitious entrepreneur-
ship in the long run.
Similarly, because scaling a venture in Europe also often implies crossing 
national borders, there is a clear case for training effective international com-
munication skills at early stages of the educational career, when such skills are 
relatively easy to train (Krashen et al. 1979; Collier 1995; Flege et al. 1999). 
In line with our principles of neutrality and justifiability, we therefore propose 
the following:
Proposal 42: Promote STEM education and English as a (mandatory) second 
language early on and then throughout students’ educational careers.
The proposal aligns well with the European Commission’s Entrepreneurship 
2020 Action Plan, including measures that induce students to be more entre-
preneurial and encourage a focus on STEM fields. Bringing an entrepreneur-
ial spirit to European curricula is a key ingredient in almost any strategy to 
create an entrepreneurial society. We stress that this should start early 
(Jayawarna et  al. 2014), but a great deal can be done to make students in 
tertiary education more entrepreneurial as well.
Students typically make a crucial human capital decision at the end of sec-
ondary school when they decide whether to work or pursue tertiary educa-
tion. In light of this fact, it is notable that tertiary enrolment has exploded in 
recent decades, which is evident from the first column of Table 7.1. The fact 
that the enrolment rate is high in many of the poorest EU countries, notably 
Greece, Bulgaria, and the Baltic countries, suggests that high enrolment rates 
per se are no guarantee that university studies have a high social rate of return, 
especially not in an entrepreneurial society.
The educational quality at the earlier levels largely determines how much 
one can expect and demand from students at the tertiary level. If their earlier 
education has been deficient, fewer students will be willing or able to choose 
more demanding lines of study, notably science and engineering. The second 
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column in Table 7.1 confirms that such education matters more in European 
countries than in the USA (see also Fig. A.4 in the Appendix).
The demonstrated importance of engineering skills for entrepreneurship 
notwithstanding, more technical graduates in no way equates to more suc-
cessful entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, universities can teach students entrepre-
neurial skills even when they are learning about other topics by making 
academic research and teaching more action-oriented and aimed at real-world 
experience; a mindset of trial and error and learning from failure is, after all, 
something all pupils should embrace (Sanders et al. 2018c). Moreover, to the 
extent that there are specific courses in entrepreneurship, they should be 
taught by people who have been involved in entrepreneurial venturing (rather 
Table 7.1 Tertiary enrolment and graduates in science and engineering in EU countries 












Greece 117.4 29.9 Portugal 62.9 27.9
Finland 87.0 29.5 Czech Rep. 64.0 23.2
USA 85.8a 17.4 Italy 62.9 23.3
Spain 91.2 23.9 Sweden 62.3 26.0
Slovenia 80.0 25.7 France 65.3 25.3
Denmark 81.1 20.5 Croatia 67.5 25.3
Austria 83.5 30.3 Germany 66.3 36.4b
Netherlands 81.8 14.1 Hungary 48.0 22.8
Ireland 83.5 24.9 UK 57.3 26.1
Estonia 72.0 26.5 Slovakia 52.7 21.1
Belgium 74.6 17.4 Cyprus 60.1 15.9
Lithuania 66.0 23.8 Romania 48.0 28.8
Poland 66.6 22.9 Malta 48.8 18.0
Bulgaria 71.2 19.7 Luxembourg 19.7 13.8
Latvia 68.2 20.5
Note: The ratio of total tertiary enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the 
age group that officially corresponds to the tertiary level of education. Tertiary 
education, whether or not aiming at an advanced research qualification, normally 
requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the successful completion of education 
at the secondary level. The share of graduates in science and engineering is defined as 
the share of all tertiary graduates in science, manufacturing, engineering, and 
construction over all tertiary graduates
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UIS online database (2010–2017)
a2015
bData from http://data.uis.unesco.org/index.aspx?queryid=163 measuring “graduates 
from Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics programmes in tertiary 
education”. In addition, Germany had 22.0% “graduates from tertiary education 
graduating from Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction programmes” in 2016
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than by tenured university researchers lacking hands-on experience, as is all 
too often the case; see, e.g., Sanders et al. 2018a).
European educational systems differ from the USA in a fundamental 
respect: the private rates of return to education and analytical skills are much 
lower (see Table A.6 in the Appendix). Consequently, Europe cannot finance 
its university systems through high tuition fees that students subsequently 
recover by means of a highly paid job after graduation. Since their expected 
lifetime incomes are not high enough, we believe the EU should not opt for 
the American model of high private (out of pocket) investments. Instead, the 
Union should strive for accessibility to ensure an adequate supply of well- 
trained technical personnel. Given the niches in which the EU competes in 
global markets, such a supply is crucial for its entrepreneurial society.
Proposal 43: Invest in high-quality tertiary level technical education by attract-
ing excellent teaching staff and students and by strengthening Europe’s strong 
tradition of vocational training.
This general recommendation translates into different interventions 
depending on the member state. For example, the UK’s educational system 
provides world-class university education, but vocational and on-the-job 
training falls short of the country’s needs (Sanders et al. 2018c). Thus, its bril-
liant new start-ups struggle to hire and retain the human capital required to 
compete on quality in global markets. In contrast, the German university 
system fails to provide excellence, while the vocational training and appren-
tice systems support a world-class manufacturing apparatus (Sanders et  al. 
2018b). In Italy, curricula are challenging and people may be well educated, 
but traditional curricula are a poor match for dynamic market demand 
(Sanders et al. 2018a).
When discussing tertiary education, it is necessary to emphasize the impor-
tance of university campuses. Evidence shows that campuses can be hotbeds 
of entrepreneurial venturing (Audretsch 2014), and some of the Europe’s 
campuses have already realized that potential (e.g., Chalmers in Gothenburg, 
Sweden: Jacob et al. 2003; Dahlstrand 2007; Lundqvist 2014). If others are 
to follow, policymakers need to take measures that enable several university- 
level links to function efficiently. Notably, for knowledge-based entrepreneur-
ship to flourish, universities must have incentives to align subject areas with 
business sector demand and to facilitate knowledge transfer from academia to 
the entrepreneurial sector. The USA may serve as an important role model here.
That said, the US system of granting property rights for patentable research 
findings to universities is unlikely to be beneficial in Europe, given that 
7 Mobilizing Human Capital for Entrepreneurship 
110
European universities are typically government owned.3 Existing research 
shows that abolishing the “professor’s privilege” (i.e., the university research-
er’s rights to acquire IPR by patenting ideas stemming from their own research) 
has negative effects on patenting and knowledge commercialization in coun-
tries where universities are state owned (Hvide and Jones 2018; Färnstrand 
Damsgaard and Thursby 2013; Goldfarb and Henrekson 2003).
The fact that Continental Europe operates just behind the global technol-
ogy frontier (Acemoglu et al. 2017) suggests that its prevalence of vocational 
education and on-the-job-training compensates for a lack of innovative, 
entrepreneurial campuses. In addition, semi-public knowledge institutes 
(such as the Fraunhofer Institut and Max Planck Society in Germany, the 
CNRS in France, and TNO and ECN in the Netherlands) complement the 
European university system, diffusing scientific knowledge into commercial 
activity and society at large (Agrawal 2001; Bergman 2010; Perkmann et al. 
2013).4 To be sure, incumbent firms are often the partners of choice in this 
more institutionalized European system of knowledge diffusion. By also sup-
porting students and researchers striving to creating new and competing ven-
tures, European universities could aid in the transition to an 
entrepreneurial society.
However, most European systems of higher education are currently ill 
equipped to take on such a role. For one thing, they are too centralized; 
European universities tend to be government owned and tax financed, with 
the entry of private universities being disallowed or highly restricted (Aghion 
et al. 2007, 2008; Jongbloed  2010). The Union’s universities should be given 
more flexibility to respond to the needs of regional collaborative innovation 
blocs, where demanding customers serve as crucial sources of information 
regarding consumer needs and preferences (von Hippel et  al. 2011). Here, 
academic entrepreneurs can show how to commercialize new knowledge and 
research. Furthermore, it is important to actively engage with societal partners 
outside of academia, such as corporations, governments, NGOs, and civil 
society organizations. Reaching out more to such external stakeholders would 
expose students and staff to more opportunities for useful application of new 
knowledge in social or commercial ventures.
3 Much research examines the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act that established this incentive in the USA 
(Popp Berman 2008; Leydesdorff and Meyer 2010). The EU’s and many European countries’ efforts to 
emulate its success have met mixed results (Siepmann 2004; Mowery and Sampat 2004), likely because 
the same institutional reform works out very differently in different national contexts.
4 Wikipedia lists 106 such institutes in France, 173 in Germany, and 64 in the Netherlands. The US total 
is 405, suggesting that they are far more prevalent in Europe.
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Proposal 44: The link between universities and external stakeholders should be 
strengthened by encouraging universities to stimulate entrepreneurial initiatives 
and university spinoffs.
There are already successful examples of such collaborations, bringing busi-
ness to science and science to business (Jacob et  al. 2003; Hommen et  al. 
2006; Castillo and Meyer 2018). Successful incubators managed by European 
universities ranking in the global top 20 include Bath in the UK, Politechnico 
di Milano in Italy, Chalmers ventures in Gothenburg, Sweden, and London’s 
South Bank University. More European incubators are affiliated with and col-
laborating with universities (Castillo and Meyer 2018). Such joint efforts may 
be especially crucial in high-technology fields; for example, universities and 
their faculties have encouraged local economic development by improving the 
ability of new and incumbent firms to use biotech research (Zucker et  al. 
1998; McKelvey et  al. 2003; Okubo and Sjöberg 2000; Link and Swann 
2016; Amoroso et al. 2018). If they learn from such examples, European poli-
cymakers will be better placed to stimulate academic entrepreneurship and 
accelerate the commercialization of university-developed inventions of great 
potential value (Goldfarb and Henrekson 2003; Kauffman Foundation 2007; 
Link and Swann 2016; Amoroso et al. 2018).
A shift towards excellence is also required if academic entrepreneurship is 
to flourish. European universities already pay lip service to excellence (Vogel 
2006; Corradi 2009; Hallonsten and Silander 2012; Wolfensberger 2015), 
but the reality is that few of them rank among the top universities globally.5 
Europe’s strategy of providing a high-quality university education to the aver-
age student worked very well in the age of “the managed society” (Audretsch 
and Thurik 2000) when the rapid adoption of new knowledge in multina-
tional industrial firms was sufficient to maintain a viable competitive position 
(Acemoglu et al. 2006; Audretsch et al. 2017). Following the rise of Asia, this 
strategy must now be complemented with policies allowing Europe’s best and 
brightest to excel.
The challenge is to turn (some of ) the EU’s universities into world-class 
institutions while safeguarding the distinct inclusive character of university 
education (Aghion et al. 2008). A sensible way to reach higher is to broaden 
the base. Europe’s university research and education systems are still nation-
ally organized and fragmented. Differences are often deeply rooted, which 
5 Whereas seven UK universities can be found among the 50 highest ranked universities, only five univer-
sities from the rest of the EU appear (three from Germany, one from Belgium, and one from Sweden) 
(Times Higher Education 2018).
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complicates efforts to create an integrated European Research Area (European 
Commission 2012). Indeed, the Union respects member states’ prerogatives 
in this area. For example, EU leadership acknowledges the existence of 28 
national research systems funded from national tax revenues and states that 
these member state-specific systems “will remain distinct in so far as this ben-
efits the EU and individual Member States, allowing Europe to capitalize on 
its scientific, cultural and geographical diversity” (European Commission 
2012, p.  3). This obliging attitude sometimes hampers the exchange and 
mobility of both students and academic staff and may be a chief reason why 
so little actual progress has been made. Most students still study in their coun-
try of birth, and only the most productive and innovative researchers are truly 
mobile (Karamanis and Economidou 2018).
A push for more openness in the national science foundations could 
strengthen the integration of the EU’s knowledge base. National borders and 
nationality should, after all, be irrelevant in regard to basic research. Therefore, 
it is worth pondering whether all EU researchers should be eligible for fund-
ing by all member states’ national research funding agencies. Such a change 
would be relatively easy to implement, but it entails a non-negligible risk that 
the already strong universities and knowledge centers will be the big winners, 
further concentrating world-class research in leading countries at the expense 
of laggards.
Of course, the top-ranked universities in the USA and elsewhere maintain 
their position precisely by attracting the best and brightest from a large popu-
lation of students. Today, these institutions compete for the best and brightest 
from all over the world. Perhaps geographical concentration is simply the 
price we have to pay for academic excellence, and as long as all Europeans 
have equal access, the problem may be tolerable. Before considering a reform 
in this direction, however, policymakers should strive to ensure that all coun-
tries develop an intellectual environment capable of identifying and honing 
citizens’ talents, absorbing research findings and applying them commercially. 
To level the playing field before introducing healthy competition, there is a 
need to nurture a sound academic environment in all member states, thereby 
paving the way for a much needed top-level European research environment 
(Aghion et al. 2008).
Proposal 45: Both the EU and its member states should create healthy, well- 
funded, academic institutions that allow Europe’s most talented academics to 
pursue their research interests.
The specifics matter for the implementation of such a proposal, and they 
differ across countries. In Germany, for example, this proposal may be 
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 interpreted as a call for increased public funding for universities, which despite 
their strong educational focus have seen a steep decline in their spending per 
student (Füller 2017; Sanders et al. 2018b). By contrast, Italy should first take 
measures to open up academic institutions characterized by deeply entrenched 
vested interests and gilded contracts; before such structural issues are addressed, 
it makes little sense to spend much money (Sanders et al. 2018a).
Competition on excellence among universities will inevitably create 
regional knowledge concentration, especially given the importance of net-
works in academic research and economies of agglomeration. This concentra-
tion should be considered as normal and acceptable between member states as 
it is between regions within countries. Likewise, successful entrepreneurial 
ecosystems and industrial clusters follow an economic logic that is not neces-
sarily politically convenient. There is little doubt that geographic proximity 
facilitates knowledge spillover and knowledge transfer among networks and 
collaborations (Jaffe et al. 1993; Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Ponds et al. 2007; 
Arzaghi and Henderson 2008; Rosenthal and Strange 2008).
These findings hint at a potential role for governments, national and local, 
in promoting urbanization, local networks, and clusters (Andersson and 
Henrekson 2015). Today, clusters are considerably more common in Western 
European countries, but they could help facilitate entrepreneurship in Eastern 
and Mediterranean Europe as well if policymakers enable a greater transfer of 
knowledge between businesses and knowledge-creating organizations (Moretti 
2012; Moretti and Thulin 2013). Strong, dynamic clusters are bottom-up 
phenomena that can emerge anywhere (Klepper 2016) and should be allowed 
to form endogenously. However, policy and institutional reforms can improve 
initial conditions. For one thing, they can reform real estate markets so that 
housing prices reflect scarcity and preferences; where appropriate, they should 
also liberalize zoning laws and remove any red tape that could curb cluster 
development (Glaeser 2008, 2011). Local policymakers should also provide 
an infrastructure that allows smooth transportation and commuting.
Proposal 46: Liberalize, where possible, spatial planning regulations to allow the 
endogenous clustering of business activity rather than trying to plan clusters 
from the top down.
Furthermore, policymakers should keep in mind the late Steven Klepper’s 
(2016) persuasive findings that industry clusters can gain momentum through 
entrepreneurial spinoffs from existing firms. In the USA, it seems that many 
spinoffs and spinouts result from conflict and strategic disagreement between 
R&D workers and their managers (e.g., Klepper 2002, 2009; Klepper and 
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Thompson 2010). In the more consensual European context, a system of col-
laborative, open innovation characterized by intrapreneurship and consensual 
spinouts may well serve a similar function; at least in the UK, spin-off ven-
tures are on average more innovative and successful than those started without 
industry experience (Sanders et al. 2018c; Wennberg et al. 2011). The same is 
probably the case elsewhere in the Union. Currently, however, incumbent 
firms likely shelve many potentially valuable R&D projects because they do 
not fit these firms’ strategies and interests.
It may be worthwhile to encourage entrepreneurial R&D workers to spin 
off and develop such projects as independent ventures. Another option would 
be to promote intrapreneurship—entrepreneurship by employees. Judging by 
the evidence to date, intrapreneurship seems well aligned with the Nordic 
welfare state and the  Rhineland consensus model (Henrekson and Roine 
2007; Bosma et al. 2010), perhaps because intrapreneurship depends crucially 
on management practices and employee autonomy in the workplace, phe-
nomena that, in turn, stem from a high level of generalized trust (Elert et al. 
2019; Ljunge and Stenkula 2018). While trust is not easily stimulated through 
institutional reforms, policymakers should permit the many European firms 
that already experiment with intrapreneurship (Bosma et al. 2013, 2014) to 
keep doing so. Hopefully, careful study of intrapreneurship can teach us how 
to develop more targeted interventions in the future.
Returning to the role that knowledge plays in an entrepreneurial society, we 
should note that scientific knowledge is a pure public good (Nelson 1959; 
Romer 1990; Salter and Martin 2001; Pavitt 1991)—channeling more money 
to basic research that provides positive knowledge spillovers throughout the 
Union would therefore seem like a no-regrets policy. Furthermore, R&D 
spending is positively associated with a greater patenting rate (Elert et  al. 
2017). However, it does not follow from these facts that a policy of increased 
government R&D spending or subsidies will result in more economically 
valuable knowledge.6 Public R&D can crowd out private R&D: the share of 
R&D in the business sector that is directly or indirectly funded by the govern-
ment tends to be lower in countries with high R&D spending by business 
enterprises and higher in countries with low R&D spending by businesses 
(Table A.7 in the Appendix). Furthermore, patenting and R&D are inputs in 
the production process; the desired output—higher value creation—depends 
on many more steps along the way.
6 Da Rin et al. (2006) examined 14 European countries between 1988 and 2001, without finding any 
positive relationship between public R&D spending and the rate of innovation (defined as the share of 
high-tech and early-stage venture capital investments).
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For these reasons, it is probably better to promote R&D—and ultimately, 
scientific knowledge—through the pull of demand rather than through the 
push of supply. A broad policy program conducive to innovative entrepre-
neurial venturing will likely spontaneously increase R&D spending and allo-
cate it efficiently as a side effect. Conversely, if a well-functioning entrepreneurial 
ecosystem is not already in place, a government push to increase R&D 
becomes a waste of resources, directing focus and resources towards factors 
that would have found better use elsewhere in the European economy. 
Spontaneous, demand-driven increases in R&D expenditures should be pre-
ferred over any top-down designed alternatives, as it is next to impossible for 
a bureaucracy to “pick the winners.” Instead, policies and reforms should aim 
to mobilize and incentivize the available resources to flow to their most pro-
ductive use, including R&D.
People always create knowledge; policymakers should, therefore, begin by 
increasing the pool of talented and highly motivated individuals able to dedi-
cate time to research. As such, educational reforms must aim to increase the 
stock and quality of home-grown human capital. The aging European econ-
omy would also do well not to ignore the pool of talent available abroad. In 
this respect, the European Commission’s Blue Card Directive, while laudable, 
is problematic because it remains reserved exclusively for highly qualified 
employees (Eisele 2013). The Directive explicitly refers to this group as “man-
agers and specialists” who are required to have (and hold) a formal labor con-
tract with a minimum salary that may differ per member state but that is 
invariably high. In its current guise, therefore, the Blue Card system has little 
to offer entrepreneurial start-ups in Europe. It certainly does not promote the 
immigration of entrepreneurs, who are typically not specialists with high sala-
ries but “jacks-of-all-trades” possessing a broad and balanced skill mix (Lazear 
2005). A college drop-out with a wild idea (like Bill Gates when he founded 
Microsoft) would currently not qualify for a Blue Card. In line with our prin-
ciple of neutrality, we therefore propose to reform the Blue Card system in a 
direction that makes it more conducive to an entrepreneurial society.
Proposal 47: Reform the European Blue Card system to also include nonem-
ployees and people lacking high formal educational credentials provided they 
have a plan to support themselves and the requisite equity to start a via-
ble business.
Furthermore, entrepreneurship should not be promoted by picking win-
ners but by creating an environment in which winners thrive. To that end, 
policy initiatives should support firms that experiment with a clear market 
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focus in mind, much like the US Small Business and Innovation Research 
Program (SBIR), a highly competitive program encouraging domestic small 
businesses to engage in federal research and development with the potential 
for commercialization. However, whereas SBIR by and large has been success-
ful in stimulating innovation (Lerner 1999; Wessner 2008), similar initiatives 
by EU member states have thus far had mixed and limited success (Camerer 
and van Eijl 2011; Apostol 2017).
Hopefully, that track record can improve: according to Apostol (2017), a 
key success factor for such programs is that they predominantly tender high- 
risk R&D projects to small and young firms, and public program managers 
play a critical role by carefully selecting these projects based on a sound under-
standing of market and technological trends. Moreover, a tolerance for failure 
is essential, and an EU equivalent to the US SBIR program should not be a 
backdoor to protecting local and domestic firms from foreign competition. It 
seems, therefore, that SBIR-type programs are best suited for countries with 
high-quality public sectors, low risk of corruption, and a strong tradition of 
small industrial firm R&D. Strict enforcement of nondiscrimination clauses 
is also essential. Thus, in line with the principle of contestability, we propose:
Proposal 48: Develop highly competitive programs encouraging small busi-
nesses to engage in research and development with the potential for 
commercialization.
Of course, IPR are essential to ensure strong incentives for knowledge cre-
ation and diffusion. In Chap. 2, we made several proposals to improve the 
balance between just rewards and positive externalities in the IPR system. 
These reforms are relevant here as well. As we noted in Chap. 2, a core issue is 
to weigh the interests of inventors against the positive spillover effects of 
knowledge diffusion. We would add that although bureaucrats should not try 
to pick winners, policymakers may have a legitimate role to play in formulat-
ing challenges for entrepreneurs (Montalvo and Leijten 2015; Mazzucato 
2018). SBIR-like programs would be one way for political bodies to support 
and direct the activities of entrepreneurs. By challenging entrepreneurs to 
develop innovative solutions to well-defined social challenges, such programs 
provide clear market signals, even if the customer is the taxpayer. Such tar-
geted support can also be justified if one expects strong positive externalities; 
in the European setting, this would be the case for international partnerships 
for innovation, in which public and private parties cooperate to address spe-
cific innovation challenges.
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Proposal 49: Support international partnerships for innovation through specific 
innovation challenges.
The European Commission’s Horizon 2020 program already has this struc-
ture. For the most part, it sets clear innovation challenges and invites interna-
tional consortia to enter an open competition for the funds. The solution to 
the problem articulated in a call is rarely the only positive outcome of such 
grants, as lasting collaborations across the Continent are established in the 
process. In an interim evaluation, the European Commission (2017c) reported 
that some 75% of Horizon 2020 funding benefited international collabora-
tions, which, in nine cases out of ten, benefited EU-28 research institutes and 
researchers. It is too early to tell if the connections forged in European proj-
ects will have lasting impact and sustain a more integrated European Research 
Area, but we believe that incentivizing researchers to collaborate across bor-
ders is an effective way to make progress in this area.
Horizon 2020 and similar public R&D programs typically select a few 
proposals on a predefined call before commissioning the research. By contrast, 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the use of innovation challenges 
often took the specific form of prizes. Such challenge-based prizes yielded 
substantial progress in such varied fields as navigation, air voyage, and food 
preservation (Abramowicz 2003; Shavell and van Ypersele 2001). The compe-
titions are specific, in the sense that they stipulate a clear goal to be achieved—
say, the development of a climate-neutral technology for transportation—but 
can be formulated in an open-ended way in regard to matters of technology. 
Furthermore, technology inducement prizes are exempt from the welfare loss 
that comes from the monopoly rents associated with patents (Adler 2011) and 
do not require an extensive bureaucracy that assesses and evaluates proposals 
and credentials ex ante.7 While a social loss due to duplication of effort is 
likely to occur, a prize does imply that the public pays a clear and pre-set 
amount only when the problem gets solved.
The prize philosophy currently guides the XPRIZE Foundation, a non-
profit organization that designs and manages public competitions intended to 
encourage technological development that could benefit humanity. The same 
is the case for Sir Richard Branson’s Virgin Earth Challenge, awarding 25 
million dollars to “a commercially viable design which results in the removal 
of anthropogenic, atmospheric greenhouse gases so as to contribute materially 
7 An evaluation of the web page Innocentive, where firms and organizations announce rewards to problem- 
solvers, reveals that the best solutions often originate with outsiders who are neither researchers nor work 
in the relevant field (Lakhani et al. 2007).
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to the stability of Earth’s climate.” Though huge, that prize sum is small in 
 comparison to what governments throughout the world spend annually on 
energy- and climate-related research, as well as in comparison to the projected 
costs should humanity fail to stop climate change. European countries could 
easily emulate the same philosophy, combining a minimal risk to taxpayers 
with innovation encouragement that does not commit to specific firms or a 
particular technology. Moreover, a prize can be made transparent, neutral, 
and contestable by design. We therefore propose the following:
Proposal 50: Institute technology inducement prizes to further the development 
of commercially applicable knowledge in socially important areas, such as cli-
mate change, health care, and education.
Obviously, it is always possible that collaborations emanating from pub-
licly funded knowledge creation have spillover effects that benefit third-party 
countries or private parties and might be perceived as free riding on European 
funds (e.g., Mazzucato 2015). From the point of view of an entrepreneurial 
society, however, it would be wise to allow private firms, even from third- 
party countries, to use publicly generated knowledge at zero marginal cost.
The problem is not that they use “our” knowledge but that the knowledge 
in question is sometimes used to secure socially inefficient rents for the benefit 
of the few. Ultimately, it is a good thing that a firm like Apple uses vast 
amounts of knowledge—even if some of that knowledge was initially devel-
oped with public funds in European university labs. The act of taking the risk 
and putting all that knowledge together in a well-designed and functional 
smartphone entitles the firm to a handsome reward. This emphatically does 
not mean that Apple should be allowed to patent some design features and use 
those patents to prevent competitors from entering the same market.8 
Unfortunately, such practices do occur, but they do not justify a stop on pro-
moting publicly funded research ex ante, nor should policymakers seek to 
recover such public funds ex post through taxation or the exclusion of foreign 
partners. Instead, the goal should be to maximize the social benefits and con-
sumer surplus by enforcing full disclosure and contestability, in IPR as well.
8 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc._v._Samsung_Electronics_Co. for an entertaining descrip-
tion of the Smartphone War in which Samsung and Apple have been engaged since 2011. Burnick (2017) 
offers a more academic account of the Supreme Court Ruling.
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7.3  Summary
The European entrepreneurial society will bring inclusive and innovative 
growth only if its citizens are educated and able to act on the opportunities 
that arise. Educational reform tailored to national preconditions is essential in 
equipping Europeans for a productive and fulfilling future in that society. 
Knowledge and innovation clustering will inevitably result in regional dispari-
ties but should not be considered a problem as long as Europeans can partici-
pate and benefit from such clustering regardless of their place of birth. The 
principles of neutrality and contestability ensure that the entrepreneurial soci-
ety will be inclusive at all levels, whereas a clear focus on excellence and soci-
etal challenges through public procurement, prizes, and public research 
programs can ensure the innovativeness and sustainability of growth.
In Table 7.2, we list the proposals made in this chapter. As seen, the appro-
priate level of policymaking differs quite a bit: For the reforms in the educa-
tional system, member states or even regional and local authorities possess the 
necessary legal competencies, but the EU can and should support their 
actions. Likewise, the policies and institutions supporting local and regional 
knowledge and entrepreneurship clusters will typically take shape in the inter-
action between universities and local authorities. In contrast, the European 
Commission should be able to address innovation policy, as the Lisbon Treaty 
gave it the budget and legal competencies necessary to do so.
Table 7.2 Summary of proposals regarding mobilizing human capital for entrepre-
neurship, specifying the level in the governance hierarchy where the necessary deci-
sions should be made
No. Principle(s) Policy area Proposal
Policy 
levela
41 Neutrality and 
contestability
Education system Reforms in primary and secondary 
education should provide pupils 
with a solid and coherent 
knowledge base and promote 





42 Neutrality and 
contestability
Education system Promote STEM education and 
English as a (mandatory) second 






Education system Invest in high-quality tertiary 
level technical education by 
attracting excellent teaching staff 
and students and by 
strengthening Europe’s strong 
tradition of vocational training.
MS
(continued)
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Table 7.2 (continued)









The link between universities and 
external stakeholders should be 
strengthened by encouraging 
universities to stimulate 










Both the EU and its member 
states should create healthy, 
well-funded, academic 
institutions that allow Europe’s 
most talented academics to 








Liberalize, where possible, spatial 
planning regulations to allow the 
endogenous clustering of 
business activity rather than 





47 Neutrality and 
contestability
Immigration Reform the European Blue Card 
system to also include 
nonemployees and people 
lacking high formal educational 
credentials provided they have a 
plan to support themselves and 






Innovation policy Develop highly competitive 
programs encouraging small 
businesses to engage research 







Innovation policy Support international 
partnerships for innovation 






Innovation policy Institute technology inducement 
prizes to further the development 
of commercially applicable 
knowledge in especially 
important areas, such as climate 
change.
EU
aEU federal level, MS member state level, REG regional government level, LOC local/
municipal level
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Making Entrepreneurship Policy 
or Entrepreneurial Policymaking
Europe faces what some have dubbed an innovation emergency. Following 
the global financial crisis, the Union’s challenge has been to return to a path 
of inclusive, sustainable, and innovative growth. This challenge, we believe, 
can only be overcome by a strategy acknowledging the importance of entre-
preneurship, especially the type of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship that 
introduces new products and technologies and serves as a conduit of new 
knowledge to generate innovation and progress. To understand how to pro-
mote an entrepreneurial society, policymakers must recognize the crucial 
importance of collaborative innovation blocs, their agents, the roles these 
agents play, and how the blocs interact with the institutional framework that 
surrounds them. Indeed, tracing these components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem helped us identify the institutional areas in need of reform if Europe 
is to transform into a more entrepreneurial society.
We argued that an entrepreneurship-friendly reform strategy, to be coher-
ent, must be informed by a set of common principles, which we identified for 
each area under discussion. In total, the result was a list of six principles: neu-
trality, transparency, moderation, contestability, legality, and justifiability. When 
tailored to local, regional, and national conditions, a reform strategy inspired 
by these principles is Europe’s best chance to maintain its position in the 
global world order given the challenges we face in a globalized world increas-
ingly steeped in digitalization.
To illustrate how these principles might be enshrined in Europe’s diverse 
institutional landscape, we have proposed institutional reforms pertaining to 
six broad areas:
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 1. The rule of law and the protection of property rights: The rule of law and 
secure property rights are fundamental to any market economy. To under-
stand how they can be strengthened in an entrepreneurship-friendly man-
ner across the EU, we first emphasize the principle of legality, i.e., 
considering de facto rather than de jure institutions. In regard to the pro-
tection of property rights, however, these cannot be absolute; property 
rights applying to intangibles and intellectual property in particular require 
a careful balancing of public and private interests to ensure justifiability. A 
clear and actionable reform agenda presents itself here given the European 
Commission’s competencies in international negotiations on these issues.
 2. Taxation: Taxation shapes and biases the incentives for corporations, indi-
viduals, and organizations in a multitude of ways, which are often detri-
mental to entrepreneurial venturing. Sometimes, reforms that explicitly 
favor entrepreneurship yield strong positive external effects, in line with 
the principle of justifiability. More often, we argue for a level playing field 
to ensure neutrality and moderate taxation to restore or maintain market 
incentives. The EU’s limited competencies in this area mean that tax 
reforms in support of a more entrepreneurial society are chiefly the domain 
of member states.
 3. Savings, finance, and capital: Europe’s history has left most EU member 
states with a largely bank-based, highly regulated system of financial mar-
kets that predominantly “locks up” savings in professionally managed 
funds and assets. In such a system, entrepreneurial investees without col-
lateral, strong balance sheets or long track records are fighting an uphill 
battle for credit and financial resources. We propose to aim for neutrality 
and transparency and level the financial playing field to restore contestabil-
ity. Of course, there is a fundamental public interest in financial stability, 
especially in the payment and store-of-value functions of money. In line 
with the principle of justifiability, these valid considerations must be 
acknowledged but not allowed to prevent well-designed public interven-
tions that enable the financial sector to mobilize more of Europe’s ample 
financial resources for entrepreneurial ventures. Proposals are mostly 
addressed at the EU level, as competencies for reform are increasingly del-
egated to the European level.
 4. Labor markets and social security systems: These institutions largely deter-
mine the allocation of human resources, notably skilled labor, to entrepre-
neurial ventures. Systems are typically tilted in favor of large, stable 
incumbent firms, which implies that experimental, innovative ventures are 
at a disadvantage. Our proposed reforms aim to improve the situation for 
entrepreneurs in Europe by making rights more transparent and portable 
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and security more universal and unconditional. Such portability and 
unconditionality ensure neutrality and contestability for human resources, 
whereas flexibility for entrepreneurs must be balanced against security for 
employees, according to the principle of justifiability. We primarily address 
proposals to the member states, as they retain most legal competencies in 
this area.
 5. Contestable markets for entry and exit: An area of strong and extensive EU 
competencies is the single market. Under that heading, Europe can do 
more to ensure that a vibrant entrepreneurial society can bloom across the 
Union. Lowered entry barriers are key to this reform area, and this is par-
ticularly true for services: especially in the semi-public and public domains 
of health, education, and similar services, there is room for productive 
venturing under appropriate constraints. Finally, to facilitate entry in many 
sectors, exit must also be well arranged, which motivates our proposals in 
the area of bankruptcy law and the smooth liquidation of outdated and 
failed ventures. The proposals in this chapter are addressed at national and 
European policymakers alike, as the EU has extensive competencies in 
regulating markets and competition, whereas health and education are the 
domain of member states.
 6. Mobilizing human capital for entrepreneurship: Since the Treaty of Lisbon, 
knowledge policy is firmly part of the Commission’s competencies, but we 
are yet to see institutional reforms aimed at building a truly European 
knowledge space. If realized, such a knowledge space would permit useful 
knowledge to flow freely to the benefit of incumbents and challengers 
alike. The large positive externalities justify public policy at the local, 
national, and European levels, whereas neutrality and contestability inevita-
bly lead to an endogenous clustering of knowledge and innovation across 
the Union.
Throughout the six chapters, we make no fewer than 50 reform proposals, 
the lion’s share of which are highly concrete. We hope that they will inspire 
policymakers, practitioners, and other readers of this book and provide a firm 
and principled idea of how a European reform agenda could look. Of course, 
policymakers will need to tailor most proposals to specific national and 
regional contexts; others may need to be reformulated or reconsidered. We see 
this as demonstrating the robustness of our approach and not as a weakness. 
There are already enough books where unquestionably talented economists 
present statistical inference and econometrics to support proposals that, 
ultimately, amount to an if-it-works-on-average-it-will-work-everywhere 
approach to reforms (see, e.g., Colander and Freedman 2018). As Rodrik 
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(2015) argues, no one model can be applied everywhere. All judicious policy 
advice is context dependent.
Benchmarking is useful, of course, as is learning from success elsewhere. 
However, one must always dig deep and uncover the full causal chain that 
explains success before naïvely starting to implement partial reforms. As no 
two institutions are built upon the same bedrock, it is better to identify the 
functions that a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem needs and then build insti-
tutions that perform those functions, perhaps differently in different places, 
but fitting in the local context.
That is not the same as saying “it all depends” and giving up on offering 
guidance. As long as reforms are informed by the core principles that enabled 
us to derive our proposals in the first place, reform adjustments and reformu-
lations are, in our view, a feature rather than a bug of our approach. The devil 
is in the details, and policymaking itself must therefore be an entrepreneurial 
process. Institutional reforms should go through rapid cycles of experimenta-
tion, learning, and pivoting until policymakers find suitable and satisfactory 
solutions. Ultimately, these solutions may end up looking different from what 
we have proposed above, but the general principles should still shine through. 
Below, we identify several points to which followers of our strategy 
should adhere.
First, a European reform agenda striving to create an entrepreneurial soci-
ety needs sophistication. It falls to reformers and other practitioners to pack-
age the proposed principles into institutional designs sensitive to local 
constraints and opportunities. The identification of best-practice institutions 
is a sine qua non for any reform agenda to be successful, but so is the recogni-
tion that a first-order economic principle such as market competition does 
not map onto one single policy package. No unique correspondence exists 
between functionally good institutions and the form that such institutions 
take; in fact, policymakers must choose between several institutional bundles, 
each with the potential to achieve the desired economic and social ends. The 
bundle that is the most appropriate will depend upon the context. At best, 
misguided reforms that ignore this fact do not work, plain and simple. At 
worst, a thoughtless introduction of supposedly first-class institutions can 
backfire, undermining existing domestic institutions instead of taking hold 
(Rodrik 2008).
Second, a reform agenda must be appropriately concrete. Most historical 
and econometric studies of institutions and growth tend to remain at a high 
level of generality and do not provide much policy guidance (Besley and 
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Burgess 2003; Rodrik 2008).1 Here, we have attempted to go beyond abstract 
reasoning, drilling down to the specific effects of particular measures. Much 
more work is required in this respect before an entrepreneurial reform agenda 
is realized, but we hope to have proceeded further down the ladder of con-
creteness than most other books and articles with similar aims.
Third, a reform agenda must prioritize. The EOE and VoC perspectives are 
valuable for understanding how. The EOE perspective identifies which insti-
tutions matter the most for the key actors in collaborative innovation blocs, 
whereas the VoC perspective groups countries with respect to their institu-
tional frameworks, hinting at the institutional complementarities within a 
particular cluster of countries (Dilli et al. 2018). Here, an essential part of 
future work is to identify and suggest the removal of the so-called institutional 
bottlenecks (Acs et al. 2014). Doing so will make it possible for researchers 
and policymakers to assess the problems that should be the top priority within 
a cluster. Furthermore, countries in a cluster can be more or less successful, 
and their relative rank within the cluster has important informational and 
practical value for any reform process. Rather than trying to leapfrog directly 
to a point of institutional bliss, a laggard country should try to become more 
like the leader in its cluster in the short and medium term. This goal is likely 
to be attainable by virtue of its relative modesty and because the reforming 
country then aspires to something that has been tried before in a similar insti-
tutional context.
Fourth, the reform process should be incremental and leave room for 
experimentation rather than imitation without reflection. From a 
Schumpeterian (and, arguably, Popperian) perspective, the quest to develop 
an optimal set of legal rules ignores a central feature of successful economic 
development, namely, the fact that institutions and organizations in a com-
petitive environment continuously contest, innovate, and adapt. Reforms 
that are tailor-made to a country’s specific constraints and opportunities 
through experimentation during a discovery process will likely be more ben-
eficial than reforms based on mere imitation (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003; 
Sabel and Reddy 2007). Nevertheless, given the complexities involved, it is 
important to keep in mind that simple legal principles are often preferable to 
a detail-oriented case-by-case approach. Indeed, one possibility is to strive for 
the sort of “simple rules for a complex world” advocated by Epstein (2009).
1 For instance, although it is very useful to know that inclusive institutions introduced in colonies in the 
sixteenth century persist to this day and can be instrumented with settler mortality in that era (Acemoglu 
et al. 2001), that leaves us with preciously little actionable policy advice.
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Finally, a reform agenda should dig into the local context. An offshoot of 
the FIRES project is presently conducting urgent work in this direction that 
will culminate in the book The Entrepreneurial Society: Tailoring a Reform 
Strategy to Local Institutions, edited by Axel Marx, Mark Sanders, and Mikael 
Stenkula. If the reform proposals in this book form a menu of options, this 
second book will show how to assess an entrepreneurial ecosystem and how 
that assessment should be used to select those proposals that are most relevant 
to a particular local, regional, and national context. Together, the two vol-
umes help reformers address the most urgent and pressing problems and 
choose specific designs that achieve the goal and fit the context. Our explicit 
formulation of our reform agenda’s underlying principles gives direction to 
that exercise, while our proposals may inspire policymakers to look beyond 
the limits of traditional entrepreneurship policy.
The EU needs a new and appealing narrative. By offering real opportunities 
for all, the entrepreneurial society provides an urgently needed optimistic 
answer to the stifling populist conservatism that has swept across Europe and 
put the European project in jeopardy. The recipes of neoliberal reformers have 
failed to deliver for significant parts of Europe’s constituency, and the current 
debate simply cannot support another round of “structural reforms” naïvely 
liberalizing product, service, labor, and capital markets. Instead, the EU needs 
to start building an institutional environment that brings appealing opportu-
nities to all of its citizens. By directing its citizens’ abundant creativity, talent, 
and resources towards new venturing, Europe can return to socially inclusive, 
ecologically sustainable, and innovation-driven growth. This will not turn the 
gilets jaunes into a happy and docile electorate. But it will provide the defend-
ers of an open European society with more ammunition to turn the populist, 
nationalist tide and goes a long way towards protecting the European project 
that has brought peace and prosperity to most of the Continent for the 
past 70 years.
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Fig. A.2 The net replacement rates of unemployment benefits in EU countries and the 
















Fig. A.3 Ease of starting a business in EU countries, the USA, and the leading country, 
2019. Note: The ranking of economies on the ease of starting a business is determined 
based on their distance to frontier scores for starting a business. These scores are the 
simple average of the distance to frontier scores for each of the component indicators. 




















Fig. A.4 Share of 25- to 34-year olds with upper secondary or postsecondary non-ter-
tiary education in EU countries and the USA, 2017. Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 
2018, p. 55
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Table A.1 European countries with wealth taxation, 2019
Country Tax rate, %
Top rate applies or 
exempted amount Comments
France 0.5–1.5 Above €10 million Exempted amount: €1.3 million 
(per household)
Italy 0.2/0.76 No exemption 0.2% on financial assets held 
abroad and 0.76% on real estate 
held abroad except if primary 
residence
Liechtenstein 0.1–1.12 CHF 200,000 2.5–2.8% income tax on 4% on 
net wealth (= a net wealth tax of 
0.1–1.12%)
Luxembourg 0.5 Only applies for corporations
Moldova 0.8 MDL 1.5 mio 
exempted
For real estate (except land)
Netherlands 1.2 30% income tax on a fictitious 
return of 4% on financial assets 
(= a net wealth tax of 1.2%)
Norway 0.85 NOK 1.48 mio p.p. 
exempted
Spain 0.2–2.5 Exemption € 700,000; 
top rate above  
€ 10.7 million
Habitual dwellings exempt up to 
€300,000




and the respective national tax agencies websites
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Top rate on 
amount > Comments
USAa 0–40 $5.6 mio $5.6 mio Some states levy an 
additional inheritance tax
Austria n/a Abolished 2008
Belgiumb 3–55 0 €75,000
Bulgaria 0.4–0.8 €128,000 For direct descendants, up to 
6.6% for others
Croatia 0–5 HRK 50,000 n/a HRK 50,000 ≈ €6700
Cyprus n/a Abolished 2001
Czech Rep. n/a Abolished 2014
Denmarka 15 DKK 289,000 Flat rate DKK 289,000 ≈ €39,000
Estonia n/a
Finland 0–33 €20,000 €1 mio
France 5–60 0 €1.8 mio
Germany 7–50 0 €6 mio
Greece 10 €400,000 €220,000
Ireland 33 €325,000 n/a
Italy 4 €1 mio n/a
Latvia n/a
Lithuania 0 €3000 €150,000 n/a for family members
Luxembourg 0–1.5 €10,000 €1.75 mio
Malta n/a % stamp-duty for inherited 
immovable property
Netherlands 10–20 €19,868 €117,214
Norway n/a Abolished 2014
Poland 0–20 PLN 9637 PLN 20,557 PLN 20,557 ≈ €5000
Portugal n/a Abolished 2004
Romania n/a
Slovakia n/a
Slovenia 5–39 €5,000 Exemption applies to direct 
descendants
Spain 7.65–34 €15,957 €797,555
Sweden n/a Abolished 2004
Switzerland 0/6 Zürich/Geneva
UKa 40 £325,000 £325,000 If ≥10% to charity, rate 36%
Note: In most cases the same tax rate applies to in vivo gifts
Source: Ernst and Young (2018), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
ey-worldwide-estate-and-inheritance-tax-guide-2018/$FILE/ey-worldwide-estate-and-
inheritance-tax-guide-2018.pdf and the respective national tax agencies websites
aThe estate rather than the inheritance lot allocated to each heir is taxed; Denmark 




Table A.3 Rules limiting the deduction of interest expenses by firms in European coun-







Austria n/a n/a Claimed to have equally effective  
legislation; derogation denied by the EC
Belgium 30 €3 mio
Bulgaria 30 €3 mio
Croatia 30 €3 mio
Cyprus 30 €3 mio
Czech Rep. 30 CZK 80 mio CZK 80 mio ≈ €3 mio
Denmark 30 DKK 22.3 
mio
DKK 22.3 mio ≈ €3 mio
Estonia 30 €3 mio
Finland 25 €3 mio
France 30 €3 mio
Germany 30 €3 mio
Greece 30 €3 mio
Ireland n/a Claimed to have equally effective  
legislation. Derogation denied by the EC
Italy 30 n/a
Latvia 30 €3 mio
Lithuania 30 €3 mio
Luxembourg 30 €3 mio
Malta 30 €3 mio
Netherlands 30 €1 mio
Norway 25 NOK 25 mio NOK 25 mio ≈ €1 mio
Poland 30 PLN 3 mio PLN 3 mio ≈ €0.7 mio
Portugal 30 €1 mio
Romania 30 RON 4.6 mio RON 4.6 mio ≈ €1 mio
Slovakia 25 n/a
Slovenia n/a n/a Thin cap rule of debt-to-equity ratio of 4:1
Spain 30 €1 mio 30% of the calculation base (adjusted 
operating income)
Sweden 30 SEK 5 mio SEK 5 mio ≈ €0.5 mio
Switzerland n/a n/a Notional interest deduction on safety equity, 
i.e., equity which exceeds the average equity 
required for business operations
UK 30 GBP 2 mio GBP 2 mio ≈ €2.2 mio
Note: In implementing ATAD II, most countries have exercised their right to exclude 
financial undertakings. Among member states of the EU, only Greece, France, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Spain had legislation deemed by the European Commission to be equally 
effective to the interest limitation rule as specified in Article 4 of the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive
Source: https://www.ibfd.org/IBFD-Tax-Portal/News/New-Tables-Monitor-Anti-Tax-
Avoidance-Directive-implementation and the websites of the various national tax 
agencies
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Table A.4 Effective tax rate on stock options in selected countries, 2012
Country Tax rate, % Country Tax rate, %
Australia 24.8 Japan 50.5
Canada 31.9 Netherlands 25.0
China 45.0 Norway 50.8
Denmark 55.3 Portugal 56.5
Finland 51.3 Singapore 20.0
France 29.9 South Korea 61.5
Germany 47.5 Spain 52.0
Hong Kong 15.0 Sweden 54.3
Ireland 7.4 Switzerland 51.5
Israel 25.0 UK 28.0
Italy 72.2 USA 15.0



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.6 Before tax educational premiums and return on analytical/numerical ability 




Return on analytical/ 
numerical ability
USA 11.1 USA 27.9
Poland 10.1 Ireland 24.1
Germany 9.5 Germany 23.5
Slovakia 9.5 Spain 22.8
Cyprus 8.9 UK 22.5
UK 8.5 Poland 19.1
Ireland 8.5 Netherlands 18.3
Netherlands 8.2 Austria 17.9
Spain 7.9 Slovakia 17.9
Austria 7.7 Estonia 17.9
Estonia 7.4 France 17.4
Finland 6.8 Belgium 14.9
Belgium 6.2 Finland 14.2
Czech Rep. 5.9 Cyprus 13.8
France 5.5 Denmark 13.7
Denmark 5.5 Italy 13.2
Italy 5.3 Czech Rep. 12.4
Sweden 4.2 Sweden 12.1
Note: The educational premium is defined as the relative increase in the wage that can 
be attributed to an additional year of schooling. The return on analytical/numerical 
ability is defined as the relative increase in the wage that results from a one standard 
deviation increase in a person’s PIAAC score for numeracy. All EU countries in the 
Hanushek et al. study are included in the table
Source: Hanushek et al. (2015)
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Table A.7 Direct government funding of business R&D and tax incentives for R&D, 











funding as % of 
total BERD
Austria 0.13 0.14 0.27 8.8
Belgiuma 0.11 0.28 0.39 15.7
Czech Rep. 0.08 0.06 0.14 8.3
Denmark 0.05 0.08 0.13 4.5
Estonia 0.06 0.00 0.06 4.7
Finland 0.07 0.00 0.07 2.6
Francea 0.11 0.28 0.39 17.4
Germany 0.07 0.00 0.07 2.4
Greece 0.03 0.05 0.08 7.9
Hungary 0.20 0.15 0.35 29.0
Irelanda 0.07 0.29 0.36 30.6
Italy 0.04 0.04 0.08 6.2
Netherlands 0.02 0.15 0.17 8.4
Poland 0.05 – 0.05 5.2
Portugal 0.05 0.10 0.15 11.8
Slovakia 0.02 0.003 0.02 2.9
Slovenia 0.07 0.12 0.19 9.5
Spain 0.06 0.06 0.12 10.1
Swedena 0.13 0.05 0.18 5.5
UKa 0.10 0.13 0.23 13.6
USAb 0.18 0.07 0.25 9.1
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2017
a2014
b2013
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